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ABSTRACT 
 
 
In 2003, a conflict broke out in Darfur, Sudan’s western province, between the mainly 
“African” rebels and the government forces and their proxy “Arab” militias. It is estimated 
that about 200,000 people have so far died in the conflict from fighting, disease, and 
starvation. The UN and aid agencies estimate that over two million Darfurians, out of the 
population of about six million, are living in refugee camps. Even though the majority of all 
deaths in Darfur have occurred in 2003 and 2004, the conflict is nowhere near the end. 
 
Even after more than five years since the Darfur conflict began, there is hardly any 
comprehensive information about the rebels’ aims, objectives, and plans for the future. We 
cannot fully understand the conflict and plan peace negotiations between the warring parties 
if we do not know enough about the rebels.  
 
This study has critically explored the aims and perspectives of the Justice and Equality 
Movement, currently the most powerful Darfur rebel movement. The author has used the 
first-hand information gathered through interviews with the representatives of the rebel 
movement and additional data about the conflict and the rebels collected through an extensive 
literature analysis to portray the movement and its aims, perspectives, and plans for the 
future. Using the grounded theory approach as the data analysis tool, the author has presented 
key findings about the Darfur conflict from the perspective of the Justice and Equality 
Movement that have emerged from the data collected in this study. 
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CHAPTER ONE – GENERAL INTRODUCTION 
 
 
1. Introduction 
 
This chapter will introduce the study, present the aims and objectives, and the author’s 
motivation and interest for this topic. The author will briefly discuss research design and 
methodology, type of sample, methods of data collection and analysis, validity and reliability, 
and ethical considerations. The chapter will present limitations and significance of the study, 
the plan for dissemination of the findings, and the structure and format of the study.  
 
The aim of this qualitative study is to critically explore the Darfur conflict and the future of 
the region from the perspective of the Justice and Equality Movement (JEM), currently the 
most powerful Darfur rebel movements. In 2003, a conflict broke out in Sudan’s western 
province of Darfur between the mainly “African” rebels and the government forces and their 
proxy “Arab” militias.1 It is estimated that about 200,000 people have so far died in the 
conflict from fighting, diseases, and starvation. The World Health Organization estimates that 
about 20% people died from fighting and violence, while 80% died from starvation and 
diseases. The UN and aid agencies estimate that over two million Darfurians, out of the 
population of about six million, are living in refugee camps (BBC Online, 6 September 2007; 
Heleta, 29 May 2008). Even though the majority of all deaths in Darfur have occurred in 
2003 and 2004 (Natsios 2008), the conflict is nowhere near the end. 
 
Two loosely connected rebel movements, the Justice and Equality Movement and the Sudan 
Liberation Movement, began attacking the government forces in Darfur in April 2003. Both 
groups listed political, economic, and social marginalization of the region as the main causes 
of the rebellion (Baldo 2006). The majority of the rebels came from Darfur’s “African” 
sedentary ethnic and tribal groups Fur, Zaghawa, and Massaleit (International Crisis Group 
2006). In response to the rebellion, the government of Sudan mobilized and armed local 
militias from Darfur’s “Arab” groups to fight against the rebels. The Sudanese army 
supplied the militias with weapons and equipment and supported their attacks on the rebels 
and civilians with military intelligence and air bombings (Prunier 2005: 98).  
                                                
1
 The terms “Africans” and “Arabs” in Darfur are placed in inverted commas since this issue is very complex 
culturally, racially, and linguistically. Due to the centuries of intermarriage, the divide is not straightforward. 
Often, belonging to one group or another is determined by a way of life (Prunier 2005: 4-5). This will be 
discussed in more detail in chapter four. 
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In May 2006, the government of Sudan and one faction of the Sudan Liberation Movement 
signed the Darfur Peace Agreement (DPA), while another SLM faction and the Justice and 
Equality Movement refused to sign it. Signing of the DPA, instead of bringing peace, only 
intensified fighting and deteriorated the humanitarian situation in Darfur (International Crisis 
Group 2007a). The agreement damaged relationships among the rebel groups and led to 
leadership struggles and fragmentation along ethnic and tribal lines. It is estimated that 
currently there are over twenty rebel movements and factions in Darfur. According to the 
BBC (10 May 2008), “very little, other than the names, is known about the composition, 
leadership, and numbers of the breakaway groups.” 
 
Alex de Waal (2006c), a program director at the Social Science Research Council and the 
author of many books about Sudan and Darfur, believes that “the crisis in Darfur is political. 
It’s a civil war, and like all wars it needs a political settlement.” According to the UN 
Secretary General, Ban Ki-moon, the main obstacle to a peaceful solution to the conflict is 
the “lack of political will among all the parties to pursue a peaceful solution” (Sudan Tribune, 
17 April 2008). Jean-Marie Guehenno, UN’s peacekeeping chief, claims that the situation in 
Darfur “has grown infinitely more complex and prospects for peace now seem more remote.” 
Guehenno thinks that there is no political will on any side “to abandon the military option, 
engage in negotiations, or fully cooperate with UNAMID [United Nations Mission in Sudan] 
and the humanitarian community” (Reuters, 15 May 2008). 
 
 
1.1. Statement of the problem 
 
Even after almost six years since the Darfur conflict began, there is hardly any 
comprehensive information about the rebels’ aims, objectives, and plans for the future. We 
cannot fully understand the conflict and plan peace negotiations between the warring parties 
if we do not know enough about the rebels. 
 
This study will critically explore the aims and perspectives of the Justice and Equality 
Movement, currently the most powerful Darfur rebel movement. The author will use the first-
hand information gathered through interviews with the official representatives of the 
movement and additional data about the conflict and the rebels collected through a literature 
analysis to portray the movement and its aims, perspectives, and plans for the future. 
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1.2. Aims and objectives of the study 
 
1.2.1. Aims 
 
• Explore why the Justice and Equality Movement began the rebellion;  
• Explore what the JEM wants to achieve; 
• Contribute to a better understanding of the Darfur conflict. 
 
1.2.2. Objectives 
 
• Present the Justice and Equality Movement’s perspectives about the causes of the 
conflict; 
• Present the JEM’s perspectives about the possible solutions to the conflict and the 
future of the region. 
 
 
1.3. Motivation for the study 
 
The author is a Masters student in Conflict Transformation and Management at Nelson 
Mandela Metropolitan University in Port Elizabeth, South Africa. His primary research 
interests are conflicts within states, deep-rooted conflicts, conflicts over basic human needs, 
and negotiations that can bring lasting peace. Since August 2007, the author has focused his 
research activities primarily on the Darfur conflict as this is currently one of the main conflict 
hotspots and humanitarian disasters in the world. The author has written and published 
extensively about Sudan and Darfur in newspapers and magazines in Sudan, Europe, Middle 
East, and the United States.2 His research papers on Darfur and Sudan have been listed on the 
website of the Chr. Michelsen Institute, an independent centre for research on international 
development and policy from Norway, as some of the essential readings on the conflict in 
Sudan and the current conflict in Darfur.3 
 
The author’s passion for the field of conflict transformation and management has been 
shaped by his wartime experience during the civil war in Bosnia and Herzegovina in the 
1990s. He is the author of Not My Turn to Die: Memoirs of a Broken Childhood in Bosnia 
                                                
2
 Links to author’s articles can be found at http://www.savoheleta.com/index_files/news.htm  
3
 Research papers on Sudan and Darfur on Chr. Michelsen Institute’s website: 
http://www.cmi.no/sudan/?id=33&Darfur-Peace-Process  
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(March 2008, AMACOM Books, New York). In the book, he gives a testimony about the 
suffering in his childhood and demonstrates the personal struggle and search for the strength 
to choose peace, reconciliation, and hope over hatred and revenge. The International Crisis 
Group calls the book “a gripping and compelling story of the nobility of good and banality of 
evil… a fascinating piece of memoir literature from Bosnia.” Having survived the horrors of 
the Bosnian war, the author has dedicated his life to peace building and conflict 
transformation and management worldwide. 
 
 
1.4. Research design and methodology 
 
The methodology used in this exploratory qualitative study is the interpretive research 
methodology. Since the aim of the interpretive social science is to learn about individuals and 
their views, perspectives, interpretations, and experiences (Neuman 2006: 88), the author 
believes that this research methodology is the most appropriate for a study of the aims and 
perspectives of one of the Justice and Equality Movement.  
 
To analyze the data collected in the study, the author has used the grounded theory approach, 
one of the main analytical tools in qualitative social science research (Babbie and Mouton 
2001: 53). Denscombe (2007: 92) argues that this approach is particularly useful when social 
researchers want to “investigate the participants’ points of view.” Being derived from the 
data, grounded theories and findings closely and accurately explain human actions and 
behaviour (Sarantakos 2005: 118). 
 
Even though the grounded theory approach is mainly used to generate theories about studied 
topics, the author’s goal is not to develop a grounded theory that explains the perspectives of 
the rebels or the conflict in Darfur. Instead, he will present key findings about the conflict 
from the perspective of the Justice and Equality Movement. The author believes that more 
research is needed and other rebel groups and other parties in Darfur and Sudan need to be 
included in the sample in order to come up with a grounded theory. Strauss and Corbin 
(1998: 155) note that the grounded theory approach can be used even if the “ultimate research 
goal is to arrive at a set of findings rather than theory development.” In this case, researchers 
present their findings without the final integration of concepts and categories and 
development of a theory.  
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1.5. Interpretive social science and qualitative research approach 
 
The interpretive social science is a research paradigm whose primary goal is to “understand 
human behaviour and actions” (Sarantakos 2005: 12). The purpose of interpretive research is 
to learn about individuals and their experiences, “develop an understanding of social life, and 
discover how people construct meaning in natural settings” (Neuman 2006: 88). Interpretive 
researchers think that people’s statements and behaviours usually have different meanings 
and cannot be seen as standardized. Because of this, they rarely conduct surveys to collect 
facts. They believe that only qualitative data collection methods such as careful and extensive 
interviews, case studies, and participant observations can give them enough credible data 
about people (Berg 1995: 3; Henn, Weinstein, and Foard 2006: 14). 
 
Interpretive researchers use the qualitative research approach in order to conduct “systematic 
analyses of socially meaningful actions” and understand how humans relate to each other and 
“create and maintain their social worlds” (Neuman 2006: 88). The qualitative research 
approach emphasizes that the facts are “fluid and embedded within a meaning system” and 
depend on a complex web of people and events in a specific setting (Neuman 2006: 92-93). 
This approach holds that social reality is not stable and has no repeating patterns. Instead, 
people and their interactions, views, actions, and beliefs shape reality (Neuman 2006: 89). 
 
 
1.6. Type of sample 
 
The sample for this study was based on non-probability purposive and theoretical sampling 
strategies, which lead researchers to choose participants according to their “relevance to the 
research question and analytical framework” (Schwandt 2007: 269). The author has 
interviewed the representatives of the rebel Justice and Equality Movement and included 
them in the sample. 
 
 
1.7. Data collection 
 
To gather the first-hand data about the Justice and Equality Movement, the author has 
conducted extensive semi-structured interviews with the representatives of the movement. 
Semi-structured interviews are believed to be one of the best methods for a study of this type 
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(Neuman 2006: 92-93). Due to the safety concerns and the lack of funds, the author was not 
able to travel to Darfur and conduct face-to-face interviews with the rebel movement 
officials. Instead, the interview questions have been emailed to the JEM representatives, 
which they answered and returned to the author. The author was able to probe the participants 
with additional questions during the data analysis process. 
 
In addition to the interviews, the author has conducted an extensive literature analysis and 
consulted a wide range of sources (books, academic journals, news articles and interviews, 
NGO publications, and statements from the rebel movement) in order to get a better picture 
of the Darfur conflict and the aims and perspectives of the Justice and Equality Movement. 
The literature analysis has been used to either confirm or contradict the data collected through 
the interviews or bring in new arguments and views. 
 
 
1.8. Data analysis 
 
To analyze the data collected in this study, the author has used the grounded theory approach. 
This approach is used in qualitative social research and employs a “systematic set of 
procedures to develop an inductively derived grounded theory about a phenomenon” (Strauss 
and Corbin 1990: 24). Glaser and Strauss (1967: 1), the founders of the grounded theory, 
argue that this data analysis approach helps social researchers to generate theories from “data 
systematically obtained and analyzed.” Babbie (2007: 54) writes that the grounded theory is 
an approach used to construct theories “through the inductive method by first observing 
aspects of social life and then seeking to discover patterns that may point to relatively 
universal principles.”  
 
The grounded theory approach is one of the most common methods used for the qualitative 
data analysis and specifically in exploratory research (Henn, Weinstein, and Foard 2006: 198-
199). Since the grounded theories and findings are derived from the data, they closely and 
accurately explain human actions and behaviour (Sarantakos 2005: 118). Strauss and Corbin 
(1998: 155) note that this approach can be used even if the “ultimate research goal is to arrive 
at a set of findings rather than theory development.” In this case, researchers present their 
findings without the final development of a grounded theory.  
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Denscombe (2007: 93-94) notes that some researchers take the grounded theory approach to 
the extremes and “start research without any fixed ideas about the nature of the things that are 
about to be investigated.” Researchers who use the grounded theory approach in this way do 
not conduct a review of literature before data collection. On the other hand, the majority of 
researchers who use the grounded theory approach conduct a literature review and explore a 
historical background of their topics in order to prepare themselves for the research. This 
author has conducted an extensive review of literature in order to develop a better 
understanding of the history of Sudan and Darfur, the current conflict in Darfur, and the 
concepts that are important for this study. 
 
 
1.9. Validity and reliability 
 
The author has used semi-structured interviews and literature analysis to get multiple 
perspectives and confirm the credibility and authenticity of the study and findings. The study 
was planned and conducted in an accurate and professional manner to ensure its validity, 
reliability, credibility, and trustworthiness. 
 
 
1.10. Ethical considerations 
 
To protect the participants from any harm, the author has asked them to remain anonymous in 
the study. Anonymity will ensure that the participants are unidentifiable to protect their 
identity after the study is made public. In addition, the author has guaranteed confidentiality 
of the data collected during the interview process (Sarantakos 2005: 20-21). 
 
The interviews have been conducted on a voluntary basis and the participants were able to 
leave the process at any time. The process was based on informed consent, which was 
communicated to the participants prior to the interviews (see Appendix III). The participants 
voluntarily took part in the study fully understanding possible risks and consequences 
involved. They were informed of their right to decline to answer any questions they found 
inappropriate. The author has advised the participants not to reveal any politically sensitive 
information that may jeopardize them and their movement after the study and the findings are 
made public. 
 
 19
1.11. Limitations of the study 
 
This study focuses on the Justice and Equality Movement, one of the two original Darfur 
rebel movements. As noted above, it is estimated that there are currently over twenty rebel 
factions in Darfur. One of the main limitations of this study is the focus on only one rebel 
movement. This had to be done due to the time constraints and the author’s inability to reach 
other rebel movements and factions at this point.  
 
Sarantakos (2005: 350) argues that the main limitation of the grounded theory approach is a 
possibility of researchers being too subjective and having “high level of arbitrary decisions” 
in their studies. To limit subjectivity and arbitrary decisions, the author has kept an open 
mind throughout the research process and has based the findings solely on the data collected 
in the study.  
 
 
1.12. Significance of the study 
 
This study critically explores the Darfur conflict and the future of the region from the 
perspective of the Justice and Equality Movement, currently the most powerful Darfur rebel 
movement. To be able to fully understand the conflict and plan negotiations between the 
warring parties in Darfur, it is very important to explore why the rebels decided to start the 
rebellion and what they are trying to achieve. We need to know if their fight is political, 
economic, and/or existential and what the various rebel groups would like Darfur to become 
in the future - a more developed part of Sudan, an independent country, or something else. It 
is “vitally important to have access to [credible and up to date] information about the 
conflict” and the parties before any new peace talks, since one of the major “frustrations 
disputants regularly experience is the feeling that no one really understands” them and their 
problems (Bradshaw 2007: 89). 
 
The timing of this study is right because Darfur is currently one of the main conflict hotspots 
and humanitarian disasters in the world. The author hopes to contribute to a better 
understanding of the aims and perspectives of the Justice and Equality Movement, one of the 
main groups in the Darfur conflict, and inspire more research about this and other rebel 
movements and factions and the Darfur conflict in general. He hopes that his findings will be 
of value to organizations and institutions which decide to organize future peace talks to end 
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the Darfur conflict. 
 
 
1.13. Dissemination of the findings 
 
This study will be presented in the form of a treatise. A paper copy will be available in the 
Nelson Mandela Metropolitan University (NMMU) library. An electronic copy of the treatise 
will be available on the NMMU website, as well as on the author’s personal website.  
 
The participants will receive the final copy of the study in an electronic form after the study 
is completed. The author will summarize the study and findings and communicate the 
information to the media, international organizations working in the conflict management 
field, the Justice and Equality Movement, and all other interested parties. He will summarize 
the findings into a number of articles and analyses and publish them in newspapers and 
magazines around the world. 
 
 
1.14. Structure and format of the study 
 
This study consists of seven chapters which are summarized below:  
 
 
CHAPTER ONE – GENERAL INTRODUCTION 
 
This chapter introduces the study, presents the aims and objectives, and the author’s 
motivation and interest for this topic. The author briefly discusses research design and 
methodology, type of sample, methods of data collection and analysis, validity and reliability, 
and ethical considerations. The chapter presents limitations and significance of the study, the 
plan for dissemination of the findings, and the structure and format of the study.  
 
 
CHAPTER TWO – LITERARY REVIEW 
 
This chapter will review the literature consulted during the research process and focus of the 
concepts important for this study, such as the colonial legacies and post-independence state 
formation in Africa, dictatorship and personal rule, wars and displacement, human 
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aggression, protracted conflict and violence, rebellion, revolution, and counter-insurgency, 
and approaches to end conflicts. The author will also review some of the most important 
books, academic journals, and analyses about the history of Sudan and Darfur and the current 
conflict in Darfur. 
 
 
CHAPTER THREE – RESEARCH DESIGN AND METHODOLOGY 
 
This chapter will discuss in detail research design and methodology, sample, data collection, 
data analysis and the grounded theory approach, validity and reliability, ethical 
considerations, and limitations of the study. 
 
  
CHAPTER FOUR – HISTORICAL BACKGROUND: SUDAN AND DARFUR 
 
This chapter will explore historical roots of conflicts in Sudan and Darfur. The first part of 
the chapter will focus on Sudan under the colonial rule and post-independence divisions and 
conflict. The second part will focus on the Darfur province and the roots of the current 
conflict and rebellion.  
 
 
CHAPTER FIVE – RESEARCH FINDINGS 
 
This chapter will present research findings collected through semi-structured interviews with 
the representatives of the Justice and Equality Movement and an extensive literature analysis. 
The chapter will be divided into twelve sections that deal with the issues regarding the Darfur 
conflict and the aims and perspectives of the JEM. 
 
 
CHAPTER SIX – DATA ANALYSIS 
 
In this chapter, the author will conduct an analysis of the data presented in chapter five using 
the grounded theory approach. When appropriate, the author will refer to chapters two and 
four – Literature Review and Historical Background respectively – in order to either confirm 
or contradict the data collected through the interviews or bring in new arguments and views. 
This chapter will present key findings derived from the data. 
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CHAPTER SEVEN – CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
 
This chapter will reflect on the study and the process of data collection and analysis, present 
the summary of the research findings, and discuss the limitations and significance of the 
study. The author will give recommendations for further research and the Darfur peace 
process. 
 
 
1.15. Conclusion 
 
This chapter has introduced the study, presented the aims and objectives, and the author’s 
motivation and interest for this topic. The author has briefly discussed research design and 
methodology, type of sample, methods of data collection and analysis, validity and reliability, 
and ethical considerations. The chapter has presented limitations and significance of the 
study, the plan for dissemination of the findings, and the structure and format of the study.  
 
The next chapter will review the literature consulted during the research process and focus of 
the concepts important for this study, such as the colonial legacies in Africa, post-colonial 
state formation, dictatorship and personal rule, wars and displacement, human aggression, 
protracted conflict and violence, rebellion, revolution, and counter-insurgency, and 
approaches to end conflicts. The author will also review some of the most important books, 
academic journals, and analyses consulted for the study that focus on the history of Sudan 
and Darfur and the current conflict in Darfur in order to show the issues and arguments that 
are discussed and put forward by historians and experts. 
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CHAPTER TWO – LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
 
2. Introduction 
 
This chapter will review the literature consulted during the research process and focus on the 
concepts important for this study, such as the colonial legacies and post-independence state 
formation in Africa, dictatorship and personal rule, wars and displacement, human 
aggression, protracted conflict and violence, rebellion, revolution, and counter-insurgency, 
international community’s response to African conflicts, and approaches to end conflicts. The 
author will also review some of the most important books, academic journals, and analyses 
consulted in this study that focus on the history of Sudan and Darfur and the current conflict 
in Darfur.  
 
The first part of the chapter will show that the roots of many problems in Sudan and the rest 
of the African continent can be found in the colonial legacies. Dictatorship and personal rule 
after independence have disrupted the state formation and development in many African 
countries. As a consequence, wars have ravaged the African continent since the 1950s, Sudan 
being the country with the longest period of war and conflict in Africa. This chapter will also 
look at the causes of human aggression and conflict, violence, and group mobilization in 
general and Sudan in particular. The author will present the most important literature that 
attempts to explain the causes of rebellion, revolution, and counter-insurgency and examine 
why conflicts in Africa do not receive as much attention in the Western world as conflicts in 
the Middle East or Europe. The part of the chapter that focuses on ending conflicts will show 
that armed conflicts end either in a victory for one party or through negotiations. In the case 
of Darfur, neither side in the conflict is able to win through fighting. At the same time, 
negotiations to end the conflict have been unsuccessful until now. 
 
In the second part of the chapter, the author will review some of the most important books, 
academic journals, and analyses consulted for this study that focus on the history of Sudan 
and Darfur and the current conflict in Darfur. This part will show the issues and arguments 
that are discussed and put forward by historians and experts. The author will refer to the 
information presented in the literature review in chapter six, which will analyze the findings 
collected in the study using the grounded theory approach and present key findings that 
emerge from the data. 
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2.1. Colonial legacies in Africa 
 
Colonialism is defined as “control by one country over a dependent area or people.” The 
main aim of colonialism is to benefit the colonial powers in economic, political, and strategic 
terms (World Encyclopaedia 2005). Examining the colonial legacies in Africa is very 
important since the roots of many problems that African countries have faced since 
independence – from ethnic divisions, conflicts, economic dependencies, to personal rule and 
authoritarianism – can be found in the policies implemented on the continent by the colonial 
powers. Sandbrook (1985: 42) emphasizes that political and ethnic tensions in Africa after 
independence cannot be understood without putting them in the context of colonial times. 
Guest (2004: 111) notes that modern conflicts in Africa are rooted in “manipulation of tribal 
loyalties by the colonial authorities.” In order to successfully control the masses with a small 
number of soldiers and officials, the colonial powers often used the “divide-and-rule” policies 
that left divisions and hatred on the African continent. 
 
According to Mbeki (2005: 3), one of the main causes of wars and conflicts in Africa since 
independence had been the creation of arbitrary boundaries and new countries without any 
regard to ethnic and cultural differences. Sandbrook (1985: 42) notes that colonialists, while 
drawing the modern map of Africa, paid no attention to ethnic, cultural, and linguistic criteria 
and often put bitter enemies together or divided homogeneous groups into separate countries.  
 
Easterly and Levine (1997: 1214) claim that the high levels of ethnic diversity and 
widespread ethnic conflicts have also held back the economic growth in post-independence 
Africa. The goal of the African colonizers was not an economic boom and modernization of 
the continent, but the exploitation of African resources and labour. Mabogunje (2000: 14007) 
writes that during the colonial rule, Africa experienced economic growth but not sustainable 
economic development. Economic growth had been fuelled by the introduction of crops such 
as coffee, cocoa, tea, and cotton, extraction of minerals and other natural resources, and 
building infrastructure to support this exploitation. Sandbrook (1985: 21) argues that the 
colonial powers had installed barriers to industrialization and sustainable development in 
Africa by structuring the economies of the colonies “in a self-serving fashion. The benefits 
they obtained included secure sources of inexpensive raw materials and foodstuffs and 
markets for their manufactured goods.” Mabogunje (2000: 14008) notes that colonialists did 
nothing to help African countries develop, transform, and adopt their economies “to a 
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capitalist system of production or to enable them to sustain economic growth.” 
 
Colonial authorities ruled in Africa through “authoritarian administrative apparatuses, with a 
powerful governor at the helm” (Sandbrook 1985: 85). After independence, the majority of 
new African leaders would simply continue to rule in authoritarian fashion like their former 
colonizers (this will be discussed below in more detail). Political scientist Peter Schwab 
(2001: 26) writes about the destruction that colonialism left behind in Africa, thus limiting 
later success of independent African states: 
 
Independent Africa was given little opportunity to begin the era of freedom with 
much of a chance for political or economic success. Economies were destroyed, 
resources were all but stolen and removed to the Western metropolises, people were 
enslaved, ethnic harmony was sundered and often replaced by fratricide, 
elite/traditional dichotomies were provoked as normative and customary authorities 
were made impotent, politics was treated dismissively, while obsequious politicians 
were infantilized. 
 
The roots of modern tensions and conflicts in Sudan lie in the policies implemented by the 
British colonial administration between 1899 and 1956. The policies first separated the Arab-
dominated north and the African-dominated south and led to the southern underdevelopment. 
The decision by the British administration to reverse its policies and put the regions back 
together in the 1940s has led to the northern domination in post-independence Sudan 
(O’Ballance 2000: vii). In terms of the Darfur conflict, the British colonial administration 
completely ignored Darfur in economic, social, and political terms ever since Darfur became 
a part of Sudan in 1917; this in turn had set the stage for the future conflicts (de Waal 2004). 
Chapter four will discuss in detail the colonial influence and creation of divisions in Sudan. 
 
Colonial powers left some good things in Africa too, such as roads, laws, and clinics. Many 
African countries had higher per capita income levels before independence (Mbeki 2005: 2). 
Guest (2004: 9) writes that, “if only colonialism was what held Africa back, the continent 
would have boomed when the settlers left. It did not.” The reasons for this will be discussed 
in the next section that deals with the post-colonial state formation in Africa. 
 
 
2.2. Post-colonial state formation in Africa 
 
Independent African states that were once colonized faced a problem of “state formation 
 26
preceding nation formation” (Pieterse 1996: 25). In the case of Sudan, the country’s borders 
were drawn by the Europeans during the Congress of Berlin in 1886 and hundreds of tribes 
and ethnic groups without anything in common were forced to live together (Hutchinson and 
Smith 1996: 13). The majority of post-colonial African states proved to be unable to unify 
their societies politically and socially “out of the mosaic of ethnic fragments bequeathed by 
colonial administration” (Fenton 2003: 140). 
 
DeVos (1975; quoted in Eller 1999: 8) defines ethnicity as the “subjective symbolic or 
emblematic use of any aspect of culture by a group in order to differentiate themselves from 
other groups.” Schermerhorn (1996: 17) defines ethnic groups as collectives that have “real 
or putative common ancestry and memories of shared past.” Hutchinson and Smith (1996: 5) 
define ethnic identity as the “individual level of identification with a culturally defined 
collectivity, the sense on the part of the individual that she or he belongs to a particular 
cultural community.” In Sudan, cultural differences among the country’s tribes evolved over 
time and came to be seen as strict ethnic and even racial differences between the Arabs and 
Africans (Prunier 2005: 4). 
 
Enloe (1996: 198) argues that the most serious conflicts among different ethnic groups take 
place when they also differ in their religious beliefs and when their religions are 
“theologically and organizationally elaborate and explicit.” In the case of post-independence 
Sudan, Islam, Christianity, and animist religions were not able to live next to each other in 
peace and harmony mainly due to the aggressive attempts by the northern Arab elites to 
Islamize the rest of the country. This in turn has caused two long civil wars between the 
Christian and animist south and Muslim north. 
 
Political nationalism in newly independent African states required citizens to be “united and 
homogenous” despite their differences and this caused new conflicts in diverse states 
(Hutchinson and Smith 1996: 11). A “nation” is an “idea of peoplehood” that unifies diverse 
groups living inside a country’s borders (Fenton 2003: 162). Smith (1991; quoted in Eller 
1999: 17) defines a nation as a “named human population sharing a historic territory, 
common myths, historical memories, common economy, and common legal rights and duties 
for all members.” Eller (1999: 17) emphasizes that many people in Africa do not see 
themselves as members of their nations when Smith’s definition above is taken into 
consideration. In Sudan, the country created by the European powers in the nineteenth 
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century, different tribes and ethnic groups never had any of the above in common prior 
colonization.  
 
Having a country’s formal citizenship does not automatically mean emotionally belonging to 
that nation. “Belonging is where the sociology of emotions interfaces with the sociology of 
power, where identification and participation collude, or at least aspire to or yearn for (Yuval-
Davis 2004: 216). In Sudan, the southerners have hardly ever identified with the northern 
Sudanese or participated in the post-independence nation building on equal terms. Since 1955 
and the outbreak of the first civil war in Sudan, the majority of southerners fought for 
independence, or at least autonomy of their region (Bechtold 1976: 37; Holt and Daly 1979: 
204). 
 
 
2.3. Dictatorship and authoritarianism in Africa 
 
Dictatorship is the “absolute rule without the consent of the governed.” In states ruled by 
dictators, freedom of expression is limited and “representative democracy is often abolished 
or exists as a mere formality.” Authoritarianism is a “system of government that concentrates 
power in the hands of one person or small group of people not responsible to the population 
as a whole.” In most cases, authoritarian regimes suppress the opposition and press freedom 
(World Encyclopaedia 2005).  
 
Since independence, the majority of African countries were at some point led by dictators and 
authoritarian leaders. Their primary goal was staying in power and enriching themselves and 
a small group of their followers while ignoring the citizens of their countries. Dictatorship 
and authoritarianism on the African continent are a legacy of the colonial rule further 
developed by many African leaders after independence. Quoting Francis Sutton, Hyden 
(2003: 26) writes that “authoritarianism in African states is – perhaps paradoxically – a 
feature of government in which there is a basic continuity from colonial to African control.”  
 
Dictators, surrounded by often unqualified but loyal individuals in all strategic positions, are 
one of Africa’s biggest problems (Sandbrook 1985: 90; Mabogunje 2000: 14007). In many 
African countries dictatorship, authoritarianism, and personal rule create “patron-client 
relationships, largely based on familial and ethnic loyalties.” Those who are on good terms 
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with the leaders and elites are able to get government contracts, jobs, and loans, while the rest 
of the population and the country’s economy suffer. This model of governing is disastrous for 
the long-term economic development of any country, “with the pursuit of personal 
aggrandizement and short-term political advantage leading to economic irrationality” (Meier 
and Rauch 2000: 67). Under such governance, more money and capital had been taken by 
African dictators and elites and sent to their overseas bank accounts than the amount of the 
foreign aid and investments that came to Africa after independence (Mbeki 2005: 2). Ayittey 
(1998: 343) explains how authoritarianism and elitism in Africa have caused economic, 
social, and political stagnation and triggered numerous conflicts: 
 
In country after country, the state has been captured or monopolized by one tiny 
group – an ethnic group, professional (soldiers), or a religious group – and the 
instruments of state power and government machinery have been used to advance the 
economic interests of the ruling group… This politics of exclusion does not endure. It 
eventually leads to destructive competition, instability, civil strife, institutional break-
down, and ultimately to collapse. 
 
In 1984, over half of African regimes were either military or quasi-military, coming to power 
after coups (Sandbrook 1985: 85). Goldsmith (2001: 128) notes that during the 1980s, more 
than 90 military coups took place in 29 African countries. Sandole (1999: 3) adds that in 
1992, the number of developing countries under military control was 61 out of 112. Many of 
the countries under military control were in Africa. 
 
Rasheed (1996: 62) argues that poverty in Africa is in a large number of cases “structural in 
nature,” causing impoverishment of those who do not support the rulers. Structural factors 
noted by Rasheed include political and ethnic bias, excessive control of political power, and 
economic policies that discriminate against the poor. Bates (2003: 19) writes that many 
African governments ruled by dictators or military rulers use force against those who protest 
and ask for change. “By frustrating those who would seek fundamental changes, governments 
remove proposals for comprehensive reforms from the political agenda and forbid organized 
efforts to alter the collective fate of the disadvantaged.” 
 
Ake (1993: 240) believes that “poor leadership and structural constraints have turned the high 
expectations of the independence movement into painful disappointment, forcing more 
African leaders to rely on coercion.” Schwab (2001: 67) points out that “too many African 
leaders have all but abandoned any consideration for human rights of their people,” either 
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through minor political disagreements, repression, gross human rights violations, and even 
genocides. In this, African dictators were often supported by the Western world and the 
Soviet Union during the Cold War, when “one superpower buttressed the elites empowered 
by the colonial authorities, while the other often backed the opposition, as each supported a 
different client and a different agenda” (Schwab 2001: 21). The needs of African countries 
and Africans were never important to the Cold War superpowers, only their support to either 
the Western world or the Soviet Block. In a way, the Cold War was a continuation of 
colonialism, as both the colonial and Cold War powers never cared about the wellbeing of 
Africans and were only interested in African countries in order to satisfy their strategic, 
political, and/or economic interests. Today, China supports rogue regimes in Africa in order 
to get the right to exploit their oil, minerals, and other natural resources (Spiegel, 30 May 
2007). 
 
Alex de Waal (2007) claims that since independence, “Sudan has been the most dysfunctional 
country in Africa.” The country experienced political instability, two civil wars, and only 10 
years of democracy and relative stability. For the remaining time, Sudan was “ruled by 
military regimes which came to power through coups” (International Commission of Inquiry 
on Darfur 2005: 18). In terms of authoritarianism and elitism, every post-independence 
government and military regime of Sudan has been ruled by the members of the northern 
Arab tribes which represent only about 5% of the entire population and have spent the 
majority of development funds on the northern part of the country (Natsios 2008; Flint and de 
Waal 2008: 17).  
 
 
2.4. Wars and displacement in Africa 
 
Some of the biggest burdens to many African countries are civil wars and displacement. 
Solomon and Swart (2004: 10) write that “no single internal factor has contributed more to 
socio-economic decline on the African continent and the suffering of civilian populations 
than the scourge of conflicts within and between states.” Hoogvelt (2002: 15) notes that more 
than 30 large-scale wars have ravaged Africa since 1970.  
 
According to Anstey (2006: 4), the civilian casualties in wars fought around the globe have 
risen sharply in the twentieth century. In World War I, about 5% of all casualties were 
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civilians; in World War II, some 50% of the casualties came from the civilian populations; 
since 1990s, over 80% of the casualties in conflicts around the world were civilians. Many of 
the civilian casualties in post-1990 conflicts were on the African continent. The second part 
of the twentieth century has also seen the decline in conflicts between states and increase in 
internal conflicts. Since the end of World War II, the large majority of conflicts and wars 
around the world have been internal, rather than between sovereign states (Lobell and 
Mauceri 2004: 1). This was particularly the case in Africa, with Rwanda, Somalia, and Sudan 
being prime examples. 
 
Ayittey (1998: 193) writes that in 1996, more than twenty million Africans were refugees. In 
2002, the number of refugees and internally displaced people decreased to about twelve 
million (Zack-Williams 2002: 1-2). Ammons (1996: 78) argues that the movement of 
refugees and displaced people in Africa “have the greatest effect on the local administrative 
infrastructure, the local market economy, health and social services, transportation and 
communication systems,” thus deteriorating the social and economic development on the 
continent. 
 
Since independence, Sudan has experienced two civil wars between the north and south 
Sudan, the current conflict in Darfur, and many small-scale conflicts around the country. 
Only during the second civil war between the north and south in the period of 1983 and 2005, 
over four million people were internally displaced, 600,000 took refuge in neighbouring 
countries, and two million died from fighting, famines, and diseases (Schafer 2007: 1). The 
UN and aid agencies estimate that about 200,000 people have so far died in the current 
Darfur conflict, while over two million Darfurians were forced to leave their homes. The 
displaced live either in refugee camps in Chad or in internally displaced persons’ (IDP) 
camps in Darfur (BBC Online, 6 September 2007). Appendix II presents a map of IDP and 
refugee camps in Darfur and eastern Chad. According to the Economist (20 November 2008), 
about five million Darfurians “are either in camps or are relying on aid to survive.” The 
displacement and civilian suffering in Darfur are seen as “one of the worst humanitarian 
disasters in the world” (Tubiana 2007: 68). 
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2.5. Human aggression and violence – predisposed or learned? 
 
Are human aggression and violence a biological and instinctive phenomenon or something 
that is learned over the span of a lifetime? Two schools of thought that fundamentally differ 
on this issue will be presented below. Before going into discussion about human aggression 
theories, it is important to define what experts mean by aggressiveness and aggression. James 
Davies (1970: 613) writes that aggressiveness implies a “predisposition, an attitude of mind, 
an underlying characteristic” whose likely product is a tendency for a violent action, injury, 
or damage. Leonard Berkowitz (1993: 3) writes that aggression is “any form of behaviour 
that is intended to injure someone physically or psychologically.”  
 
 
2.5.1. Human aggression as a biological and instinctive phenomenon 
 
The scientific notion that human aggression could be biological and innate goes back to 
Albert Einstein and Sigmund Freud. Even though many scientists before him wrote about the 
concept of aggressive instinct, it was Freud who first explored “the psychological aspects of 
aggression and the driving force behind it” (Kaufmann 1970: 14). In 1932, an agency of the 
League of Nations invited Einstein to form a group of experts who would try to find a way of 
“delivering mankind from the menace of war.” Suspecting that aggression and violence were 
rooted deep in human psychology, Einstein asked for an opinion from Freud, the founder of 
psychoanalysis. “Might it not be that people have within them a lust for hatred and 
destruction?” was the main question Einstein asked (Berkowitz 1993: 376). Replying to 
Einstein, Freud (1973: 21) wrote the following in his letter: 
 
You express astonishment at the fact that it is so easy to make men enthusiastic about 
a war and add your suspicions that there is something at work in them – an instinct for 
hatred and destruction – which goes halfway to meet the efforts of the warmongers. I 
can only express my entire agreement. We believe in the existence of an instinct 
which seeks to destroy and kill. 
 
Ashley Montagu (1973: 10) notes that Freud and other early scientists who believed in 
aggressive instinct were inspired by “social Darwinism” and ideas such as “the survival of the 
fittest,” “the struggle for existence,” and “the weakest go to the wall.” Freud’s most important 
theory of aggression that came after his involvement with Einstein and under the influence of 
destructiveness of World War I is known as the “death instinct.” The idea of Freud’s death 
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instinct is that an “organism wishes to return to the state of nothingness whence it emerged… 
the stronger the death instinct in a person, the more necessary is it for that person to direct 
aggression outward against objects and people” (Buss 1961: 185). Arnold Buss (1961: 186) 
writes that Freud was aware that there was no direct and clear evidence for the existence of a 
death instinct, but he explained that the lack of proof was due to its being a “silent instinct.” 
 
One of the best known proponents of aggressive instinct in humans was Konrad Lorenz. In 
his bestselling book On Aggression (1966), Lorenz defined aggression as “the fighting 
instinct in beast and man which is directed against members of the same species… aggression 
is an instinct as any other, and in natural conditions it helps just as much as any other to 
ensure the survival of the individual and the species.” For Lorenz, humans could easily be 
compared to animals when it comes to an aggressive drive (Jakobi et al. 1975: 51-52). Lorenz 
believed that aggression is not a learned reaction to external cues, but “species-specific 
instinct humans have inherited from their anthropoid ancestors in the service of evolutionary 
adaptation and survival” (Kim 1976: 254). Erich Fromm (1973: 43) writes that, for Lorenz, 
human aggression was not a reaction to the external environment, “but a ‘built-in’ inner 
excitation that seeks for release and will find expression regardless of how adequate the outer 
stimulus is.” 
 
 
2.5.2. Human aggression – influenced by the environment 
 
Theorists who disagree with the notion that human aggression is a biological and instinctive 
phenomenon believe that aggression is something that is learned over the span of a lifetime 
and caused by the environment. Sometimes, people are forced to become aggressive and 
violent when their development is hindered. In other instances, people remember that 
aggressiveness can pay off – they learn that they can settle disputes by being aggressive 
towards others (Berkowitz 1993: 142). 
 
One of the oldest and still commonly used hypothesis that describes aggression as a reactive 
form of behaviour is “frustration-aggression hypothesis.” Established first in 1939 by Dollard 
et al. and since then significantly modified after being criticized by the members of the 
scientific community, the hypothesis states that “frustration produces instigations to a number 
of different types of responses, one of which is instigation to aggression” (Buss 1961: 27-28). 
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According to Herbert Selg (1975: 11), elements of the hypothesis were derived from the 1848 
Communist Manifesto, written by Karl Marx, who maintained that the “exploitation of the 
workers will frustrate them that they will be bound, sooner or later, to rise up against their 
oppressors.” Roger Johnson (1972: 133) claims that the authors of the hypothesis were also 
inspired by Freud’s work on motivational antecedents that cause frustration. Before 1939, 
Leonard Eron (1994: 3) writes, a large majority of psychologists considered human 
aggression to be instinctual and inherent. The main value of frustration-aggression hypothesis 
was that it has led to research that focused on causes of aggression other than biological and 
genetic. 
 
Arnold Buss (1961: 28) writes that in 1941, Abraham Maslow disagreed that simple 
frustration would lead to aggression but still supported the overall idea of the hypothesis. He 
believed that there had to be a more serious attack or threat to cause aggression. Buss claims 
that most psychologists generally accepted the frustration-aggression hypothesis, denying any 
antecedent to aggression other than frustration. Writing about the limits of frustration-
aggression hypothesis, Buss argues that aggressive behaviour may occur because it has 
previously led to a reward and not because it is aggravated by a frustrating situation. 
Similarly, it could be a case of scapegoating. Berkowitz (1993: 77) writes that scapegoating 
happens when a victim is assaulted mainly because he or she is unable to attack back. When 
the attacked are afraid to punish the real attacker, they often shift their aggression onto 
someone else who is weaker. 
 
Group aggression is another aspect of aggressive behaviour that is influenced by the external 
environment. It is believed that even non-aggressive individuals, when under pressure from a 
group, could act aggressively and violently. Mummendey and Otten (1993: 152) write about 
“one of the best known theoretical approaches to the phenomenon of collective aggression:” 
 
Postulating deindividuating processes within social groups lower consciousness about 
normative concerns and moral responsibility. Deindividuation is influenced by a 
number of input variables such as anonymity, diffusion of responsibility, changes in 
time perspective, and changes in states of consciousness, and explains conditions that 
lead to seemingly meaningless and irrational kinds of violence and destruction. 
  
An example of deindividuation is military, where soldiers in most cases cannot act on their 
own but have to follow their superiors’ orders even if they believe that their actions are 
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wrong. According to Kim (1976: 265), “soldiers in modern times are being constantly 
indoctrinated through positive and negative reinforcements to subordinate their individual 
impulses to the dictates of the state.” Writing about the origins of wars, Stanislav Andreski 
(1964: 130) writes that, if humans had an innate tendency for war and killing, “it would not 
be necessary to indoctrinate them with warlike virtues.” The fact that so much time was and 
is devoted in many societies to such indoctrination proves that “there is no instinct for war in 
humans.” Roger Johnson (1972: 2) states that wars do not start because soldiers have an urge 
to kill. Soldiers fight because they are ordered to do so. Fromm (1973: 284-285) notes that 
anyone with the knowledge of history knows that wars are not caused by destructive urges or 
instincts, but by motives such as “land for cultivation, riches, slaves, raw materials, markets, 
expansion, defence, and a wish for revenge.” 
 
Socio-economic problems and the inability to satisfy basic human needs can lead people to 
become violent and aggressive toward their family members, the community in which they 
live, or other people and other communities. In some instances poverty can force people, who 
otherwise would never commit a crime, to rob a store or someone’s private property and even 
kill in the process. Davies (1970: 618) argues that, when the basic needs that are common to 
all humans are severely frustrated, this is likely to cause aggressive behaviour. Berkowitz 
(1993: 262) thinks that people can easily become violent when they are bothered by their 
inability to afford essentials they need to survive and disturbed by the failure of their self-
esteem. Andreski (1964: 132) states that unemployment, apart from bringing poverty into 
communities, “breaks up social bonds and creates a large mass of uprooted men, whose 
frustrated desire for a place in society may lead them to favour measures of mass 
regimentation.” John Burton (1997: 10) writes that not only economic problems, but also the 
lack of recognition and respect for people’s identity can force people to protest using any 
means available.  
 
 
2.5.3. Contrasting the two opposing views on human aggression 
 
Describing the concept of aggression, Roger Johnson (1972: 41) says that “aggression is not 
an accident of nature, an invention of the devil, or a product of the twentieth century. It 
represents behaviour which has adapted through the process of evolution to the needs of 
survival.” Baron (1977: 78) notes that aggression and violence do not happen in a “social 
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vacuum.” Instead, such behaviours often “seem to stem from aspects of the social 
environment that instigate their occurrence and influence both the forms and directions.” 
 
Kriesberg (1998: 33) writes that survival of human beings would not be possible without 
nurturing and socialization in the external environment. Davies (1970: 622) claims that 
humans have an innate tendency to fulfil their basic needs but they do not have an instinct to 
fulfil these needs by aggressive and violent means. Johnson (1972: 3) states that some of the 
early popular notions on human aggression that influenced many scientists (such as Lorenz) 
were “fundamentally myths without any scientific foundation.” Johnson gives Freud’s 
instinct for death and destruction as an example. As it was noted above, even Freud himself 
was aware that there was no credible evidence to prove the existence of a death instinct, but 
he still claimed that it existed.  
 
Many critics of Lorenz’s work disagree with his theory of aggressive instinct because he 
mainly used the results of research done on animals. Samuel Kim (1976: 264) writes that 
Lorenz’s theory of aggression was developed largely from the observations of animal 
behaviour – “the hunting behaviour of the dog, food-begging of a young bird, fighting in a 
fish, and courtship flights of butterflies.” Leonard Berkowitz (1973: 42) writes that Lorenz 
attempted to explain various human actions by “drawing gross analogies between these 
behaviours and supposedly similar response patterns exhibited by other animal species… For 
Lorenz, man is remarkably similar to the Greylag goose.” Finally, John Burton (1997: 17) 
believes that, if aggression is inherent in humans, then we just have to live with everyday 
social problems and violence. But if the outside environment stimulates aggression, “then at 
least some reduction of conflict and violence would be possible.” Conflict and violence will 
be discussed in the next part. 
 
 
2.6. Conflict, violence, and group mobilization 
 
Conflict is a part of human relations and cannot be entirely eliminated. Burton (1990: 50) 
argues that “there has always been conflict at all societal levels” over territory, religion, 
values, interests, and oppression, to name only a few causes. Anstey (2006: 5) defines social 
conflict as a “purposeful behaviour involving planning as to how to attain scarce vales and 
overcome resistance.” Conflict requires use of power to defeat “obstructing groups or 
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resistance.” Violent conflict is defined as “intentional struggle between collective actors that 
involves the application of significant social power for the purpose of injuring, disrupting, or 
destroying human beings, human psyches, material property, and/or socio-cultural structures” 
(Himes 1980: 104). Burton (quoted in Anstey 2006: 17) argues that deep-rooted conflicts are 
“founded in fundamental human needs for security, identity, recognition, and development.” 
The level of severity depends on injury and grievance experienced by the parties during the 
course of a conflict. Greater hostility and harm inflicted by one party to the other, the level of 
severity of the conflict will be greater (Kriesberg 1998: 18).  
 
Rubenstein (2008: 58) argues that “the potential for conflict exists whenever individuals or 
groups pursue goals that they perceive to be incompatible.” Conflict escalates when parties 
come to a conclusion that their differing objectives cannot be achieved at the same time 
(Anstey 2006: 6). The most common sources of conflict are scarcity, human needs, 
incompatible interests and values, ideology, identity, structural imbalances, ambiguity, 
differing goals, and interpersonal relations (Anstey 2006: 12; Bradshaw 2007a: 15; Cheldelin, 
Druckman, and Fast 2008: 39-40). According to Kriesberg (1998: 58), conflicts emerge when 
at least four conditions are met: 
 
1) Parties involved must see themselves as separate entities;  
2) One or more parties must have a grievance;  
3) One or more parties must have a goal to reduce the grievance;  
4) Members of the aggrieved party must have the means and believe that they can 
change their conditions. 
 
As it will be shown in chapter four, the Darfur rebels saw their province and the central 
government of Sudan as separate entities due to the decades-long marginalization of Darfur 
and they aimed to reduce their grievances caused by political, social, and economic neglect 
through an armed rebellion. The widespread presence of weapons in Darfur gave the rebels 
the means to fight (Baldo 2006).   
 
Not all conflicts are bad. Some conflicts are destructive while others can be productive. In 
destructive conflicts, parties use force and violence to defeat or destroy each other and win a 
dispute. Productive conflicts “witness the arousal of a problem-solving motivation; trigger 
creativity and innovation; stimulate new ways of interacting; and promote communication 
 37
and understanding” (Anstey 2006: 9-10). Conflicts between states and interstate conflicts 
between different ethnic or religious groups are in most cases very destructive. 
 
The four sources of conflict that are the most relevant for this study are basic human needs, 
structural imbalances, competition over scarce resources, and identity. These will be 
discussed below in more detail.  
 
 
2.6.1. Basic human needs 
 
Davies (1988: 26) divides basic human needs into four categories: 1) physical needs; 2) 
social-affectional needs; 3) self-esteem, dignity, or equality needs; and 4) self-actualization 
needs. These needs are often seen as non-negotiable. When the basic needs that are common 
to all humans are severely frustrated, this is likely to cause aggressive behaviour and conflict 
(Davies 1970: 618). Berkowitz (1993: 262) believes that, when people are bothered by their 
inability to afford the things they and their families need, and disturbed by the failure of their 
self-esteem, “their nerves are raw, and they may easily become violent.” John Burton (1997: 
10) writes that the lack of recognition and respect for people’s identity can force people to 
protest using any means available. Bradshaw (2007a: 45) notes that “social conflict is 
normally the result of frustrated human needs, as human beings have no choice but to pursue 
the fulfilment of their needs.” Individuals and groups around the world often put their own 
lives and the lives of others at risk in order to achieve their basic human needs (Rubenstein 
2008: 67).  
 
Political, economic and social marginalization of the Darfur region since Sudan’s 
independence is seen as the main cause of the current rebellion (Baldo 2006). In order to 
satisfy their needs for security, development, and recognition, the Darfurians decided to take 
up arms and rebel against the central government until their demands are met. 
 
 
2.6.2. Scarcity 
 
Mark Anstey (2006: 12) writes that scarcity of resources puts pressure on every country. 
Tensions between individuals and groups are very likely in nations that cannot provide 
essentials such as food and housing for their populations. As awareness of scarcity increases, 
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the need for the limited resources also increases, thus mounting the likelihood of conflict 
among the parties (Pruitt and Kim 2004: 21; Druckman 2008: 132). Deutsch (1973: 15) notes 
that conflicts over resources tend to be complex and long, especially when there is no 
willingness to compromise among the parties or a substitute for the scarce resources. 
 
Competition over resources is an important source of conflict in Darfur. Following droughts 
and famines in the 1980s, a conflict erupted between various groups over the scarce natural 
resources (de Waal 2004). After their livestock was destroyed in the famines, Darfur herders 
(Arabs) had to choose whether to maintain their way of life or take up farming. Either route 
led to clashes with farmers (Africans) and both sides soon began arming themselves to defend 
their interests (Mamdani 2007).  
 
 
2.6.3. Structural imbalances  
 
Structural imbalances are “actual or perceived inequalities of control of resources, ownership, 
or resource distribution. Issues of power are central and dominant groups use their capacity 
for control to entrench a position of authority” (Anstey 2006: 17-18). Kriesberg (1998: 77) 
argues that increased structural imbalances and inequalities between the opposing groups 
“tend to arouse a sense of grievance among the relatively disadvantaged, especially when one 
party is increasing its gains at the expense of another.” This can last for decades, but as 
Burton (1988: 193) writes, no matter what the consequences are, the oppressed people will in 
the end find means to fight an oppressive regime. “The state,” according to Burton, “has the 
means of repression and can survive for a long period of time at great cost; but finally 
suitably led peoples’ power, reflecting human needs that will be pursued, prevails.” 
 
Structural imbalances in Sudan date back to the British colonial rule. Between 1899 and 
1956, the British ruled Sudan as two distinct parts, isolating the southern (Christian and 
animist) provinces from the northern (Arab) influence and discouraging any contact between 
the north and south (Eprile 1974: 70). The British administration heavily invested in the Arab 
north, modernizing and liberalizing political and economic institutions and improving social, 
educational, and health services, while the south and other peripheries were completely 
ignored (El Mahdi 1965: 122). Similarly, the Darfur region was “completely neglected” by 
the British authorities in economic, social, and political terms (de Waal 2004; Prunier 2006: 
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195). When Sudan became independent, the new government, controlled by the northern 
Arab elites, continued to marginalize the south and Darfur (Miller 2007: 127). According to 
the International Crisis Group, (2007b: 8), all conflicts in Sudan have a similar cause: “poor 
governance and a belief that the central government does not act on behalf of, or represent the 
interests of,” all parts of the country. 
 
 
2.6.4. Identity 
 
Identity conflicts tend to be violent and deadly. Anstey (2006: 16) writes that identity 
conflicts are protracted and destructive, especially in countries where ethnic tensions exist for 
a long period of time and where “status, wealth, or access to opportunity are determined by 
ethnic groups.” Identity has become one of the features of the conflict in Darfur in the second 
half of the twentieth century. Manipulation of ethnic identities is seen as a major source of 
animosity that can lead to violence and conflict. In the mid-1980s, the government of Sudan 
began introducing “policies that manipulated ethnicity [in Darfur] in the interest of central 
politicians and their provincial allies.” This manipulation “gradually produced an alarming shift 
in the nature of the conflict, with ethnicity becoming a major mobilizing factor” (International 
Crisis Group 2004: 4-5). Alex de Waal (2004a) writes that “Darfur’s complex identities have 
been radically and traumatically simplified [in the second part of the twentieth century], 
creating a polarized ‘Arab versus African’ dichotomy that is historically bogus, but 
disturbingly powerful.” 
 
One of the main sources of conflict in Africa today are the borders drawn by the European 
colonial powers in the nineteenth century without any regard to the opinions and needs of 
Africans (Schwab 2001: 16). Guest (2004: 10) argues that the borders between the African 
countries often “split tribes in half and lump mutually hostile ethnic groups together.” 
Hutchinson and Smith (1996: 13) write that the imperialist and colonial powers drew 
boundaries of Sudan and the rest of Africa “without regard to ethnic identities” thus, 
intentionally or not, preparing the ground for future conflicts.  
 
The theory of conflict group mobilization “examines the processes and conditions that cause 
a loosely knit and politically inactive group of people to develop into a well-organized 
conflict group that is capable of challenging the status quo.” To achieve group mobilization, 
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there has to be a “group of people that feels strongly about a shared identity, has a common 
set of grievances against a commonly agreed target, and aspirations to redress these 
grievances” (Pruitt and Kim 2004: 32). Kriesberg (1982: 66) writes that groups in a conflict 
form and transform self-awareness of belonging to a collective entity through experiences of 
discrimination, prejudice, and hostility. Chapter four will show how the common set of 
grievances have led the ethnically and tribally diverse people of Darfur to organize around 
two rebel groups in 2003 and start a rebellion against the central government of Sudan. 
 
 
2.7. Rebellion, revolution, and counter-insurgency  
 
A rebellion is a “limited political upheaval involving the replacement of one ruling group by 
another” (Oxford Dictionary of Sociology 1998). Russell (1974: 56) defines rebellion as a 
violent struggle that threatens to seize power through violence and fighting. Robertson 
(quoted in Calvert 1990: 3) defines revolution as a “violent and total change in a political 
system, which not only vastly alters the distribution of power in the society, but results in 
major changes in the whole social structure.” Katz (2001: 5) argues that revolutions involve 
the “downfall of an old regime through violent means and replacement by a new regime that 
attempts to establish a new political and socioeconomic order.” Rebellions share many 
common characteristics with revolutions, the main difference being “the scope and intensity 
of the social changes that follow the seizure of power” (Oxford Dictionary of Sociology 
1998). According to Weede and Muller (1998: 49), a rebellion can become a revolution if the 
rebels succeed in overthrowing the ruling regime and substantially changing the system. 
 
When a government fails to fulfil the essential requirements to its citizens, the doors are open 
for a mass upheaval by the excluded parts of the society (Calvert 1990: 65). Gurr and 
Goldstone (1991: 334) note that a widely shared sense of grievance among people is a 
necessary condition for a mass mobilization and rebellion. Welch and Taintor (1972: 6) offer 
four preconditions that may lead to a mass unrest, rebellion, or revolution: 
 
1) Widespread sense of disappointment with the conditions of life (relative deprivation); 
2) Focusing the feelings of disappointment upon political institutions; 
3) Vacillation, incompetence, and incoherence of political leadership through resistance 
to reform or through injudicious use of force; 
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4) Combination of economic and political feelings of deprivation with the acceptance of 
a myth or ideology of change. 
 
Moshiri (1991: 20) defines relative deprivation as “a perceived discrepancy between people’s 
value expectations and their value capabilities.” The theory of relative deprivation states that 
the perception of relative deprivation “leads to discontent, which tends to lead to 
politicization of discontent, which tends to lead to political violence” (Gurr 1970: 12-13). 
According to the relative deprivation argument (Nkemdirim 1977: 76),  
 
The hardships which individuals collectively endure in the form of stress, uprooting, 
land alienation, hunger, poverty, anxiety, frustration, and anger are due to the impact 
of large-scale structural changes. Hardships are seen as an immediate, ultimate, and 
direct spur to collective violence against an oppressive government. 
 
Every insurgency, rebellion, or revolution provokes a response from the governments that the 
revolutionary or rebel movements are fighting against and/or trying to overthrow. Walt 
(2001: 37) argues that successful revolutions occur rarely due to the fact that “even weak 
states usually control far greater resources than their internal opponents.” On the other hand, 
violence and severe coercion used in counter-insurgencies often lead to a decline in political 
support for the regime, especially in the areas where fighting is occurring (Sederberg 1994: 
293). This often helps revolutionary and rebel movements to attract more support from 
victimized communities. Halliday (1999: 225) adds that counter-insurgencies that last long 
often “alienate significant constituencies within the society,” and influence other countries to 
oppose them.  
 
Counter-insurgency can take a number of forms. Some governments use regular army to 
topple the insurgents. Other states prefer counter-insurgency by “indirect means” – through 
providing arms, equipment, financial support, training, and other assistance to paramilitary 
groups to fight the insurgents (Katz 2001: 114-15). Some governments try to destabilize the 
revolutionary/rebel movements and their leadership. Gurr and Goldstone (1991: 337) write 
that many rebellions and revolutions fail due to factionalism and leadership struggle within 
the movements. 
 
Success of revolutionary and rebel movements depends on factors such as the emergence of a 
broad coalition of forces that challenge the ruling regime, balance of military power, internal 
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solidarity, support from the masses, financing, and international support (Gurr and Goldstone 
1991: 336; Weede and Muller 1998: 55). Gurr and Goldstone (1991: 340) emphasize that the 
international community’s pressures and involvement are often crucial in “shaping the 
revolutionary process and its outcomes.” 
 
 
2.7.1. Rebellion and counter-insurgency in Darfur 
 
In May 2000, the Darfur Islamists published The Black Book in which they explained the 
marginalization of Darfur and the “region’s systematic under-representation in national 
governments” of post-independence Sudan. The book “condemned the Islamist promise to 
Darfur as a sham” and created the ground for a rebellion against the government (de Waal 
2004). In April 2003, two loosely connected movements, the Sudan Liberation Movement 
and the Justice and Equality Movement, started attacking the government forces in Darfur. 
Some of the major rebel attacks were on military bases and airports in Darfur, where rebels 
killed hundreds of soldiers and destroyed a number of aircrafts, helicopters, and other 
military equipment (Prunier 2005: 95-96; Tar 2006: 417). 
 
In response to the rebellion, the Sudanese government mobilized and armed local militias from 
Darfur’s “Arab” ethnic groups to fight against the “African” rebels. The Sudanese army 
supplied the militias with weapons and equipment and supported their attacks on the rebels 
and civilians with military intelligence and air bombings (Prunier 2005: 98). The counter-
insurgency in Darfur frequently went “beyond the separation and interdiction doctrines of 
measured counter-insurgency” (Slim 2004: 814), causing an estimated 200,000 deaths, 
millions of displaced, and a nearly total destruction of local communities. The rebellion and 
counter-insurgency in Darfur will be discussed in more detail in chapter four. 
 
 
2.8. The international community and conflicts in Africa 
 
International relations are based on realism, or Realpolitik, the oldest and most used theory of 
international relations both in academic circles and as an approach used by governments in 
foreign relations (Kegley and Wittkopf 1995: 25; Hough 2004: 2; Donnelly 2005: 29).  
Political realism is a “doctrine of skepticism” (Crawford 2000: 73) that leads governments to 
act not according to the moral and legal principles, but by considerations of power and 
 43
national interests (Donnelly 2005: 48).  
 
Realists focus on the role of state power, self-interest, force, diplomacy, national security, and 
balance of power. The main form of power in their view is military power (Crawford 2000: 
72; Kolodziej 2005: 129). States often pursue their national interest “even if this conflicts 
with the interests of other states and peoples” (Hough 2004: 3). Realists stress that powerful 
states often get away with violating moral norms. When they are not able to do so, it is 
“because the power of other states has been mobilized on behalf of the moral norm” 
(Donnelly 2005: 49). Realists view international relations as a “zero-sum struggle for power, 
and peace as the fragile outcome of mutual insecurity and existential deterrence” (Griffiths 
1992: 141; George 1994: 72). 
 
Realism is seen as the primary reason for the lack of interest for the recent African conflicts 
in the Western world. When a conflict in Africa does not affect the strategic, security, or 
economic interests of the powerful Western countries, the international community will not 
do much, if anything, to intervene and end that conflict. At the same time, the international 
community will be preoccupied with Middle Eastern or European conflicts. The 1994 
genocide in Rwanda, a prime example of this lack of interest in African conflicts, will be 
discussed below in reference to the conflict in the Balkans that was happening at the same 
time. 
 
When the Rwandan genocide began in April 1994, the international community simply 
turned away and disregarded the reports of unthinkable brutality. The Western governments 
ignored the killings of more than 800,000 people in only 100 days because they saw no 
economic and national security interest in saving Africans (Berry and Berry 1999: 6). The 
United Nations (UN), depending on the member states and their contributions in money, 
equipment, and personnel, had no means to intervene (Polman 2004: 5). 
 
In May 1994, then the United States president, Bill Clinton, signed the Presidential Decision 
Directive 25 (PDD). The purpose of the PDD was to reform multilateral peace operations in 
order to make “disciplined and coherent choices about which peace operations to support, 
both when voting in the UN Security Council for the UN peace operations and when 
participating in such operations with US troops” (White House Press Statement, 6 May 
1994). From then on, the US would officially only intervene in places where they had 
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economic or national security interest. Moreover, the PDD was also used to persuade other 
countries not to intervene in places the United States government did not want to get involved 
(Gourevitch 1998: 150). 
 
The UN could not act on its own and intervene in Rwanda since it does not have an army, but 
depends on the member countries to send troops and pay for the peacekeeping operations. 
Waltz (as quoted in Crawford 2000: 103), one of the leading realist theorists, writes that the 
international organizations such as the UN are not capable of acting in “important ways 
except with the support, or at least the acquiescence, of the principal states concerned with 
the matters at hand.” Hough (2004: 3) notes that powerful countries see organizations such as 
the UN as mere “alliances of convenience between states.” The most powerful states create 
international institutions to maintain or increase their share of world power. These institutions 
are fundamentally “arenas for acting out power relationships” (Mearsheimer 1995: 340).  
 
While the UN could not find troops and deploy them to Rwanda, the international community 
was more than willing to send troops to the Balkans region in Eastern Europe. On 27 April 
1994, only six days after the reduction of the UN mission in Rwanda to 270 soldiers, the UN 
Security Council authorized an increase of international presence in Bosnia, adding 6,550 
troops to about 24,000 UN troops already there (Melvern 2000: 174). In Bosnia, Serbs, 
Croats, and Muslims, different ethnic and religious groups, fought a civil war from 1992 to 
1995. While opposed to any kind of intervention in Rwanda in the summer of 1994, US 
President, Bill Clinton, saw American self-interest in Bosnia. According to Joseph Biden, one 
of the most important foreign policy issues facing the United States Congress in the 1990s 
was the American involvement in Bosnia. “Helping Bosnia to create a viable multi-ethnic, 
free-market democracy sends a critical message to other would-be ‘ethnic cleansers’ that a 
repeat of such carnage will not be tolerated elsewhere in Europe” (Biden 1998: 1). In 
December 1994, Clinton offered 20,000 US soldiers as ground troops in Bosnia to help 
evacuate the UN peacekeepers that were under threat (Los Angeles Times, 9 December 
1994). While the PDD prevented the US administration from intervening in Rwanda or 
allowing other countries to do so, it did not prevent the deployment of thousands of American 
and European soldiers into the brutal war in the Balkans. 
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2.8.1. The international community and the Darfur conflict 
 
Understanding that the international community’s involvement and pressures on Sudan’s 
regime are crucial for their success, the Darfur rebels have used “the Western public’s 
revulsion at the atrocities in Darfur to portray the conflict as genocide,” thus hoping to 
delegitimize the government in the eyes of the international community and foster regime 
change (Flint and de Waal 2008: 101). The rebels have largely succeeded in labelling the 
conflict as genocide in the eyes of the Western world. In September 2004, then the US 
Secretary of State, Colin Powell, used the term “genocide” to describe the conflict in Darfur 
(Prunier 2005: 140). Since then, many politicians, humanitarians, activists, journalists, and 
celebrities in the West have used the same label.  
 
The Western media, governments, and activist groups often present the conflict in Darfur as a 
war between the “Arabs” and “Africans,” with the “Arab” militias carrying out genocide, 
massacres, rape, and pillage of innocent “Africans” with the support of the Sudanese 
government. David Lanz (2008: 213) explains how the Darfur conflict is often 
misrepresented in the reports by the Western media and activists: 
 
Darfur, in these accounts, is a place where history is of little importance in 
understanding the present, where an evil Arab government has induced Arab tribal 
militia to kill hundreds of thousands of innocent black African victims and displace 
millions more. Darfur is portrayed as a place where the forces of evil will continue to 
wreak havoc on a population of suffering victims until Western military forces 
intervene to save them. 
 
Such accounts “simplify and misrepresent” a very complex conflict and have “led to 
demonization of all Arabs” (O’Fahey 2004: 24). de Waal (2008a: 387) notes that the crimes 
committed by the “Arab” militias in Darfur have been “applied indiscriminately to all Darfur 
Arabs” in the West. Consequently, as  Flint and de Waal (2008: 187) write, the Western 
media and activists have completely ignored the suffering of the Darfur “Arabs” in the hands 
of the “African” rebels, noting that “the first coverage of the ‘Arab’ victims of the war by a 
major newspaper [in the West] was in 2006, fully three years after the war began.” 
 
In 1946, the UN defined genocide as “acts committed with intent to destroy, in whole or in 
part, a national, ethnic, racial, or religious group (Gourevitch 1998: 3). Even though the 
International Commission of Inquiry on Darfur (2005: 3) has established that the government 
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of Sudan and “Arab” militias have not committed genocide in Darfur but were responsible for 
“serious violations of human rights and humanitarian law amounting to crimes under 
international law,” the majority of the Western media, activists, and some governments claim 
that the government has committed and is still committing genocide. Straus (2005) argues 
that the debate in the West, instead of being focused on how to stop the crisis and human 
suffering in Darfur, is only about “whether or not it should be called ‘genocide.’” 
 
Many analysts argue that labelling the conflict as “genocide” has only made things worse on 
the ground in Darfur. It convinced the rebels that they “do not need to negotiate with the 
government,” hoping the international community would eventually intervene. The 
government of Sudan has also used the label to “market itself in the Middle East as another 
victim of America’s anti-Arab and anti-Islamic policies” (Washington Post, 23 April 2006). 
 
According to the Reuters’ Alert Net (6 November 2008), there are currently 16,370 
humanitarian workers working for eighty-five humanitarian, non-governmental, and aid 
organizations and sixteen United Nations agencies in Darfur. Flint and de Waal (2008: 182) 
note that, apart from the humanitarian assistance to the refugees and displaced people and 
readiness “to condemn human rights violations in very strong terms,” the international 
community is not willing to do anything significant in Darfur. Eric Heinze (2007: 383), an 
academic from the University of Oklahoma, argues that the “emotive and condemnatory” 
statements about Darfur from the Western governments were meant to be “a substitute for 
more decisive action.” 
 
An example of the unwillingness to do anything significant in Darfur is the lack of 
helicopters for the United Nations-African Union Mission in Darfur (UNAMID). Since June 
2007, the representatives of the United Nations, African Union, and aid groups have 
numerous times asked the world powers to provide the UNAMID with six attack helicopters 
and eighteen transport helicopters so they can start protecting civilians in Darfur. Helicopters 
are essential for any success of the mission in the vast and remote region the size of France. 
As of December 2008, no country has supplied even one helicopter for the Darfur mission 
(AFP, 8 December 2008). 
 
Self-interests of the powerful countries, such as the American cooperation with the Sudanese 
government in its “war on terror” and Chinese investments in Sudan’s oil industry, “have added 
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to the difficulty in resolving the conflict” (International Crisis Group 2007: i). Lee Feinstein 
(2007: 46), a senior fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations, notes that, as in many other 
instances, the UN Security Council has often been unable to “take strong action” regarding 
Darfur. Protecting their own interests in Sudan, China, Russia, and Pakistan have claimed in 
the UN Security Council that “the human suffering in Darfur was insufficient to provoke 
serious reflection on whether Sudan was fulfilling its responsibilities to its citizens” (Bellamy 
and Williams 2006: 150). Despite continued fighting and atrocities in Darfur, the Security 
Council was “prevented from enacting stiffer sanctions [on Sudan] due to resistance from 
China and Russia” (Human Rights Watch 2006).   
 
While the UN Charter states that the purpose of the organization is the “avoidance of war and 
maintenance of peace” (Simoni 1995: 157), the founders of the organization have not 
provided the means to achieve such a grand goal. Bennett (1991: 5) argues that since its 
founding, the UN has “lacked effective or independent means for intervention to preserve 
peace or dictate a solution.” The UN can do only what its member states decide to do (Riggs 
and Plano 1988: 348; Polman 2004: 5).  
 
With all its shortcomings and the lack of funds (Welling 2007: 159), the African Union 
played perhaps the most constructive role in Darfur. Since 2004, the AU has brokered several 
talks between the government of Sudan and rebels aimed at reaching a peaceful solution to 
the conflict (Udombana 2005: 1186; Lanz 2008a: 2). In 2006, the African Union refused to 
allow Sudan to chair the Union “due to its record in Darfur” (Human Rights Watch 2007). On 
the other hand, the Arab countries and organizations such as the Arab League or the 
Organization of Islamic Countries have shamefully ignored the conflict in Darfur and even 
supported the deadly actions of the Sudanese government (Slim 2004: 812). Even though the 
victims in Darfur are Muslims, the fact that they are the victims of an “Arab” regime 
presumably prevents the Muslim and Arab countries from speaking out against the crimes 
committed against civilians in Darfur. 
 
 
2.9. Ending conflict 
 
Every dispute and conflict is resolved at some point. Conflicts either “deescalate, stagnate, or 
stop” (Kriesberg 1982: 174). Armed conflicts end either in a military victory for one party or 
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through negotiations (Pruitt and Kim 2004: 88). Mark Anstey (2006: 104) offers a detailed 
definition of negotiations: 
 
Negotiations are a verbal interactive process involving two or more parties who are 
seeking to reach an agreement over a problem or conflict of interest between them and 
in which they seek to preserve their interests, but adjust their views and positions in 
the joint effort to achieve an agreement. 
 
Conflicts and disputes cannot be ended through negotiations at any point; rather, the parties 
need to come to a conclusion that a solution to the conflict has to be reached through the 
means other than fighting. A negotiation process can only be successful in the long-run if all 
parties approach it with an intention to achieve a settlement and a belief that resolving 
conflict through negotiations is the best option available (Anstey 2006: 138). The experts use 
the term “ripeness” to describe the moment when the parties in a conflict are ready to 
negotiate. Zartman (1985: 232) explains what has to happen for conflicts to be ripe for 
resolution: 
 
Conflicts are ripe for resolution in the face of two types of stalemate – deadlocks and 
deadlines. Deadlocks occur when the parties realize that they are unable to achieve 
their aims, resolve the problems, or win the conflict. Deadlines reflect a realization by 
the parties that matters will deteriorate if they do not negotiate a settlement. 
 
Negotiations aimed at ending a conflict often require bargaining, concessions, and 
compromising from all parties. This approach is known as distributive, positional, or power 
bargaining, while some theorists call it a traditional negotiation approach (Bradshaw 2007a: 
72). Using this approach, each party in a conflict tries to maximize its gains at the negotiation 
table, thus “expecting that the gains come at the expense of the other side” (Kriesberg 1998: 
266). The parties open up the negotiation process “with extreme positions which are then 
vigorously defended.” This negotiation approach often leaves at least one of the parties 
unhappy with the outcome and can lead to escalation of a new conflict between the same 
parties in the future (Bradshaw 2007a: 72). 
 
Burton (quoted in Anstey 2006: 17) argues that the traditional negotiation approach should 
not be used when deep-rooted conflicts are negotiated, as these types of conflicts “cannot be 
compromised, but require accommodation through problem-solving rather than power-driven 
bargaining.” Problem-solving entails an effort by all parties to find “mutually acceptable 
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solutions” (Pruitt and Kim 2004: 190). The aim of problem-solving is to change the views 
and perspectives of the conflicting parties from “‘conflict to be won’ to ‘problem to be 
solved’” (Mitchell 2008: 302). Kriesberg (1998: 267) notes that the problem-solving 
approach attempts to “separate people from the problem, focus on interests and not positions, 
invent options for mutual gain, and insist on objective criteria in choosing options.” 
 
Mediation is often used to resolve conflicts. Mediation is an intervention into a dispute by a 
third-party. The goal of mediation is to assists the parties in finding a “mutually acceptable 
and voluntary” agreement (Pruitt and Kim 2004: 232; Anstey 2006: 245). Mediation attempts 
to solve problems and transform damaged relationships of the parties (Cheldelin 2008: 281). 
Nathan (2007) adds that a job of a mediator is to “help adversaries overcome their enmity, 
build their confidence in negotiations, and facilitate dialogue, bargaining, and collaborative 
problem-solving.” 
 
John Burton (1990: 233) believes that the only way to resolve deep-rooted and protracted 
conflicts is to completely “remove their causes and create conditions in which they cannot 
occur.” Post-conflict reconstruction of societies damaged by fighting and animosity is one 
way of creating conditions mentioned by Burton. The aim of post-conflict reconstruction is to 
“prevent renewal of the conflict by restoring social and political structures and institutions” 
(Botes 2008: 373). 
 
 
2.9.1. Attempts to end the Darfur conflict 
 
With the help of the African Union and the support from the international community, the 
initial talks between the government and rebels aimed at ending the Darfur conflict began in 
Abuja, Nigeria, in August 2004. The Darfur rebels were represented by the Justice and 
Equality Movement and two factions of the Sudan Liberation Movement that fragmented due 
to the internal divisions among the leadership. After signing a Declaration of Principles in 
May 2005, the parties began negotiating a peace agreement (Buchanan-Smith and Jaspars 
2007: 559). 
 
As mentioned above, a negotiation process can be successful only if all parties have an 
intention to achieve a settlement and believe that resolving conflict through negotiations is 
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the best option available (Anstey 2006: 138). Bradshaw (2007: 4) notes that the only way the 
parties can come to an agreement is through understanding each others’ points of view. 
Kriesberg (1998: 272) reminds that parties sometimes enter a negotiation process only to be 
seen as working for peace but without any serious devotion to end conflict.  
 
In Abuja, instead of negotiating and trying to understand each others’ perspectives and views, 
the parties kept “reiterating their demands, rejecting the positions of their opponents, trading 
accusations and recriminations, grandstanding for the benefit of the international observers, 
and attempting to win support for their positions from the mediators” (Nathan 2006a). In the 
view of Laurie Nathan (2006), an advisor during the talks in Abuja, one of the main reasons 
for the lack of serious negotiations was the fact that the government of Sudan did not take the 
Darfur rebels seriously. The government claimed that the rebels “were not representative of 
the people of Darfur, posed little military threat, and were too divided to achieve a unified 
negotiating posture.” On the other hand, rebels “viewed the government as an ‘evil’ regime 
that had repeatedly broken its promises.”  
 
The main factors that prevented the rebels from making progress against the government’s 
negotiation team were “divisions and shifting alliances” of the rebel factions (International 
Crisis Group 2006: 2). Nathan (2006) notes that the rebels were not able to unify their 
positions during the talks and often even refused to meet each other. Alex de Waal (2006c), 
an advisor to the African Union during the talks, believes that the Abuja negotiations “served 
mostly as a forum in which each side could rehearse its condemnations of the other.” Nathan 
(2006) explains how none of the parties engaged in serious negotiations: 
 
The parties made no effort to accommodate each other’s positions and forge common 
ground. There was no bargaining, let alone collaborative problem-solving. For months 
on end the parties simply reiterated their demands, rejected their opponents’ positions, 
traded accusations, and attempted to gain a military advantage in the field. 
 
Instead of honest negotiations to end the conflict and bring peace to the region, the 
government and rebels viewed “the battlefield as the strategic arena of the conflict” and the 
negotiations in Abuja only as a tactical arena (Nathan 2006; Brickhill 2007: 5). While the 
representatives of the rebels and government negotiated in Abuja, their forces continued 
fighting in Darfur (UN High Commissioner 2006: 5; de Waal 2008b: 369). 
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When after months of talks there was no progress in Abuja, the African Union and its 
international partners – particularly the United States – lost their patience. The AU mediators 
and international community’s special envoys, without serious strategy for ending the Darfur 
conflict, decided to use the “deadline diplomacy” as their main negotiation tool (Nathan 
2006). Pressured by the international community, the parties were compelled to come to an 
agreement (de Waal 2006).  
 
The Darfur Peace Agreement (DPA) was signed in May 2006 by the government of Sudan 
and one faction of the SLM. The JEM and another SLM faction refused to sign the DPA. One 
of the rebel leaders who did not sign the peace agreement described the agreement’s text as a 
“product of intimidation, bullying, and diplomatic terrorism.” Another rebel leader claimed 
that the agreement did not “address the root causes of the conflict and was not the result of 
negotiations between the parties (Brickhill 2007: 9). Signing of the DPA, instead of bringing 
peace, only intensified the fighting and deteriorated the humanitarian situation in the region 
(Nathan 2007; Human Rights Watch 2007). The negotiation process that led to the DPA and 
the aftermath of the agreement will be discussed in more detail in chapter four. 
 
 
2.10. Books, academic journals, and analyses 
 
This part of the literature review will present some of the most important books, academic 
journals, and analyses about the history of Sudan and Darfur and the current conflict in 
Darfur. 
 
 
2.10.1. Books 
 
In A Short History of the Sudan (1965), a Sudanese historian, Mandour El Mahdi, examines 
Sudan’s history from the ancient times until the 1956 independence. According to the book’s 
preface, El Mahdi’s book is not intended to cover all aspects of Sudan’s pre-independence 
history, but to be a general introduction to the “social and political patterns within a wider 
framework of events.” While the book does not pay much attention to the Darfur region of 
Sudan, it gives some valuable information about the arrival of the “Arabs” and “Africans” to 
the region, Darfur’s independence, the Turko-Egyptian conquest of Darfur, and addition of 
the Darfur sultanate to the rest of Sudan in the early twentieth century.  
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Kingdoms of the Sudan, published in 1974 by R.S. O’Fahey and J.L. Spaulding, gives 
historical accounts of the two kingdoms, Sinnar and Dar Fur, that existed between the 
sixteenth and nineteenth century on the territory that is today northern and western Sudan 
respectively. The authors emphasize the lack of credible and reliable historical data about 
Darfur before the eighteenth century due to nonexistent written records and other historical 
evidence. Nevertheless, the book is an important source of the eighteenth and nineteenth 
century historical, social, and economic data about Darfur. The authors highlight the fact that 
the Darfur kingdom was the most powerful entity in the region in this time period. 
 
The History of the Sudan, published in 1979 by Holt and Daly, discusses events in Sudan 
from the arrival of Islam in the seventeenth century until the late 1970s, when the third 
edition of the book was written. The book examines the origins of various ethnic groups in 
Sudan. The authors discuss the Islamization of Darfur, the region’s struggle for independence 
in the nineteenth and early twentieth century, as well as the conquest of the Darfur kingdom 
in 1916-1917, and its incorporation into Sudan and the Anglo-Egyptian Condominium.  
 
Gerard Prunier, an African scholar, published Darfur: The Ambiguous Genocide in 2005. 
This book is one of the essential sources on the Darfur conflict. Prunier writes in detail about 
the period when Darfur was an independent kingdom and discusses complex ethnic 
distinctions in the region – from the “African” and “Arab” tribes to ethnic and tribal 
differences among both groups. The author notes that people with different ethnic and tribal 
backgrounds have lived in Darfur in relative peace for centuries but have been exploited and 
politicized by the governments of Sudan, Chad, Libya, and other external forces in the 1980s. 
This has polarized Darfur’s “Arabs” and “Africans” and set the stage for the current conflict. 
The book examines colonial and post-colonial neglect of Darfur and its people and the author 
makes a connection between this and the rebellion that began in 2003. Prunier ends the book 
with a discussion about the genocide claims and the media coverage of the conflict in the 
West, and the role the Darfur conflict plays in the general Sudanese context. 
 
War in Darfur and the Search for Peace (2007) is a book of essays and analyses about the 
Darfur conflict edited by Alex de Waal. What makes this book one of the most important 
sources on the current Darfur conflict is the diversity of contributors, both the Sudanese and 
Western scholars, historians, and experts. The first part of the book examines the deep-rooted 
causes of the conflict. The contributors discuss local administration and governance, land 
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rights and control, Islam and Islamism, and the causes of the 2003 rebellion. The second part 
discusses the Darfur peace process, the coverage of the conflict in the American press, the 
Western activism regarding the conflict, and the prospects for peace in Darfur. As Alex de 
Waal notes in the preface of the book, the authors wanted to present “different perspectives 
on the origins and escalation of Darfur’s war and the search for peace” and contribute to a 
better understanding of the complex conflict. 
 
The 2008 edition of Darfur: A New History of a Long War, by Julie Flint and Alex de Waal, 
is an essential reading about the current conflict in Darfur. The book gives a short overview 
of the history of Darfur and its people – from the independent kingdom, annexation by the 
Anglo-Egyptian condominium, colonial times, to Sudan’s independence. The authors blame 
the British colonialists and successive Sudanese governments after independence for the lack 
of development in Darfur. They assert that the notions of Arab supremacy and racism, 
preached from Libya and the Sudanese capital, have triggered divisions and animosity 
between the “Arabs” and “Africans” in Darfur in the 1980s and 1990s, culminating in the 
large-scale conflict that began in 2003. Flint and de Waal look closely at the links between 
the Sudanese government and “Arab” militias, called Janjaweed, claiming that there is 
enough evidence that the government of Sudan is using these militias as a proxy in the Darfur 
conflict. They write about the Darfur rebel movements and their leaders, with the emphasis 
on the causes of their fragmentation and divisions. The authors examine the international 
community’s reaction to the conflict and the Abuja peace talks that resulted in the 2006 
Darfur Peace Agreement that was signed by the Sudanese government and only one rebel 
faction but did not bring peace. They end the book with a chapter titled Endless Chaos, 
having little hope that the Darfur conflict will end any time soon. 
 
 
2.10.2. Academic journals and analyses 
 
In Darfur Rising: Sudan’s New Crisis, published in March 2004, the International Crisis 
Group analysts look at the causes of the current conflict in Darfur that was then in its first 
year. The report blames the post-independence governments of Sudan for decades of 
“manipulation of the ethnic fabric” in Darfur which have led to politicization and militarization 
of various ethnic groups. The analysis also points out that the discriminatory economic policies 
implemented by the successive central governments of Sudan have caused economic 
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underdevelopment of the Darfur province and were one of the main causes of the rebellion that 
broke out in 2003. 
 
In Counter-Insurgency on the Cheap, published in August 2004, Alex de Waal, one of the 
leading international experts on Sudan and Darfur, discusses the events that have led to ethnic 
polarization in Darfur which in turn fuelled the 2003 rebellion. The author goes back to the 
British colonial conquest, discussing how the British rulers and subsequent Sudanese 
governments have done little or nothing to help political, economic, and social development 
of the Darfur region. de Waal notes that a conflict between various groups in Darfur had 
erupted in the 1980s over the scarce natural resources after widespread droughts and famines. 
The author claims that the geographical location of the Darfur province has also played a role 
in ethnic polarization, noting the external influences from neighbouring Chad and Libya. 
Both countries have used Darfur as a base for military actions against each other in the 1980s, 
leaving behind divisions and weapons. Alex de Waal ends the analysis with a discussion 
about the “counter-insurgency on the cheap – famine and scorched earth policy” which have 
been the main weapons used in Darfur by the Sudanese government forces and “Arab” 
militias known as Janjaweed. 
 
In Darfur: The Fight for Peace (2004), Farah Arbab from the Institute of Strategic Studies 
from Islamabad, Pakistan, explores the causes and the politics of the Darfur conflict, analyzes 
the efforts to bring peace to this Sudanese province, and examines the internal and external 
implications of the conflict. Arbab expresses his fear that, if the international community 
does not find a way to end the conflict in Darfur, the crisis “may eventually be remembered 
as the [main factor] that destroyed the chance for peace in Sudan and the region.” 
 
A report titled Geopolitical Implications of the Darfur Conflict, published by the Spanish 
Real Instituto Elcano in September 2004, discusses interests and positions of the major 
international players toward the Darfur conflict. According to the report, the main 
international players are those who support the Sudanese government (France, China, and the 
Arab and Muslim countries) and the United States and its allies who are critical of the 
government of Sudan and its involvement in Darfur. The report concludes that Darfur is “a 
key part of the geo-strategic balance of several lines of conflict in Africa (Arab vs. black 
world) and the world (competition between the West, Arab world, and China for areas of 
influence and energy supply).” 
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In Inside Darfur: Ethnic Genocide by a Governance Crisis (2004), Mahgoub El-Tigani 
Mahmoud argues that the current conflict in Darfur is political and government-made. He 
believes that the Arab-led government of Sudan is biased in its support for the Darfurian 
“Arabs” while ignoring the pleas of the “Africans” in the region. The author notes that ethnic 
polarization in Darfur had erupted on a large-scale after the military coup in 1989 that had 
brought to power the Islamic regime of the current President of Sudan, Omar al Bashir. El-
Tigani believes that the current conflict in Darfur “demonstrates a deep disrespect for human 
dignity by the fundamentalist religious ideology of Arab supremacy.” 
 
On 18 September 2004 the United Nations Security Council adopted the resolution 1564 and 
requested from the UN Secretary-General to establish an international commission of inquiry 
whose aim would be to “investigate reports of violations of international humanitarian law 
and human rights law in Darfur by all parties.” The report also aimed to “determine whether 
or not acts of genocide have occurred and to identify the perpetrators of such violations.” 
Report of the International Commission of Inquiry on Darfur to the United Nations 
Secretary-General (2005) presents the findings of the commission. The report concludes that 
“the government of Sudan has not pursued a policy of genocide” in Darfur, but was 
responsible, together with the Arab militias called Janjaweed, “for serious violations of 
human rights and humanitarian law amounting to crimes under international law.” The 
commission also found evidence that the rebel forces have been “responsible for serious 
violations of human rights and humanitarian law which may amount to war crimes.” 
 
In Darfur and the Genocide Debate (2005), Straus discusses the proclamations by activists, 
aid agencies, media, and some Western governments that the Sudanese government and 
Janjaweed militias are committing genocide in Darfur. He argues that the debate in the West 
has been focused not on how to stop the crisis and human suffering in Darfur, but on 
“whether or not it should be called ‘genocide’ under the terms of the Genocide Convention.” 
The author believes that calling the current conflict “genocide” has helped bring the Darfur 
conflict and Sudan to the centre of the media attention and international political agendas but 
still did not help end the conflict and bring peace to the region. 
 
In Causes of Conflict in Sudan: Testing the Black Book (2005), Alex Cobham from the 
University of Oxford tests the claims of economic and political marginalization of Darfur and 
other Sudan’s peripheries by the Sudanese northern elites expressed in The Black Book which 
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was secretly published in Sudan in 2000. Relying on the data from the government of Sudan, 
World Bank, International Monetary Fond, and United Nations, the author examines 
economic and developmental data, revenue and expenditure patters, and regional human 
development outcomes. Cobham comes to a conclusion that “the claims made in The Black 
Book that Sudan has been governed to benefit the northern region disproportionately at the 
expense of all other” Sudanese regions are correct.  
 
In a Human Rights Watch publication titled Darfur: Whose Responsibility to Protect? (2005), 
Michael Clough, Africa advocacy director at Human Rights Watch, asks what has to happen 
in Darfur before the international community realizes that something has to be done to stop 
the conflict and suffering of innocent civilians. The author argues that the conflict in Darfur 
has erupted after decades of exploitation, manipulation, and neglect of the region by the 
successive central governments of Sudan. Clough believes that the environmental 
degradation and famines in the 1980s have led to competition over diminishing resources 
among the people in Darfur, thus increasing the likelihood of a large-scale conflict. He notes 
that the immediate cause of the rebellion in 2003 was the progress in negotiations to end the 
two-decades-long north-south war, which created fears among many Darfurians that they 
might be excluded from the power and wealth-sharing agreement being negotiated by the 
central government and southern Sudan. 
 
In Old Conflict, New Complex Emergency: An Analysis of Darfur Crisis, Western Sudan 
(2006), Usman Tar, a Nigerian academic, examines the state of affairs in post-independence 
Sudan, noting that the country was unstable and at war for decades since 1956, with the 
exception of the 1972-83 period. The author argues that the current Darfur conflict is “deeply 
rooted in ages of resource and racial conflict between Darfurians of Arab and African 
descent,” and adds that the differences among the ethnic and tribal groups have been 
politicized by the central governments of Sudan in the last two decades. Usman Tar believes 
that the solution to the conflict rests primarily with the government of Sudan, which could 
easily end the marginalization of the Darfur region, stop supporting armed militias, and bring 
peace. 
 
In The Crisis in Darfur (2007), Molly Miller writes that the current conflict in Darfur did not 
begin out of nowhere in 2003, but that it had deep and complicated historical roots. She 
blames colonialism for disruption of local institutions, the ambitions of the Libyan leader, 
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Muammar Qaddafi, in the region, the arrival of modern weaponry, the ideology of the 
Islamist movement, and political, social, and economic marginalization of Darfur by colonial 
and post-colonial governments of Sudan. Miller argues that all these factors have 
significantly contributed to the current conflict.  
 
In Darfur: Revitalizing the Peace Process, published in April 2007, the International Crisis 
Group examines the 2006 Darfur Peace Agreement and its shortcomings and failures and 
gives recommendations for future negotiations. The report points out that the negotiations 
failed to bring peace in Darfur due to many factors: the international community’s pressures 
and wrong mediation approaches; the government of Sudan and its unwillingness to negotiate 
the end of the conflict and constant attempts to sabotage the process; and the rebel 
movements for their lack of unity and refusal to constructively negotiate. In the report, the 
International Crisis Group experts recommend that the DPA should be completely discarded 
and a new agreement negotiated in the future.  
 
In The Politics of Naming: Genocide, Civil War, Insurgency (2007), Mahmood Mamdani 
argues that the conflict in Darfur and international campaigns to end it by mainly American 
faith-based advocacy groups are highly politicized in the West. He compares the Darfur 
conflict to the current conflict in Iraq, adding that even though the similarities are remarkable, 
“the violence in the two places is named differently. In Iraq, it is said to be a cycle of 
insurgency and counter-insurgency; in Darfur, it is called genocide.” Mamdani asks: “Why 
the difference? Who does the naming? Who is being named? What difference does it make?” 
The answers, according to Mamdani, lie in the fact that the Darfur conflict is used in the 
current American-led “War on Terror” to help the West demonize the “Arabs” who are 
allegedly perpetuating genocide against “helpless Africans.” While this view considers the 
West’s actions in Darfur as a conspiracy against the “Arab” government of Sudan, it is an 
interesting point of view considering the larger picture and the international relations in the 
post 9-11 world.  
 
In Long Road to Peace in Darfur (2007), Laurie Nathan, one of the mediators during the 
Darfur Peace Agreement negotiations, explains why the sides in the conflict have failed to 
come up with an agreement that would end the war and human suffering in Darfur. He lists 
wrong strategies used by negotiators and mediators, divisions among the rebels, and the 
government’s unwillingness to compromise as the main factors that have led to an agreement 
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that was only signed by the government and one rebel faction. Nathan argues that the 
agreement, ignored by the other two rebel groups/factions, did not bring peace to Darfur; 
instead, it has led to more divisions among the rebels and an increase in fighting on the 
ground.  
 
In Divided They Fall: The Fragmentation of Darfur’s Rebel Groups (2007), Victor Tanner 
and Jérôme Tubiana argue that the tradition of opposition to occupation and central 
governments is an old one in Darfur, noting the resistance to incorporation of Darfur into 
Sudan under the colonial rule. They examine historical roots of the current Darfur conflict 
and the rebel movements which began the rebellion in 2003. The authors look at the causes of 
the fragmentation and disunity among the rebels after the Darfur Peace Agreement was 
signed by the government and one rebel group in 2006. Tanner and Tubiana argue that any 
solution to the Darfur conflict will “first require that the rebels unite, and this is increasingly 
difficult with the rapid proliferation of groups. Without that unity, however, there will be no 
sustainable peace in Darfur.” 
 
 
2.11. Conclusion 
 
This chapter has reviewed the literature consulted during the research process and has 
focused on the concepts important for this study, such as the colonial legacies in Africa, post-
colonial state formation, dictatorship and personal rule, wars and displacement, human 
aggression, protracted conflict and violence, rebellion, revolution, and counter-insurgency, 
international community’s response to African conflicts, and approaches to end conflicts. The 
author has also reviewed the some of the most important books, academic journals, and 
analyses consulted in the study that focus on the history of Sudan and Darfur and the current 
conflict in Darfur in order to show the issues and arguments that are discussed and put 
forward by historians and experts.  
 
The next chapter will discuss in detail research design and methodology, sample, data 
collection, data analysis and the grounded theory approach, validity and reliability, ethical 
considerations, and limitations of the study. 
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CHAPTER THREE - RESEARCH DESIGN AND METHODOLOGY 
 
 
3. Introduction 
 
This chapter will discuss in detail research design and methodology, sample, data collection, 
data analysis and the grounded theory approach, validity and reliability, ethical 
considerations, and limitations of the study. The methodology used in this exploratory 
qualitative study is the interpretive social science research methodology. Since the aim of the 
interpretive social science is to learn about individuals and their views, perspectives, 
interpretations, and experiences (Neuman 2006: 88), the author believes that this research 
methodology is the most appropriate for a study of the Justice and Equality Movement’s aims 
and perspectives about the Darfur conflict. To analyze the data collected in the study, the 
author has used the grounded theory approach, one of the main analytical tools in qualitative 
social science research (Babbie and Mouton 2001: 53). Denscombe (2007: 92) argues that 
this approach is particularly useful when social researchers want to “investigate the 
participants’ points of view.” Being derived from the data, grounded theories and findings 
accurately explain human actions and behaviour (Sarantakos 2005: 118). 
 
Even though the grounded theory approach is mainly used to generate theories about studied 
topics, the author’s goal in this study is not to develop a grounded theory that explains the 
perspectives of the rebels or the conflict in Darfur. Instead, he will present key findings about 
the conflict from the perspective of the rebel Justice and Equality Movement. The author 
believes that more research is needed and other rebel groups and other parties in Darfur and 
Sudan need to be included in the sample in order to come up with a grounded theory. Strauss 
and Corbin (1998: 155) note that the grounded theory approach can be used even when 
researchers want to develop a set of key findings instead of coming up with a theory. In this 
case, they present their findings without the final integration of concepts and categories and 
development of a grounded theory.  
 
Denscombe (2007: 93-94) notes that some researchers take the grounded theory approach to 
the extremes and “start research without any fixed ideas about the nature of the things that are 
about to be investigated.” Researchers who use the grounded theory approach in this way do 
not conduct a review of literature before data collection. On the other hand, the majority of 
researchers who use the grounded theory approach conduct a literature review and explore a 
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historical background of their topics in order to prepare themselves for the research. This 
author has conducted an extensive review of literature in order to develop a better 
understanding of the history of Sudan and Darfur, the current conflict in Darfur, and the 
concepts that are important for this study. 
 
 
3.1. Type of research 
 
The author has conducted an exploratory qualitative study to critically explore the Darfur 
conflict and the future of the region from the perspective of the Justice and Equality 
Movement, currently the most powerful Darfur rebel movements. 
 
 
3.2. Aims and objectives of the study 
 
3.2.1. Aims 
 
• Explore why the Justice and Equality Movement began the rebellion;  
• Explore what the JEM wants to achieve; 
• Contribute to a better understanding of the Darfur conflict. 
 
3.2.2. Objectives 
 
• Present the Justice and Equality Movement’s perspectives about the causes of the 
conflict; 
• Present the JEM’s perspectives about the possible solutions to the conflict and the 
future of the region. 
 
 
3.3. Interpretive social science and qualitative research approach 
 
Interpretive social science is a research paradigm whose primary goal is to “understand 
human behaviour and actions” (Sarantakos 2005: 12). The purpose of interpretive social 
research is to learn about individuals and their experiences, “develop an understanding of 
social life, and discover how people construct meaning in natural settings” (Neuman 2006: 
88). Interpretive researchers think that social researchers need to collect, analyze, and take 
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into consideration people’s points of view, values, and feelings. Since they believe that 
people and their interactions, views, actions, and beliefs shape reality, interpretive researchers 
do not think that value-free science is possible (Neuman 2006: 93-94). Struwig and Stead 
(2001: 16) add that social research is part of everyday reality and as a result cannot be 
considered value-free. 
 
The interpretive research approach is criticized by positivist researchers for the lack of 
precision and objectivity in data collection. The positivist social science approach uses 
quantitative research methods such as surveys, experiments, and interpretation of statistical 
data in quest of precise measures, objective research, and causal laws that can be used to 
make predictions about human behaviour (Struwig and Stead 2001: 5). Contrary to the 
methods used by positivists, interpretive researchers use qualitative data collection methods 
such as participant observation, semi-structured, in-depth, and open-ended interviews, and 
case studies to collect data about people. They believe that there are so many unquantifiable 
facts about humans that can only be understood through interpretive and qualitative research 
methods (Berg 1995: 7; Babbie and Mouton 2001: 53; Sarantakos 2005: 50). According to 
Henn, Weinstein, and Foard (2006: 16), interpretive research methods “imply an insider 
approach” in order to construct and analyze subjective information. Interpretive researchers 
think that people’s statements and behaviours usually have different meanings and cannot be 
seen as standardized (Berg 1995: 3). 
 
Interpretive researchers use the qualitative research approach in order to conduct “systematic 
analyses of socially meaningful actions” and understand how humans relate to each other and 
“create and maintain their social worlds” (Neuman 2006: 88). The qualitative research 
methods mentioned above are used to generate valid data that “provide an account of 
[participants’] world in their own words” (Henn, Weinstein, and Foard 2006: 14). The 
qualitative research approach emphasizes that facts are “fluid and embedded within a 
meaning system” and depend on a complex web of people and events in a specific setting 
(Neuman 2006: 92-93). Neuman (2006: 88-89) adds that the proponents of qualitative 
research argue that social reality is not stable and has no repeating patterns. Instead, people 
and their interactions, views, actions, and beliefs shape reality. 
 
 
 
 62
3.4. Research methods used in the study 
 
To gather the first-hand data about the Justice and Equality Movement, the author has 
conducted extensive semi-structured interviews with the representatives of the movement. 
Semi-structured interviews are believed to be one of the best methods for a study of this type. 
Interpretive researchers argue that only qualitative data collection methods such as extensive 
and semi-structured interviews,  careful observations, and in-depth case studies can give them 
enough credible data about people (Neuman 2006: 92-93). 
 
Walsh (2001: 66) believes that the advantage of semi-structured interviews is that participants 
may be more open to talk about their “views and beliefs” when given an opportunity to add to 
the conversation, thus helping researchers to “discover unexpected and unforeseen data.” 
May (2001: 123) notes that semi-structured interviews “allow people to answer more on their 
own terms than standardized interviews.” In this regard, the author has asked predetermined 
questions while also giving the participants an opportunity to talk about issues they thought 
were important.  
 
In addition to interviewing the representatives of the Justice and Equality Movement, the 
author has conducted an extensive literature analysis (books, academic journals, news articles 
and interviews, NGO publications, and statements from the rebel movements) to get a better 
picture of the conflict and the aims and objectives of the JEM. The literature analysis has 
been used to either confirm or contradict the data collected through the interviews or bring in 
new views and perspectives. Furthermore, the author has used the literature review and the 
historical background about Sudan and Darfur as sources of data and has referred to these in 
chapter six during the data analysis process. 
 
 
3.5. Units of analysis 
 
Unit of analysis in this study is the Justice and Equality Movement, a rebel movement from 
Sudan’s western province of Darfur. 
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3.6. Type of sample 
 
The sample for the study was based on non-probability purposive and theoretical sampling 
strategies, which lead researchers to choose participants for their “relevance to the research 
question and analytical framework” (Schwandt 2007: 269). The author has interviewed the 
official representatives of the Justice and Equality Movement and included them in the 
sample. In addition, the data collected through a literature analysis has also been included in 
the sample. More information about this is provided in the next section that discusses the 
sample size. 
 
 
3.6.1. Sample size 
 
The grounded theory approach, the method of data analysis used in this study, states that “the 
nature of sampling and the respondents, as well as sample size,” are determined “according to 
the information gathered during the study.” For the grounded theory approach, “sampling 
refers not only to people but also to events and settings” (Sarantakos 2005: 118). According 
to Schwandt (2007: 270), when a theoretical strategy is used for sampling, “the size of the 
sample depends entirely on the nature of the study and the research question and concepts 
being investigated.” 
 
The sample in this study are the Justice and Equality Movement’s officials who were 
interviewed for the study and the data collected from the literature (books, academic journals, 
news articles and interviews, NGO publications, and statements from the rebel movement). 
 
 
3.7. Data collection 
 
The primary data for this study were collected through semi-structured interviews with the 
JEM officials. Due to the safety concerns and the lack of funds, the author could not travel to 
Darfur and conduct face-to-face interviews with the representatives of the rebel movement. 
Instead, the interview questions have been emailed to the JEM representatives, which they 
answered and returned to the author. The author was able to probe the participants with 
additional questions during the data analysis process. 
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One of the major disadvantages in using the internet to conduct interviews instead of 
interviewing participants in person is the inability to observe “visual clues” and “non-verbal 
behaviour” of the participants (Sarantakos 2005: 285; Denscombe 2007: 187). However, 
using the internet to interview the rebel representatives was the only method the author could 
use at this point. 
 
Below are the predetermined questions used for this study: 
 
• Can you explain why the fighting started in 2003? 
• Was there a link between the Comprehensive Peace Agreement negotiated at the time 
between the government of Sudan and southern Sudan and the escalation of conflict 
and violence in Darfur? 
• What is the political program of your movement?  
• How do your goals differ from those of some of your main rivals in Darfur? 
• How would you characterize the current conflict in Darfur – as a rebellion, revolution, 
uprising, civil war, or some other characterization?  
• What is your movement fighting for – access to government, restructuring of the state, 
breaking away, or replacing the government? 
• How do you see Darfur in the future – politically, socially, and economically? 
• How would you improve the lives of ordinary people in Darfur? 
• How broad is the support for your movement among the people in Darfur? 
• Why do you think there are currently so many movements opposing the government 
in Darfur? 
• Do you think cooperation among the Darfur rebel movements is possible? If yes, how 
do you think this could be achieved? If not, how do you think future negotiations to 
end the conflict should be approached? 
• What do you think about the international community’s response to the Darfur 
conflict? 
 
The participants were also asked follow up questions after the initial data were collected and 
analyzed. These questions either asked them to clarify their statements made in response to 
the initial questions or to answer questions that specifically deal with their movement. 
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The initial questions have been developed on the basis of the author’s previous research work 
and the literature analysis. The additional questions have emerged after the initial data 
collection and analysis. Strauss and Corbin (1998: 205) recommend this method of designing 
interview and follow-up questions when using the grounded theory approach. 
 
In addition to the interviews, the author has consulted a wide range of sources (books, 
academic journals, news articles and interviews, NGO publications, and statements from the 
rebel movement) in order to get a better picture of the Darfur conflict and the aims and 
perspectives of the Justice and Equality Movement. The literature analysis has been used to 
either confirm or contradict the data collected through the interviews or bring in new 
arguments and views. 
 
 
3.8. Data analysis 
 
3.8.1. Grounded theory approach 
 
To analyze the data collected in this study, the author has used the grounded theory approach. 
The grounded theory approach is a data analysis method used primarily in qualitative social 
research that employs “a systematic set of procedures to develop an inductively derived 
grounded theory about a phenomenon” (Strauss and Corbin 1990: 24). Glaser and Strauss 
(1967: 1), the founders of the grounded theory, argue that this approach helps social 
researchers generate theories from “data systematically obtained and analyzed.” Babbie 
(2007: 54) writes that the grounded theory approach is used to construct theories and findings 
“through the inductive method by first observing aspects of social life and then seeking to 
discover patterns that may point to relatively universal principles.”  
 
The grounded theory approach is one of the most common methods used for qualitative data 
analysis and specifically in exploratory research (Henn, Weinstein, and Foard 2006: 198-
199). Since the grounded theories and findings are derived from the data, they closely and 
accurately explain human actions and behaviour (Sarantakos 2005: 118). Strauss and Corbin 
(1998: 155) note that the grounded theory approach can be used even if the “ultimate research 
goal is to arrive at a set of findings rather than theory development.” In this case, the 
researchers present their findings without the final integration of concepts and categories and 
development of a theory.  
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Denscombe (2007: 93-94) notes that some researchers take the grounded theory approach to 
the extremes and “start research without any fixed ideas about the nature of the things that are 
about to be investigated.” Researchers who use the grounded theory in this way do not 
conduct a review of literature before collecting data for their studies. On the other hand, the 
majority of researchers who use the grounded theory approach conduct a literature review 
and explore a historical background of their topics in order to prepare for their research 
projects.  
 
Instead of using conventional research practices that start out with theories and hypotheses 
and then try to prove them, the grounded theory approach focuses on concepts and meanings 
that emerge from the data gathered in a study and tries to build up findings and theories 
“from the ground up” (Babbie and Mouton 2001: 498). Sarantakos (2005: 119) stresses that 
the grounded theory approach “aims to develop theory through the research, not to subject 
research to theory.”  
 
One of the aspects of the grounded theory approach is the “acceptance of openness to ideas” 
that develop during the course of the research (Henn, Weinstein, and Foard 2006: 199). When 
qualitative researchers use this approach, they remain “open to the unexpected and are willing 
to change the direction or focus of their research projects” (Neuman 2006: 158). The research 
process is not guided by “conventional practices” but the “knowledge gathered during the 
study” (Sarantakos 2005: 118). The grounded theory concepts and indicators are “concrete 
data, such as behaviour patterns and social events, which are observed or described in 
documents or interview texts” (Sarantakos 2005: 347). 
 
 
3.8.2. Using the grounded theory approach 
 
The grounded theory approach uses a method of constant comparison, where “empirical 
indicators from the data are compared looking for similarities and differences.” This process 
helps researchers to find “underlying uniformities” and “produces coded categories or 
concepts.” Finding relationships and connections among the concepts and categories may 
lead to forming theories (Schwandt 2007: 131). As noted by Henn, Weinstein, and Foard 
(2006: 199), “the cycle of sampling, data collection, and coding is driven by the constant 
comparative method,” and this method leads to saturation of the data and possible 
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development of a theory. 
 
Using the grounded theory approach, researchers can start a process of “coding” as soon as 
the initial data is collected. May (2001: 138), quoting Strauss (1988), defines coding as “the 
general term for conceptualizing data. Coding includes raising questions and giving 
provisional answers (hypothesis) about categories and their relations.” During the data 
analysis process, researchers discover words and phrases that are used by the participants or 
found in the data that highlight the issues of importance or interest to the study. Identifying 
these words and phrases is called coding (Allan 2003: 1). According to Babbie (2007: 296), 
when the grounded theory approach is used to analyze the data, “systematic coding is 
important for achieving validity and reliability in the data analysis.”  
 
After the data is coded, researchers look for conceptual patterns. Generally, this process may 
lead to the “emergence of concepts that eventually [could] become the basis of a theoretical 
model” (Sarantakos 2005: 349). Categories and concepts that are “neutral, appear frequently 
in the data, allow easy reference to other categories, and possess clear implications for a 
formal theory” could form key findings and grounded theories at the end of the research 
process (Sarantakos 2005: 348). Allan (2003: 3) explains the process of data analysis that 
may lead to a grounded theory: 
 
The codes are analyzed and those that relate to a common theme are grouped together. 
The higher order commonalities are called concepts. Concepts are then grouped and 
regrouped to find yet higher order commonalities called categories. It is these 
concepts and categories that lead to the emergence of a theory. The data that has been 
analyzed without a preconceived theory or hypothesis is truly grounded in the data 
[original emphasis]. 
 
Grounded theories and findings that emerge are fully “faithful to the evidence” gathered in 
the studies (Neuman 2006: 160). Denscombe (2007: 104) argues that theories are developed 
after “constant reference to the empirical data and this means that, unlike with speculative, 
abstract theories, they are built on a sound foundation of evidence.” The main components of 
the grounded theory approach will be discussed in more detail in the next section.  
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3.8.3. Main components of the grounded theory approach 
 
• Theoretical sampling: A data gathering method which leads researchers to choose 
participants for their “relevance to the research question and analytical framework” 
(Schwandt 2007: 269). Theoretical sampling “follows a route of discovery based on 
the development of a theory which is grounded in evidence” (Denscombe 2007: 18). 
 
• Coding: Examination of data in order to find commonalities (Denscombe 2007: 98). 
Coding requires asking numerous questions about the data and making constant 
comparisons (Babbie and Mouton 2001: 499). Sarantakos (2005: 349) argues that 
coding is “the central pathway to theory construction.” 
 
• Open coding: The initial labelling of data (Denscombe 2007: 98). During the open 
coding process, data are “closely examined and compared for similarities and 
differences (Strauss and Corbin 1998: 102). Open coding leads to creation of concepts 
and categories (Babbie and Mouton 2001: 499). 
 
• Concepts: Also known as phenomena. A concept is “an abstract representation of an 
event, object, or action/interaction that a researcher identifies as being significant in 
the data” (Strauss and Corbin 1998: 103). 
 
• Axial coding: Linking and interconnecting the codes and concepts according to their 
relationships in order to identify key components and central categories (Sarantakos 
2005: 350; Denscombe 2007: 98). 
 
• Categories: Key concepts that emerge from the data (Denscombe 2007: 98). 
 
• Selective coding: Integrating data into a central category that “represents the main 
theme of the research” (Strauss and Corbin 1998: 146). 
 
• Theoretical saturation: The point in the research process when “no new properties, 
dimensions, or relationships emerge” from the data (Strauss and Corbin 1998: 143). 
Theoretical saturation “denotes the end of the analysis” (Sarantakos 2005: 350). 
 
 69
3.8.4. Advantages and disadvantages of the grounded theory approach 
 
Listed below are the advantages and disadvantages of the grounded theory approach 
summarized from Sarantakos (2005: 121) and Denscombe (2007: 104-105): 
 
Advantages 
 
• Theory neutral;  
• Open to new ideas and arguments; 
• Adoptable – researchers can use a range of data collection methods and forms of 
data; 
• Creative – researchers develop concepts and formulate theories; 
• Can be used for both qualitative and quantitative social research; 
• Can develop new theories based on data; 
• Emerging theories are based on reality. 
 
Disadvantages 
 
• Questionable notion of conducting research without initial preconceptions; 
• Hard to plan the research process – using theoretical sampling prevents 
researchers from planning in advance the nature of the sample; 
• Possible subjectivity and arbitrary decision making about concepts and findings 
by researchers; 
• Analysis of data can be very complex. 
 
 
3.9. Validity and reliability 
 
Validity is a “measure of precision, accuracy, and relevance” of a research project 
(Sarantakos 2005: 83). Validity is very important in interpretive and qualitative social 
research. However, instead of using the term “validity,” qualitative researchers often use 
different terms, such as “credibility,” “trustworthiness,” or “authenticity.” Credibility and 
authenticity of research are more important to qualitative researchers than “the idea of a 
single version of truth” promoted by the positivist social science research approach and 
quantitative researchers. Qualitative researchers’ goal is to give a “fair, honest, and balanced 
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account of social life from the viewpoint of someone who lives it every day” (Neuman 2006: 
196). 
 
To achieve credibility, trustworthiness, and authenticity of their research, qualitative 
researchers use the following methods (Sarantakos 2005: 86): 
 
• Support the findings by other studies; 
• Use triangulation; 
• Provide detailed information about data collection and analysis; 
• Use communicative validation – involve participants or external audits to check 
the accuracy of the data and findings; 
• Use argumentative validation – present the findings in a way that can be easily 
tested. 
 
Reliability is a “measure of consistency and precision” of a research project. While 
qualitative researchers give attention to reliability, they use terms such as “consistency,” 
“applicability,” or “dependability” (Sarantakos 2005: 89; Denscombe 2007: 298). Qualitative 
researchers use a variety of “data sources and employ multiple measurement methods” in 
order to come up with reliable and dependable data (Neuman 2006: 196).  
 
 
3.9.1. Validity and reliability of this study 
 
The author has used semi-structured interviews and an extensive literature analysis to get 
multiple perspectives and confirm the credibility and authenticity of the study and findings. 
The research was planned and conducted in an accurate, ethical, and professional manner to 
ensure its validity, reliability, credibility, and trustworthiness. 
 
 
3.10. Ethical considerations 
 
3.10.1. Ethical standards 
 
Social researchers have “moral and professional obligation to be ethical” and are expected to 
always follow ethical standards in their work (Neuman 2006: 129). Below are the basic 
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ethical standards that need to be respected in social research (Sarantakos 2005: 18; 
Denscombe 2007: 141): 
 
• Respect for the “rights and dignity” of participants; 
• Honesty, integrity, and professionalism of researchers; 
• Providing clear and truthful information about research aims and procedures to 
participants; 
• Avoidance of any physical or psychological harm to participants; 
• Explaining possible risks and consequences participants may encounter due to 
their participation in a research project; 
• Right to privacy and anonymity of participants; 
• Confidentiality of the data collected in a research project; 
• Research needs to be based on informed consent. 
 
 
3.10.2. Informed consent 
 
The purpose of informed consent is to fully inform participants in a research project about the 
research and help them decide whether or not they want to participate. An informed consent 
form must communicate to participants the following (Sarantakos 2005: 20; Neuman 2006: 
136: Denscombe 2007: 146-47):  
 
• Identity of the researcher;  
• Contact details of the researcher; 
• Institution that approved the research; 
• Sponsors of the research, if any; 
• Aims, objectives, and procedures of the research; 
• Potential benefits and risks to the participants; 
• Guarantee of privacy and anonymity of the participants and confidentiality of 
data; 
• Right to withdraw from the process at any time. 
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3.10.3. Ethical considerations in this study 
 
To protect the participants from any harm, the author has asked them to remain anonymous in 
the study. Anonymity will ensure that the participants are unidentifiable to protect their 
identity after the study is made public. In addition, the author has guaranteed confidentiality 
of the data collected during the interview process (Sarantakos 2005: 20-21). 
 
The interviews have been conducted on a voluntary basis and the participants were able to 
leave the process at any time. The process was based on informed consent, which was 
communicated to the participants prior to the interviews (see Appendix III). The participants 
voluntarily took part in the study fully understanding possible risks and consequences 
involved. They were informed of their right to decline to answer any questions they found 
inappropriate. The author has advised the participants not to reveal any politically sensitive 
information that may jeopardize them and their movement after the study is made public. 
 
As a result of the distance between the participants and the author and the participants’ 
inability to receive and send back signed paper copies of informed consent, the author had to 
rely on the internet and email to deliver the informed consent forms and receive 
confirmations that participants read and understood the information and agreed to participate 
in the study. According to Denscombe (2007: 148), even though this [internet] approach is 
not “as good as a formal signature,” it still shows the agreement by the participants to be a 
part of the research process. 
 
 
3.11. Limitations of the study 
 
This study focuses on the Justice and Equality Movement, one of the two original Darfur 
rebel movements and currently the most powerful rebel force in the Darfur province. As 
noted above, it is estimated that there are over twenty rebel movements and factions in 
Darfur. One of the main limitations of this study is the focus on only one rebel movement. 
This had to be done due to the time constraints and the author’s inability to reach other rebel 
movements at this point.  
 
Sarantakos (2005: 350) argues that the main limitation of the grounded theory approach is a 
possibility of researchers being too subjective and having “high level of arbitrary decisions” 
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in their studies. To limit subjectivity and arbitrary decisions, the author has kept an open 
mind throughout the research process and has based the findings solely on the data collected 
in the study.  
 
One of the limitations of the study is relying on the media for a large portion of the data. This 
was necessary as the conflict in Darfur is ongoing and many events explored in this study are 
too recent to be discussed in books or academic journals. In order to present an up-to-date 
picture of the conflict, in many cases the author had to use news articles as the primary 
sources of data. Throughout the data collection process, the author has made sure that only 
credible and reliable news sources were included in the study (Denscombe 2007: 228). 
 
Another limitation is using the internet to interview the participants instead of conducting 
face-to-face interviews. When researchers conduct interviews this way, they lose the 
opportunity to observe “visual clues” and “non-verbal behaviour” of the participants 
(Sarantakos 2005: 285; Denscombe 2007: 187). However, using the internet to interview the 
rebel representatives was the only method the author could use at this point. 
 
 
3.12. Conclusion 
 
This chapter has discussed research design and methodology, sample, data collection, the 
grounded theory as the data analysis method, validity and reliability, ethical considerations, 
and limitations of the study.  
 
The next chapter will explore historical roots of conflicts in Sudan and Darfur. The first part 
of the chapter will focus on Sudan under the colonial rule and post-independence divisions 
and conflict between the south and north Sudan. The second part will focus on the Darfur 
province and the roots of the current conflict and rebellion. 
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CHAPTER FOUR – HISTORICAL BACKGROUND: SUDAN AND 
DARFUR 
 
 
4. Introduction 
 
This chapter will explore historical roots of conflicts in Sudan and Darfur. The historical 
analysis is important because social context is critical for understanding the social world. 
“The meaning of social actions depends of the context in which they appear… qualitative 
researchers must note what came before and what surrounds the focus of the study” (Neuman 
2006: 158).  
 
The chapter is divided into two sections. The first part of the chapter will focus on Sudan 
under the colonial rule and post-independence divisions and conflict between the south and 
north Sudan. The second part will focus on the Darfur province and the roots of the current 
conflict and rebellion. The author will show that the roots of modern tensions and conflict in 
Sudan lie in the policies implemented by the British colonial administration between 1899 
and 1956. The policies first separated the Arab-dominated north and the African-dominated 
south and led to southern underdevelopment. The decision by the British to reverse their 
policies and put the regions back together in the 1940s had led to the northern domination in 
post-independence Sudan. In terms of the Darfur province, the British colonial administration 
had completely ignored Darfur in economic, social, and political terms ever since Darfur 
became a part of Sudan in 1917, and this had set the stage for future conflicts.  
 
When Sudan became independent in 1956, the successive central governments continued to 
marginalize southern Sudan and Darfur. This consequently triggered the southern rebellion 
and two civil wars that have ravaged the country for the most part of the second half of the 
twentieth century. Similarly, the post-independence marginalization of Darfur is seen as the 
primary cause of the rebellion that broke out in 2003. 
 
The author will refer to the information presented in this chapter during the data analysis 
process in chapter six. Chapter six will analyze the data collected in this study using the 
grounded theory approach and present key findings that emerge from the data. 
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4.1. Sudan 
 
4.1.1. Sudan emerging as a political entity  
 
Sudan is the largest country in Africa (see Appendix I for the map of Sudan), with an area of 
about one million square miles (Bechtold 1976: 4). The country became a political entity in 
its present boundaries in the nineteenth century, when its borders were outlined at the 
Congress of Berlin in 1886 (O’Ballance 2000: vii). The colonial powers drew the boundaries 
of Sudan and the rest of Africa without considering the tribal and ethnic diversity on the 
continent thus, intentionally or not, preparing the ground for future conflicts (Hutchinson and 
Smith 1996: 13). 
 
As one of the most diverse countries in the world and the largest country in Africa, Sudan is 
divided by religion (70% Muslim, 25% animist, 5% Christian), ethnicity (40% Arab and 60% 
African), and tribe and economic activity (nomadic and sedentary cultures) (International 
Crisis Group 2006; Tar 2006: 409-410). The country is comprised of about 600 tribes which 
for the most of their history never had a common language, identity, or culture (Thomas 
1993: 2). 
 
All Sudanese are black, but linguistic and cultural differences have evolved over time and 
took a meaning of ethnic and even racial differences, dividing people into “Arabs” and 
“Africans” (Prunier 2005: 4). The majority in the north are considered to be “Arabs,” while 
the majority of people in other parts of the country are “Africans” (Eprile 1974: 25; Holt and 
Daly 1979: 3; Thomas 1993: 1). For centuries, the northern part of Sudan had cultural, 
economic, political, and historical ties to Arab states, while other parts of the country had 
stronger ties to Central and East Africa (Bechtold 1976: 11). This played a significant role in 
influencing the development of people’s identities. 
 
Like in all other parts of the world, there was always some form of conflict in Sudan, but 
prior to the twentieth century conflicts were not strictly “Arab” versus “African.” Instead, the 
conflicts were over resources and territory. Strict ethnic and regional separation, animosity, 
and fighting have emerged only in the twentieth century, helped by the ideological influences 
brought in by the colonizers (Prunier 2005: 5).  
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4.1.2. Creating divisions in Sudan 
 
In the late nineteenth century, Britain conquered Sudan and incorporated it to the British 
Empire. The primary reason for the British conquest was the fear of the French takeover (El 
Mahdi 1965: 116). During the scramble for Africa, Britain and France almost went to war 
over who would control Sudan’s natural resources (Woodward 1990: 14).  
 
In 1899, Britain and Egypt created the Anglo-Egyptian Condominium in Sudan. This 
agreement had no precedent in the international law (Beshir 1974: 20). While the Egyptian 
rights were recognized in the agreement, in reality it was Britain that ruled Sudan on its own 
since the British had occupied Egypt at that time (Holt and Daly 1979: 118; El Mahdi 1965: 
121; Albino 1970: 16). Thomas (1993: 3) notes that “Egypt paid” the conquest of Sudan, 
while Britain ruled and administered the territory. Deng (1978: 151) calls it the “British rule 
with Egypt as a rubber-stamp half.” 
 
Trying to control half of the world at the time, the British did not have the force to occupy 
Sudan. As in other colonies across Africa, they had to institute the “divide-and-rule” policy in 
Sudan. This policy had been “at the root of much of the tension and conflict” (Thomas 1993: 
4) and has left deep divisions in the region. The “divide-and-rule” separated the southern 
Sudanese provinces from the rest of the country and “slowed down development of the south 
while allowing things in the north to take their natural course” (O’Ballance 2000: vii; 
International Crisis Group 2006). The British isolated the southern provinces, populated 
largely by animists and Christians, from the Arab influence, discouraged any contact between 
the north and south, and did nothing to educate the southerners and raise their standards of 
living (Eprile 1974: 70).  
 
At the same time, the British administration heavily invested in the Arab north, modernizing 
and liberalizing political and economic institutions and improving social, educational, and 
health services (El Mahdi 1965: 122). The Condominium government had nothing against 
Islam in the northern parts of Sudan. In fact, the British encouraged Islamization of the north 
through financial help for building mosques and pilgrimage travels for Muslims (Holt and 
Daly 1979:124). In southern Sudan however, the British, with the help of the Christian 
missionaries, wanted to prevent the spread of Islam (O’Ballance 2000: vii) and “preserve 
purely African way of life of the southern people” (Albino 1970: 19). Wenger (1991: 4) 
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claims that the British have done this because they “planned to attach southern Sudan to the 
British colonial East Africa.” 
 
Darfur became a part of the British-Egyptian controlled Sudan only in 1917, when the 
Condominium annexed the independent kingdom of Darfur and incorporated it in Sudan’s 
borders (El Mahdi 1965: 121; Albino 1970: 16; O’Fahey and Spaulding 1974: 186; Flint and 
de Waal 2008: 10; Abdul-Jalil et al. 2007: 56). From its annexation, the Darfur region was 
“completely neglected” by the Condominium authorities in economic, social, and political 
terms (de Waal 2004; Prunier 2006: 195). Flint and de Waal (2008: 11) write that the primary 
goal of the British colonial administration was to keep order in Darfur, while at the same time 
the authorities promoted “racial hierarchy in which the Arabs were considered superior to 
non-Arabs.” de Waal (2004a) notes that the “incorporation of Darfur into Sudan have led not 
only to the economic and political marginalization, but the near-total neglect of Darfur’s 
unique history and identity.” 
 
Another policy that created divisions in Sudan, and particularly in the south, had been the 
“indirect rule.” In order to prevent religious leaders and educated urban class from 
influencing social and political life in southern Sudan, the British Condominium government 
gave “power” to tribal leaders and ruled through them (Holt and Daly 1979: 136-137). Like 
the “divide-and-rule” policy that separated the north and south, the “indirect rule” divided the 
south into hundreds of informal chiefdoms. The British authorities made their “indirect rule” 
policies official through the “Southern Policy” document. The “Southern Policy” stated that 
“the policy of the government in southern Sudan is to build up a series of self-contained tribal 
units with structure and organization based upon indigenous customs, traditional usage, and 
beliefs” (Albino 1970: 19). These southern tribal units were to be completely separated from 
the rest of the country. Under the Southern Policy, northern officials were transferred out of 
the south, trading permits for northerners were withdrawn, and speaking Arabic and wearing 
Arabic dresses were discouraged (Albino 1970: 21; Eprile 1974: 70; Deng 1978: 4; Holt and 
Daly 1979: 125). Roberta Cohen (1996: 83), a senior advisor to the Brookings-Bern Project 
on Internal Displacement, believes that the British colonial policies destroyed interactions 
among different groups in Sudan and later led to conflict between them: 
 
The protective umbrella of indirect rule made it possible for some tribal groups to 
develop vital interests while other groups became r
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the British withdrew, an intense struggle for power ensued. The privileged became 
exposed to the danger of losing power and had to mobilize their forces in defence, 
while the underprivileged aligned themselves to gain power. 
 
Deng (1978: 152) notes that the period of the British rule in the south was the “longest period 
of peace and security [in the modern history of Sudan], at least from invasion and the use of 
crude force.” Toynbee (quoted in Albino 1970: viii) believes that, while the British had 
prevented the “oppression and exploitation” of the southern Sudanese by their northern 
countrymen, they did little to help the south “to learn how to hold their own in the modern 
world.” 
 
The British administration abruptly reversed its “Southern Policy” in 1946, stating that the 
southern Sudanese were “inextricably bound, both geographically and economically, to the 
Arab northern Sudanese as far as the future development was concerned” (Eprile 1974: 18; 
Bechtold 1976: 39). One of the reasons for this sudden decision was a need to repay northern 
Sudan for helping Britain during World War II (Eprile 1974: 19). 
 
 
4.1.3. From divisions to armed conflict 
 
The tensions and mistrust between the northern and southern Sudanese that had been building 
up over decades of the colonial rule culminated into a large-scale armed conflict on the eve of 
independence in the mid-1950s (Eprile 1974: 8). Fearing marginalization by the more 
populous and developed north, the southerners organized themselves into a guerrilla 
movement and began a rebellion (Bechtold 1976: 37; International Crisis Group 2006). This 
was the beginning of the first civil war in Sudan. Arnold Toynbee (quoted in Albino 1970: ix) 
believes that the British colonial policies were the primary cause of the conflict that began in 
1955: 
 
The British differentiated the northern and southern Sudanese from each other without 
separating them politically. This made it virtually inevitable that, if and when the 
British abdicated, the northerners, being by far the stronger of the two sections of the 
Sudanese people, should attempt, as they have done, to assimilate the southerners by 
force. This, in turn, has made it inevitable that there should be a southern resistance 
movement. 
 
While the cultural identity was always strong in the north, this was not the case in the south. 
 79
As noted above, the British “Southern Policy” was intended to break the south into a number 
of tribal units and prevent the unity of the region. Serious southern consciousness only began 
emerging in the 1950s, helped by a “feeling of common animosity toward the Arabs from the 
north, the ‘new imperialists’ who soon supplanted the British in their functions as colonizers 
in the south” (Bechtold 1976: 11).  
 
Sudan became an independent country in 1956. The new central government was fully 
controlled by the northern Arab elites. With the British gone, there was no one to stop the 
spread of Islam to the south. In 1957, the Sudanese government began opening Islamic 
institutes, schools, and mosques in the south, while the Christian missionaries were 
prohibited from opening new schools (Holt and Daly 1979: 178). Fearing a possible 
Islamization and revolted by the underdevelopment of their region, the southerners began 
developing their own ethnic identity which was best manifested through their armed 
resistance (Woodward 1990: 233). Fenton (2003: 114) emphasizes that threats to ethnic 
identity can be a great mobilizer. If people are concerned about their well being and survival, 
they can be easily brought together and be a “powerful source of action.” Pieterse (1996: 37) 
adds that uneven regional development and competition over power and resources are seen as 
“the key to ethnic group formation.” As it was discussed above, the threats to ethnic identity 
and uneven regional development have played major roles in the southern mobilization and 
group formation in the 1950s. 
 
Similarly, when Sudan became independent, the new central government continued to 
marginalize Darfur (O’Fahey 2004: 25; Miller 2007: 127; Kajee 2007; Mohammed 2008). 
Alex de Waal (2004b) claims that successive governments of Sudan have always ignored 
Darfur’s people, both “Arabs” and “Africans.” Since independence, Darfur has “received less 
education, healthcare, development assistance, and fewer government posts than any other 
region” in Sudan. Prunier (2005: 32) stresses that the social and economic underdevelopment 
in Darfur have “contained the seeds of future conflicts.” The situation in the Darfur province 
after independence will be discussed in more detail in the second part of this chapter. 
 
The first north-south war lasted between 1955 and 1972. The war ended after the Addis 
Ababa agreement was signed between the Khartoum government and Southern Liberation 
Movement in 1972 (Deng 1978: 163; Connell 2003: 3). By this time over 500,000 people had 
died in the war and millions were displaced (Eprile 1974: 49). Under the peace agreement, 
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the territorial integrity of Sudan – important to the northerners – was safeguarded, while the 
southern provinces were guaranteed the regional autonomy (Bechtold 1976: 272; Holt and 
Daly 1979: 204; Schafer 2007: 3). The agreement was “passed as an organic law,” called “the 
Southern Provinces Regional Self-Government Act,” and also included in Sudan’s 
constitution in 1973. While the agreement gave some regional powers to the south, it also 
attempted to bind the region to the rest of Sudan (Woodward 1990: 143). Schafer (2007: 4), 
on the other hand, believes that the agreement failed to bring the country together and that the 
southern autonomy only created further regional divisions. Furthermore, the Addis Ababa 
agreement radicalized many northerners who did not want any compromise with the south, 
but only a military defeat and Islamization (Bechtold 1976: 273). The importance of this in 
the years to come was enormous.  
 
Holt and Daly (1979: 204) emphasize the complex situation in the south in the early 1970s: 
“The south had been ravaged, its population uprooted, its vulnerable economy all but 
destroyed, its poor infrastructure badly damaged. The physical scars of the war would prove 
as difficult to efface as the emotional.” High hopes of self-governance in the southern 
provinces died out soon after the Addis Ababa agreement was signed. Widespread unrest in 
the south began in 1976, caused by the anger at the slow “economic development of the 
region” and corruption of the southern politicians (O’Ballance 2000: 107). Political instability 
in the northern Sudan continued as well. The north witnessed a number of attempted military 
coups to overthrow an Arab military regime that was in power at the time (Holt and Daly 
1979: 207). 
 
 
4.1.4. The second north-south war 
 
In the years after independence, apart from the civil war in the south, Sudan was also 
politically unstable. Since 1956, the country has experienced only a few years of democracy 
and relative stability. For the remaining time, Sudan was “ruled by military regimes which 
came to power through coups” (International Commission of Inquiry on Darfur 2005: 18). 
Furthermore, every post-independence government and military regime of Sudan has been 
ruled by members of the northern Arab tribes which represent only about 5% of the entire 
population and have spent the majority of development funds on the northern part of the 
country (Natsios 2008; Flint and de Waal 2008: 17). Mariam Joomla (2006: 3), a researcher 
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at the Institute of Security Studies, reminds that these northern elites have been created by the 
British colonial administration that “sought to legitimate itself through the use of tribal and 
religious leaders as political allies.” Many analysts and experts blame the country’s post-
independence problems on the “excessive power held by disproportionately wealthy elite in 
Khartoum which relentlessly exploits and subjugates” other Sudanese provinces (de Waal 
2008: 3). 
 
Systematic violations of the 1972 Addis Ababa agreement by the Arab military government, 
radical Islamization of the country, and discovery of oil in the southern region eventually led 
to a new war between the north and south in the early 1980s (International Crisis Group 
2006; de Waal 2007b: 35). Substantial oil reserves in the south have added to the region’s 
“geopolitical importance” and the central government soon stepped in to try and control it 
(Connell 2003: 3). 
 
In 1983, the government introduced the Islamic law (Sharia) and attempted to impose it 
across the country, even in the regions populated by non-Muslims. The southerners saw the 
instalment of the Sharia as yet another attempt for the northern conquest, spread of Islam, and 
Arabization of the southern region (Woodward 1990: 184). In this period, the Sudanese 
regime welcomed foreign Islamic extremists into the country and strengthened its ties with 
Iran, Iraq, and Libya, the countries that supported Sudan’s war against the Christian and 
animist south (Martin 2002).  
 
The introduction of the Sharia law resembled the Mahdi religious movement in Sudan from 
the late nineteenth century, which wanted to establish a state where the Islamic law would be 
a constitution and the Koran a guiding principle of the society (El Mahdi 1965: 97). 
O’Ballance (2000: 131) writes that the government’s primary reason for the introduction of 
the Sharia was not so much a religious one; the goal was to divert attention “away from the 
disastrous economic situation and political instability” in the country.  
 
The government terminated constitutional guarantees for the southern autonomy in 1983 and 
declared Arabic as the official language. This, in addition to the southern complaints that 
their natural resources such as “water, grain, timber, minerals, and oil were being exploited 
by the north,” had caused new unrest and an armed rebellion in the south, triggering a new 
civil war (O’Ballance 2000: 132; Quénivet 2006: 39).  
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O’Ballance (2000: 204) argues that, confronting a strong armed opposition in the south, the 
new Sudanese government that came to power in 1985 soon realized that it could not win the 
war by military means. Faced with the economic collapse in the whole country, the political 
unrest in the north, and unable to defeat the southern rebels, the government eventually 
offered a compromise to the south in 1989. The first step towards negotiations and peace was 
suspension of the Sharia law. A few days before the agreement with the south was signed, a 
military coup led by Islamic extremists took control of the government, cancelled the deal, 
intensified attempts for Arabization of the entire country (Connell 2003: 3), and broadened 
the “ideological divide” between the north and south (O'Fahey 1996: 259).  
 
Rone (2003) notes that the government’s key weapon during the north-south conflict had 
been an “ethnic [and tribal] divide-and-rule policy.” Over the decades, the government 
proved “remarkably adept at fostering further divisions within the southern military 
hierarchy” (Hutchinson 2001: 321). The government would usually make a deal with one 
rebel faction thus securing their support and fractioning the southern rebel movement. “Deep 
internal divisions have long plagued the southern politics, as evidenced by the ease with 
which Khartoum has found southern proxies to fight its war” (Martin 2002).  
 
During the two north-south wars, successive governments of Sudan used the people of 
Darfur, both “Arabs” and “Africans,” as a “major constituency of devout Muslims that could 
be mobilized” to fight against the southerners (de Waal 2004a). In both conflicts, the Darfur 
province supplied the largest number of soldiers who fought on the “Arab” side against the 
Christian, animist, and “African” south (Prunier 2005: 78; Mohammed 2008). At the same 
time, the Islamists who ruled Sudan completely neglected Darfur “in the series of Islamist 
projects aimed at social transformation” (de Waal 2004a). 
 
The second north-south war lasted for over two decades and during this time “Sudan has not 
had a credible peace process” (International Crisis Group 2002: 16). The destruction caused 
by the war was enormous: over four million people were internally displaced, 600,000 took 
refuge in the neighbouring countries, and two million died from fighting, famines, and 
diseases (Schafer 2007: 1). Martin (2002) explains the difference between this internal war 
and other wars fought in a “traditional” way: 
 
Sudan’s low-intensity conflict little resembles a war in the traditional sense, with 
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national armies fighting over a contested border. The vast majority of Sudan’s 
casualties are not combatants killed in battle but civilians who fall victim to famine 
and disease - the products of a devastated rural economy, abandoned social 
infrastructure, and limited access for humanitarian groups. 
 
The second war between the central government and southern Sudan finally ended in 2005. 
This will be discussed in the next section. 
 
 
4.1.5. The Comprehensive Peace Agreement between the north and south 
 
In 2002, the southern politicians were able to put their differences behind, unify in their 
opposition to the north under the leadership of John Garang, and start serious negotiations 
with the government (Schafer 2007: 6). After three years of negotiations, the Comprehensive 
Peace Agreement (CPA) was signed between the Sudanese ruling National Congress Party 
(NCP) and southern Sudan People’s Liberation Movement (SPLM) in January 2005. The 
agreement gave the autonomy to the southern region for the next six years and included a 
referendum on self-determination for the south in 2011. The agreement also included “power 
and wealth sharing arrangements aimed at ending decades of political and economic 
marginalization of the south” (International Crisis Group 2006a: ii). Under the CPA, half of 
the revenues from the oil produced in southern Sudan should go to the southern regional 
government (Human Rights Watch 2006).  
 
Human Rights Watch (2007) warns that many of the reforms specified in the CPA are behind 
schedule. According to the International Crisis Group (2006a: 2), the Sudanese government 
is systematically attempting to “undermine, delay, or simply ignore the elements called for in 
the CPA that would fundamentally alter the status quo and its grip on power.” Another report by the 
International Crisis Group (2007b: 1) claims that the ruling Sudanese party “considers that its 
very survival is threatened by full CPA implementation.” Nevertheless, the peace between the 
north and south still holds, and the NCP and SPLM run the country through a government of 
national unity. 
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4.2. Roots of the Darfur conflict 
 
4.2.1. Incorporation of Darfur into Sudan 
 
Darfur was an independent kingdom and a political entity since the fourteenth century 
(Prunier 2005: 2; Rankhumise 2006: 4). In the seventeenth century, with the arrival of the 
Arabs, Islam became the main religion in Darfur. By 1800, Darfur was the most powerful 
state in the region (Miller 2007: 113; Flint and de Waal 2008: 2; Abdul-Jalil et al. 2007: 40). 
 
Sudan was ruled by the Anglo-Egyptian Condominium since 1899. Darfur became a part of 
the British-Egyptian controlled Sudan only in 1917, when the Condominium forcefully 
annexed the independent kingdom of Darfur and incorporated it in Sudan’s borders (El 
Mahdi 1965: 121; Albino 1970: 16; O’Fahey and Spaulding 1974: 186; Flint and de Waal 
2008: 10). From its annexation, the Darfur region was “completely neglected” by the 
Condominium authorities in economic, social, and political terms (de Waal 2004; Prunier 
2006: 195). Flint and de Waal (2008: 11) write that the primary goal of the British colonial 
administration was to keep order in Darfur, while at the same time the Condominium 
authorities promoted “racial hierarchy in which Arabs were considered superior to non-
Arabs.” Welling (2007: 149) agrees that the British “favoured [Darfurian] Arabs over the 
Africans, giving them greater economic and political power.” de Waal (2004a) notes that the 
“incorporation of Darfur into Sudan have led not only to the economic and political 
marginalization, but the near-total neglect of Darfur’s unique history and identity.”  
 
 
4.2.2. Darfur in post-independence Sudan 
 
When Sudan became independent in 1956, the new government continued to marginalize the 
Darfur province (O’Fahey 2004: 25; Miller 2007: 127; Kajee 2007; Mohammed 2008). Alex 
de Waal (2004b) claims that successive central governments of Sudan have always ignored 
Darfur’s people, both “Arabs” and “Africans.” Since independence, Darfur has “received less 
education, healthcare, and development assistance, and fewer government posts than any 
other region” in Sudan. Prunier (2005: 32) stresses that the social and economic 
underdevelopment in Darfur have “contained the seeds of future conflicts.” 
 
The population of the Darfur province consisted of many tribes – between forty and ninety 
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depending on definitions – that distinguished themselves as ethnically and culturally “Arab” 
or “African” (Flint and de Waal 2008: 6). In many cases, the way of life determined people’s 
belonging to one group or the other. Herders were considered to be “Arabs” while “Africans” 
were farmers (Prunier 2005: 5; Kajee 2007). The largest “African” ethnic and tribal groups in 
Darfur are the Fur, Zaghawa, Masalit, Berti, Tunjur, Daju, Meidob, and Birgid (Tubiana 
2007: 69). The largest “Arab” groups are the Rizeigat, Baggara, Abbala, Habbaniya, Beni 
Halba, and Taisha. In most cases, “African” and “Arab” groups have many subgroups or 
sections (Tubiana 2007: 74; Kahn 2008: 21; Flint and de Waal 2008: 8). 
 
Alex de Waal (2004) writes that “discernible racial or religious differences between 
‘Africans’ and ‘Arabs’” in Darfur have never existed. All people in Darfur are black, Muslim, 
followers of Sunni Islam, and they for centuries lived in relative peace (Baldo 2006; Kajee 
2006). “Rather than by skin colour or other physical traits,” the people in Darfur have always 
identified themselves in “ethno-cultural or tribal terms” (El-Tigani Mahmoud 2004: 3). 
Jerome Tubiana (2007: 70), Sudan expert from France, explains the divide, or the lack of, 
between the “Arabs” and “Africans” in Darfur which were (are) often misinterpreted and 
manipulated in Darfur and Sudan: 
 
The divide is not based on skin colour. It is not based on religion. Nor is it based on 
culture, as Arabs and non-Arabs share strong cultural traits and bonds. It is not based 
on language – [many] non-Arab groups speak Arabic as their native tongue… Rather, 
the basis for the cleavage is the claim to an Arab identity that has less to do with the 
above criteria than it does with often-fictional patrilineal lineages that lead back to 
mythical Arab forbearers. There may be little, if any, historical accuracy to these 
constructs. But to those who invoke them, they are fact and truth. 
 
The political situation in post-independence Sudan, where a long civil war had been fought 
between the “Arab” north and “African” south, began politicizing Darfur’s ethnic groups and 
tribes (Prunier 2005: 46). Successive governments of Sudan saw Darfurians, both “Arabs” 
and “Africans,” as a “major constituency of devout Muslims that could be mobilized” to fight 
against the southerners (de Waal 2004a). During the two north-south wars, the Darfur 
province supplied the largest number of soldiers who fought on the “Arab” side against 
“African” south (Prunier 2005: 78; Mohammed 2008). At the same time, the government 
completely neglected Darfur “in the series of Islamist projects aimed at social 
transformation” (de Waal 2004a).  
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4.2.3. Eruption of conflict in Darfur 
 
According to a United Nations Environmental Program report (22 June 2007), environmental 
degradation is one of the major causes of conflicts in Sudan and Darfur. The report indicates 
key environmental problems: land degradation, desertification (spreading southwards by an 
average of 100 kilometres over the past four decades); overgrazing of fragile soils (livestock 
population has increased in Sudan from 27 million animals a few decades ago to around 135 
million today); and deforestation (in the last fifteen years, Sudan has lost 12% of its forests). 
Following droughts and famines in the 1980s, a conflict erupted between various groups in 
Darfur over the scarce natural resources (de Waal 2004; O’Fahey 2004: 26; Clough 2005: 3; 
Miller 2007: 120; Piiparinen 2007: 366; Kagwanja and Mutahi 2007: 3). de Waal (2007b: 29) 
argues that the “driving force for Darfur’s resource competition has been land hunger by 
camel-herding Arab groups.” After their livestock was destroyed in the famines, Darfur 
herders (Arabs) had to choose whether to maintain their way of life or take up farming. Either 
route led to conflicts with farmers (Africans) and both sides soon began arming themselves to 
defend their interests (Mamdani 2007).  
 
O’Fahey (2004: 26) writes that conflicts that used to be “settled with spears or mediation by 
elders and religious figures became much more intractable when the area started to become 
awash with guns.” The UN Environmental Program notes that Darfur is a “tragic example of 
the social breakdown that can result from ecological collapse” (Seattle Times, 22 July 2007). 
Renner (23 June 2007) argues that, “to a considerable extent, the conflict [in Darfur] is the 
result of a slow-onset disaster – creeping desertification and severe droughts that have led to 
food insecurity and sporadic famine, as well as growing competition for land and water.” 
 
During the famines and conflicts caused by them, the government in Khartoum ignored the 
deteriorating situation and in many instances supported the “Arab” groups (de Waal 2004; 
Campbell 2008). In addition, in the mid-1980s, the government began introducing “policies that 
manipulated ethnicity [in Darfur] in the interests of central politicians and their provincial 
allies” (International Crisis Group 2004: 4). Prunier (2005: 47) writes that a “rapidly 
degrading ecological situation helped polarize politically manipulated ethnic identities.” 
Tanner and Tubiana (2007: 16) note that “droughts, discriminatory politics, and the lack of 
investments in marginalized rural areas all contributed to the instability by triggering violent 
responses from people who felt neglected and oppressed.” Miller (2007: 121) believes that 
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the “Arab-African” classifications that for decades had “served primarily administrative 
purposes became more rigid during the period of famines and eventually served as the locus 
for a broader war.”  
 
To make the situation in Darfur even worse at this time, in the late 1980s Libya’s leader, 
Colonel Muammar Gaddafi, began working on the establishment of a large Arab state across 
the Sahelian Africa (Miller 2007: 125; Flint and de Waal 2008: 22). One of Gaddafi’s first 
steps was to gain control of Chad. Between 1987 and 1989, the Chadian rebels who were 
backed by Libya used Darfur as a base from where they attacked Chad (de Waal 2004b; 
International Commission of Inquiry on Darfur 2005: 22). Libyans, “with their notions of 
Arab supremacy,” organized the “Arab” tribes in the region, including Darfur, into an 
“Islamic Legion” and gave its members military training and weapons. This increased 
tensions between the local “African” and “Arab” tribes in Darfur and triggered “an Arab-Fur 
war between 1987 and 1989 in which thousands were killed and hundreds of villages burned” 
(Flint and de Waal 2008: 24). The legacy of the “Islamic Legion” would remain in Darfur 
long after the Arab-Fur war. Many current “Arab” militia leaders who are accused of war 
crimes in the current Darfur conflict have been trained by Libya in the 1980s (de Waal 
2004b; Kajee 2006; Hanson 2007; Miller 2007: 124; Wolfe 2007). 
 
In 1994, despite the disagreements from the majority of Darfurians, Sudan’s central 
government decided to split the Darfur province into three states, thus dividing the Fur, the 
largest ethnic group and the largest “African” tribe in Darfur, and making them a minority in 
each state (see Appendix I for the map of Sudan and Darfur). Many analysts argue that this 
was intended to reduce the influence of the Fur and help the Darfur “Arabs” take control of 
the province (Jooma 2006: 5; Flint and de Waal 2008: 20; Abdul-Jalil et al. 2007: 56). A 
report by the International Crisis Group (2004: 5) notes that the “manipulation of ethnic fabric 
gradually produced an alarming shift in the nature of conflict, with ethnicity becoming a major 
mobilizing factor.” de Waal (2004a) writes that “Darfur’s complex identities have been 
radically and traumatically simplified [in the second part of the twentieth century], creating a 
polarized ‘Arab versus African’ dichotomy that is historically bogus, but disturbingly 
powerful.” 
 
Omar al Bashir, the current president of Sudan, came into power in 1989 following a military 
coup organized in cooperation with the Sudanese Islamists. For years, Bashir had been 
 88
heavily influenced by Hassan al Turabi, the main ideologue of the ruling National Islamic 
Front who “promoted a radical vision of political Islam” (International Commission of 
Inquiry on Darfur 2005: 18-19; Flint and de Waal 2008: 274). Alex de Waal (2004b) writes 
that the overwhelming differences over “ideology, foreign policy, the constitution, and 
ultimately power itself” led to a conflict between Turabi and Bashir. While Turabi promoted 
equality of all Muslims in Sudan, Bashir “held to the traditional view of Sudan as the 
possession of the Arabised elite.” In 1999, Bashir’s faction prevailed and dismissed Turabi 
from the post of the speaker of the National Assembly. Many Darfurians who were brought 
into the Islamist movement by Turabi decided to leave their government posts. Some of them 
later formed a rebel movement and began the Darfur rebellion. 
 
 
4.2.4. The rebellion in Darfur 
 
In May 2000, Darfur Islamists published The Black Book in which they explained economic 
marginalization of Darfur and the “region’s systematic under-representation in national 
governments” of post-independence Sudan. The book “condemned the Islamist promise to 
Darfur as a sham” and created the ground for a rebellion against the government (de Waal 
2004). In April 2003, two loosely connected rebel groups, the Sudan Liberation Movement 
(SLM) and the Justice and Equality Movement (JEM), began attacking the government forces 
in Darfur. They listed political, economic, and social marginalization of the region as the 
main causes of the rebellion (Clough 2005: 3; International Commission of Inquiry on Darfur 
2005: 23; Baldo 2006; Kindiki 2007: 4).  
 
The rebels came from predominantly “African” sedentary ethnic groups Fur, Zaghawa and 
Massaleit (International Crisis Group 2006). The SLM, seen by analysts as a secularist group, 
was backed by the Fur, the largest ethnic group in Darfur, and some members of the Zaghawa 
and Masalit. The JEM, seen as an Islamic movement and backed mainly by the Zaghawa, was 
founded by the Darfur Islamists. Many JEM members have held government posts in the past 
but broke their relations with the regime when they realized that the government was not 
going to invest in Darfur’s development and care about the wellbeing of its inhabitants (de 
Waal 2004; Prunier 2005: 121-122; Wadlow 2006: 87-88; International Crisis Group 2007; 
Mamdani 2007).  
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The rebel claims about the marginalization of Darfur came as the southern and northern 
Sudanese politicians began negotiations to end the second south-north civil war that started in 
1983 and claimed over two million lives (Prunier 2005: 89; Schafer 2007: 1). After three 
years of negotiations, the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) was signed between the 
Sudanese government and southerners in January 2005. The agreement gave the autonomy to 
the southern region and promised a referendum on self-determination in 2011. The CPA 
included “power and wealth sharing arrangements aimed at ending decades of political and 
economic marginalization of the south” (International Crisis Group 2006a: ii), with half of 
the revenues from the oil produced in southern Sudan going to the southern regional 
government (Human Rights Watch 2006; Flint and de Waal 2008: 31). 
 
Many analysts believe that the Darfur rebellion was “indirectly provoked” by the negotiations 
between the government and south (O’Fahey 2004: 27; Woodward 2004: 478; Prunier 2005: 
163; Tar 2006: 408). The Darfurians felt excluded from the power and revenue-sharing talks. 
They wanted to pressure the government to negotiate a similar agreement in Darfur and share 
the wealth with the region (El-Tigani Mahmoud 2004: 6; Clough 2005: 3; Prunier 2006). 
Andrew Natsios (2008), the United States special envoy to Sudan in 2006-7, claims that John 
Garang, the late leader of the southern Sudan’s rebel movement, had encouraged the rebels in 
Darfur to “pressure the government by demanding a power-sharing agreement like the one he 
was negotiating for the south.” The International Commission of Inquiry on Darfur (2005: 
23) established that the peace negotiations between the government and south “did in some 
way represent an example to be followed by other groups, since an armed struggle would 
apparently lead to fruitful negotiations with the government.” 
 
 
4.2.5. The counter-insurgency in Darfur 
 
The rebels began their attacks on the government and army posts in April 2003. Some of the 
major attacks were on military bases and airports in Darfur, where rebels killed hundreds of 
soldiers and destroyed a number of aircrafts, helicopters, and other military equipment 
(Prunier 2005: 95-96; Tar 2006: 417). The rebels used pickup trucks to attack their enemy at 
“high speed and with frightening surprise” (Flint 2007: 153). 
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In response to the rebellion, the government mobilized and armed local militias from Darfur’s 
“Arab” ethnic groups, particularly those without traditional land rights, to fight against the 
“African” rebels. The Sudanese army supplied militias with weapons and equipment and 
supported their attacks on the rebels and civilians with military intelligence and air bombings 
(Prunier 2005: 98; International Commission of Inquiry on Darfur 2005: 32; International 
Crisis Group 2007; Kindiki 2007: 4; Tubiana 2007: 75). These militias came to be known as 
the “Janjaweed.” The International Commission of Inquiry on Darfur (2005: 24) notes that 
the term “Janjaweed” is “a traditional Darfurian term denoting an armed bandit or outlaw on 
a horse or camel.”  
 
The government decided to use local militias in Darfur since a large part of the regular army 
was deployed in southern Sudan at the time the rebellion broke out. Another reason to rely on 
the “Arab” militias was the fact that a significant part of the Sudanese army was made up of 
recruits from Darfur’s “African” tribes whom the government did not “consider trustworthy” 
to be used in the conflict (Prunier 2005: 97; International Commission of Inquiry on Darfur 
2005: 23-24). Also, using the “Arab” militias to fight the rebels was intended to portray the 
conflict as a centuries-old “tribal warfare” (Flint and de Waal 2008: 56) and not a conflict 
over basic human needs. 
 
Prunier (2006a) argues that the Khartoum government saw the armed rebellion in Darfur as 
“the ultimate threat - a revolt of its Muslim margins. It had to be dealt with once and for all 
with the utmost violence.” Slim (2004: 822) believes that Khartoum decided to respond in 
full force because many members of the government “feared that Darfur insurgency had the 
potential to become the vanguard for a widespread northern movement for regime change 
that could easily unravel” the regime. From the government’s point of view, the counter-
insurgency in Darfur was “rational,” since the rebellion threatened its existence and had a 
potential of spreading to the rest of the country (Prunier 2005: 105). Alex de Waal (2004b) 
describes what he calls the “counter-insurgency on the cheap” used in Darfur by the 
government of Sudan: 
 
Faced with a revolt that outran the capacity of the country’s tired and overstretched 
army, [the government] knew exactly what to do. Several times during the war in the 
south they had mounted counter-insurgency on the cheap – famine and scorched earth 
their weapons of choice… Each time, they sought out a local militia, provided it with 
supplies and armaments, and declared the area of operations an ethics-free zone. 
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The counter-insurgency in Darfur was often carried out “with completely inadequate means” 
(Prunier 2005: 154), causing an estimated 200,000 civilian deaths, millions of displaced, and 
a nearly-total destruction of local communities. The response by the government forces and 
“Arab” militias frequently went “beyond the separation and interdiction doctrines of 
measured counter-insurgency” (Slim 2004: 814). Verney (2004) calls the Darfur conflict a 
“manmade disaster” that was caused by the Sudanese authorities and their use of militias 
“whose commanders have been given freedom to do as they see fit on the ground as long as 
they get rid of the target villages.” Prunier (2006: 201) argues that the counter-insurgency in 
Darfur could not result in anything else but the enormous destruction and loss of civilian life: 
 
This was not counter-insurgency organized by a government trying to restore law and 
order. It was an answer with arms by a racially and culturally dominant group to the 
insurrection of a racially and culturally subject group. The hope that repression could 
be limited to combatants was completely unrealistic. 
 
Ayesha Kajee (2006), a researcher at the South African Institute of International Affairs, 
writes that the army and its proxies launched many attacks against civilians with an intention 
to “cut the rebels off from their civilian supporters.” Consequently, the cruelty and bloodshed 
have helped the rebels recruit scores of people among the Darfur population (Baldo 2006; 
Flint and de Waal 2008: 150). In 2005, the International Commission of Inquiry on Darfur 
(2005: 3) established that the government of Sudan and their “Arab” militias have been 
responsible for the majority of death and destruction in Darfur: 
 
The government of Sudan and the Janjaweed are responsible for serious violations of 
human rights and humanitarian law amounting to crimes under international law. The 
government forces and militias conducted indiscriminate attacks, including killing of 
civilians, torture, enforced disappearances, destruction of villages, rape and other 
forms of sexual violence, pillaging and forced displacement, throughout Darfur. 
 
The International Commission (2005: 4) also found evidence that the rebel forces have been 
“responsible for serious violations of human rights and humanitarian law which may amount 
to war crimes.” 
 
 
4.2.6. Negotiating the Darfur Peace Agreement 
 
With the help of the African Union (AU) and the support from the international community, 
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talks between the government and rebels aimed at ending the Darfur conflict began in Abuja, 
Nigeria, in August 2004. In November 2004, the parties signed protocols on security and 
humanitarian situation. This was followed by a Declaration of Principles that was signed in 
May 2005, which led to negotiations of a peace agreement (Hottinger 2006).  
 
In Abuja, the rebels were represented by the Justice and Equality Movement and two 
ethnically divided factions of the Sudan Liberation Movement that formally split in 2005 due 
to internal divisions among the leadership (Buchanan-Smith and Jaspars 2007: 559). One 
SLM faction was led by Abdel Wahid Mohamed al Nur, who had support of the Fur. The 
rival faction, led by Minni Minawi, had support of the Zaghawa (Baldo 2006). 
 
For a negotiation process to be successful, all parties must have an intention to achieve a 
settlement and believe that resolving conflict through negotiations is the best option available 
(Anstey 2006: 138). Bradshaw (2007: 4) notes that the only way the parties can come to an 
agreement is through understanding each others’ points of view. Kriesberg (1998: 272) 
reminds that parties sometimes enter a negotiation process only to be seen as working for 
peace but without any serious devotion to end conflict. During the talks in Abuja, instead of 
negotiating and trying to understand each others perspectives and views, the parties kept 
“reiterating their demands, rejecting the positions of their opponents, trading accusations and 
recriminations, grandstanding for the benefit of the international observers, and attempting to 
win support for their positions from the mediators” (Nathan 2006a). 
 
The main factors that prevented the rebels from making progress against the government’s 
negotiation team were “divisions and shifting alliances” of the rebel factions (International 
Crisis Group 2006: 2). The rebels were not able to unify their positions during the talks and 
often even refused to meet each other (Nathan 2006; Toga 2007: 244). Instead of honest 
negotiations to end the conflict and bring peace to the region, the government and rebels 
viewed “the battlefield as the strategic arena of the conflict” and the negotiations in Abuja 
only as a tactical arena (Nathan 2006; Brickhill 2007: 5; Toga 2007: 243). While the 
representatives of the rebels and government negotiated in Abuja, their forces continued 
fighting in Darfur (UN High Commissioner 2006: 5; de Waal 2007c: 369). 
 
Alex de Waal (2006c), an advisor to the African Union during the talks, believes that the 
Abuja negotiations “served mostly as a forum in which each side could rehearse its 
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condemnations of the other.” Nathan (2006) explains how none of the parties engaged in 
serious negotiations: 
 
The parties made no effort to accommodate each other’s positions and forge common 
ground. There was no bargaining, let alone collaborative problem-solving. For months 
on end the parties simply reiterated their demands, rejected their opponents’ positions, 
traded accusations, and attempted to gain a military advantage in the field. 
 
When after months of talks there was no progress in Abuja, the African Union and its 
international partners – particularly the United States – lost their patience. The AU mediators 
and international community’s special envoys, without serious strategy for ending the Darfur 
conflict, decided to use the “deadline diplomacy” as their main negotiation tool (Nathan 
2006). Pressured by the international community, the parties were compelled to come to an 
agreement (de Waal 2006). Laurie Nathan (2007) explains how the “deadline diplomacy” 
prevented effective mediation: 
 
A mediator’s job is to help adversaries overcome their enmity, build their confidence 
in negotiations and facilitate dialogue, bargaining and collaborative problem-solving. 
The deadline diplomacy caused the mediators to neglect these tasks in favour of 
writing an accord that sought to reconcile the apparently irreconcilable positions of 
the parties. The result was that the agreement was owned by the mediators and not the 
parties. 
 
The final draft of the Darfur Peace Agreement was prepared by the mediators and presented 
to the parties on a “take-it-or-leave-it basis” five days before the final deadline set by the 
African Union and international community (Nathan 2006a; International Crisis Group 2006: 
3). Alex de Waal (2007c: 371) argues that the mediators transformed the process from 
negotiations and mediation into arbitration, not giving the parties a chance to make an input 
on the final text of the agreement. 
 
The agreement consisted of three main protocols that covered power-sharing, wealth-sharing, 
security arrangements, and a chapter laying out the framework for a Darfur-Darfur Dialogue 
and Consultation (International Crisis Group 2006: 2). Below are the main provisions of the 
agreement (summarized from Hottinger 2006; de Waal 2006c; Human Rights First): 
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4.2.6.1. Major wealth-sharing provisions 
 
• Establishment of a Darfur Reconstruction and Development Fund to manage 
rehabilitation, reconstruction, and development to which Sudan’s government would 
contribute US$300 million in 2006 and US$200 million in 2007 and 2008; 
• Establishment of a Compensation Commission with guidelines for determination and 
payment of compensation and other remedies to the victims of the conflict. The 
government would make an initial $30 million contribution to the Compensation 
Fund; 
• Granting refugees and internally displaced persons (IDP) the right to restitution or 
adequate compensation for property loss; 
• Establishment of commissions to arbitrate title disputes and develop policies for land 
use management and natural resource development. 
 
4.2.6.2. Power-sharing provisions 
 
• Nationally, the rebels would get the fourth highest position within the government, the 
Senior Assistant to the President, who would also be the chairperson of a new 
Transitional Darfur Regional Authority (TDRA); 
• Eight out of ten TDRA members would be nominated by the rebels; 
• Twelve seats in the National Assembly would go to the representatives of the Darfur 
rebel groups; 
• The rebels would get regional government positions, including one governorship, two 
deputy governorships, and 30 percent of the seats in the regional legislatures, until 
national and regional elections. Elections at every level of government in Darfur 
would take place no later than July 2009; 
• No later than 2010 a referendum would be held in Darfur to determine whether the 
three regional states should be consolidated into one region (seen as likely to increase 
Darfur’s influence in the national government) or remain separate states. 
 
4.2.6.3. Security-related provisions 
 
• A specific timeline for disarming the pro-government Janjaweed militia within five 
months, incorporating members of the rebel groups into the Sudanese military forces 
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or assisting their integration into civilian life, and returning principal responsibility for 
law enforcement in Darfur to a reformed civilian police force; 
• Disarming the Janjaweed would remain the responsibility of the government of Sudan 
with verification by the African Union Mission in Sudan and the Ceasefire 
Commission. The Janjaweed would be confined to their camps and would have to 
relinquish all heavy weapons before any rebel forces are asked to withdraw and 
demobilize; 
• Armed forces would be prohibited from entering displaced persons camps and other 
civilian areas, including humanitarian supply routes; 
• Security arrangements would be monitored by the African Union peacekeeping 
forces, which would later be strengthened by the United Nations peacekeepers. 
 
4.2.6.4. Darfur-Darfur Dialogue and Consultation 
 
• In recognition that many stakeholders from Darfur were not represented at the talks in 
Abuja, 60 days after the peace agreement comes into force a community-based 
reconciliation process would begin in Darfur; 
• Peace and Reconciliation Council would work on finding ways and means of ensuring 
that all armed groups become part of a region-wide peace agreement; 
• Darfur-Darfur Dialogue and Consultation (DDDC) process would be chaired by an 
“African of independence and integrity,” assisted by a team of elders from Darfur, 
and have between 800 and 1000 delegates, including sheiks and tribal leaders, 
refugees, internally displaced persons, women, rebel groups, militias, civil society, 
and other local parties. 
 
The government and the SLM faction led by Minni Minawi signed the agreement on 6 May 
2006, “under pressure from sections of the international community” (Nathan 2006a). 
Suleiman Baldo, the head of the International Crisis Group’s Africa Division, claims that 
Minawi decided to sign the peace agreement because of the pressures from the American 
diplomats in Abuja (Sudan Tribune, 7 May 2006). The JEM and the faction of the SLM led 
by Abdel Wahid refused to sign the DPA. One of the rebel leaders who did not sign the peace 
agreement described the agreement’s text as a “product of intimidation, bullying, and 
diplomatic terrorism.” Another rebel leader who rejected the deal claimed that the agreement 
 96
did not “address the root causes of the conflict and was not the result of negotiations between 
the parties” (Brickhill 2007: 9). 
 
Alex de Waal (2006a), one of the leading international experts on Sudan and Darfur, thinks 
that the non-signatories should have signed the DPA since the agreement offered mechanisms 
for realization of rebels’ central demands. He believes that the rebels would have substantial 
representation at all levels of Darfur’s state and local governments. If they won the elections 
scheduled for 2009, “Darfur would be theirs to rule.” The permanent status of Darfur would 
also go to a referendum no later than 2010, when the rebel movements could win and have an 
autonomous region, argues de Waal. 
 
The non-signatories emphasized that they wanted a “greater financial commitment to 
compensate the victims and clearer engagement by Khartoum to transfer wealth to Darfur.” 
They strongly opposed preserving the status quo of the three Darfur states, wanting 
immediately a single Darfur region and a national vice-president. In terms of security 
arrangements, the rebel groups that rejected the agreement demanded a “greater role in 
security institutions in Darfur and nationally and participation in supervising the disarmament 
of the Janjaweed militias” (Hottinger 2006). The non-signatories claimed that the core issues 
that triggered the conflict in Darfur, such as the “land tenure and use, grazing rights, and the 
role and reform of local government and administrative structures,” were not solved by the 
DPA but left to the Darfur-Darfur Dialogue and Consultation process and that they could not 
accept this (International Crisis Group 2007). 
 
 
4.2.7. The aftermath of the Darfur Peace Agreement 
 
Signing of the DPA, instead of bringing peace, only intensified the fighting and deteriorated 
the humanitarian situation in Darfur (Nathan 2007; Human Rights Watch 2007; International 
Crisis Group 2007a; Kajee 2007; Fadul and Tanner 2007: 285). Even though the signatories 
were bound by the agreement to end the conflict and “respect and promote human rights,” the 
government and Minni Minawi’s SLM faction “continued to violate the very principles” they 
signed to promote (UN High Commissioner 2006: 2). Joomla (2006: 1) argues that “the 
political commitment to implementing [the DPA] remains extremely weak” among the 
signatories. 
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Anstey (2006: 137) believes that the success of any peace agreement depends on factors such 
as meeting legitimate interests of all sides, being “owned” by the parties, and being accepted 
by all parties. As noted above, the DPA was rejected by some parties because it did not meet 
their interests and they did not feel they owned the agreement. Nathan (2007) argues that the 
“deadline diplomacy” forced the mediators to write the agreement with little input from the 
parties. The International Crisis Group (2007a) maintains that the DPA has failed because “it 
did not adequately deal with key issues, too few of the insurgents signed it, and there has been 
little buy-in from Darfur society, which was not sufficiently represented in the negotiations.” 
 
One of the major weaknesses of the DPA was the expectation of disarmament of the 
Janjaweed militias, “the main perpetrators of massive atrocities against civilians,” by the 
government of Sudan, “despite the government’s dismal record of ignoring five previous 
commitments to do this” (International Crisis Group 2006: 17). Since it has signed the DPA, 
the government was required to disarm the Janjaweed (de Waal 2006). To this day, the 
Sudanese government has not implemented this major security-related provision of the peace 
agreement (Prunier 2008). Furthermore, Minni Minawi’s SLM faction that signed the 
agreement has not been given any real power by the government (de Waal 2007; Tanner and 
Tubiana 2007: 44) and the government never provided the funds it promised in Abuja for the 
economic development of Darfur. As Prunier (2008) notes, “even the pitiful amount of 
compensation pledged to the internally displaced (US $18 per person) was not disbursed.” 
 
Under the DPA, the AU/UN troops were expected to “create buffer zones around internally 
displaced persons’ camps, establish presence in the camps, assist in the creation of 
humanitarian corridors, help create a secure environment in areas of return, and accompany 
the displaced and refugees to areas of return or resettlement” (Cohen 2007: 2). The UN 
Security Council Resolution 1769, adopted on 31 July 2007, calls for an increase of the 7,000 
African Union troops to 26,000-strong AU/UN force, but due to the slow deployment of the 
troops, the majority of the IDP camps in Darfur are still not protected (BBC, 26 February 
2008). One of the main reasons for the slow deployment has been the lack of cooperation by 
the Sudanese government. By December 2008, less then 12,500 personnel have been 
deployed to Darfur. At the same time, the international community has not provided the 
essential equipment for the mission (UN News Centre, 18 December 2008). 
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In the aftermath of the DPA, the Darfur rebels began fragmenting along the ethnic and tribal 
lines, “between military leaders in the field and political figures spending most of their time 
in exile abroad, and between those seeking compromise and hardliners” (Economist, 20 
September 2007). It is estimated that currently there are over twenty rebel factions in Darfur 
(BBC Online, 10 May 2008). 
 
 
4.2.8. The Libyan talks 
 
After the DPA failed to bring peace to Darfur, the UN and AU mediators chose Libya as a 
host of the new peace talks in October 2007. The aim of the talks was to reach an agreement 
on “ceasefire and security, power-sharing and governance, natural resource use and 
allocation, and return to land and compensation for those affected by the conflict” 
(International Herald Tribune, 25 October 2007). 
 
Announcing the talks, the UN Secretary General, Ban Ki-moon, said that “Tripoli could 
provide a good venue and could work as a good place to facilitate peace negotiations” to end 
the Darfur conflict (Voice of America, 6 September 2007). In response to the Libyan talks, 
the Darfur Association in the USA (Sudan Tribune, 23 October 2007) issued a press 
statement claiming that “by all objective standards, Tripoli is not and will not be a suitable 
and neutral venue to resolve this ever-increasing and worsening conflict in Darfur” due to 
Libya’s history of supporting radical “Arabs” in Darfur and Chad. As noted above, in the 
1980s, Libya trained and armed many leaders of the current Janjaweed militias that are 
terrorizing Darfur since 2003. 
 
The majority of the Darfur rebel movements boycotted the talks in Libya. The Washington 
Post (27 October 2007) writes that the rebel leaders gave different reasons for not attending. 
Some said that they “needed more time to unify their negotiating platform, that they did not 
trust Libya, that they did not trust the Sudanese government, or that they did not trust one 
another.” Some rebels said that they viewed Libya as “politically too close to their opponents 
in the Sudanese government” (Reuters, 14 November 2007).  
 
The leaders of the JEM and SLM said they boycotted the talks because the UN and AU 
mediators “invited many smaller groups which they claimed were government collaborators 
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geared at weakening the rebels’ position” (USA Today, 27 October 2007). Abdel Wahid, the 
leader of one faction of the Sudan Liberation Movement, said that he would not attend the 
Libyan talks because he “did not recognize most of the other rebel leaders as legitimate and 
that any peace agreement would be meaningless unless security was established in Darfur 
first” (Washington Post, 27 October 2007). Without the majority of the rebel movements 
present, the Libyan talks failed before they even began. 
 
 
4.2.9. The “free-for-all” conflict in Darfur in 2008 
 
What was once a rebellion by the JEM and SLM and the government’s counter-insurgency in 
Darfur has become a “free-for-all” conflict in late 2007 and throughout 2008. As the rebels 
fragmented into over twenty factions, many of which are nothing but armed gangs, Darfur 
became a “home to semi-organized crime and warlordism” (Washington Post, 20 June 2008). 
Further complication of the conflict has been the emergence of the Darfur “Arab” groups that 
are opposing the government of Sudan (Hanson 2007). Fadul and Tanner (2007: 312) argue 
that many members of the “Arab” tribes, who until now remained neutral in the conflict, are 
shifting toward the rebels. Others are forming their own rebel groups in order to fight against 
the government forces and their militias. Some of the Darfurian “Arab” rebel groups opposed 
to the Sudanese government are the United Revolutionary Force Front, Democratic Popular 
Front Army, and Sudanese Revolutionary Front (Wolfe 2007; Flint, 1 January 2008).  
 
Ahmed Kamal El-Din (2007: 93), a lawyer and independent Sudanese Islamist, stresses that 
the current Darfur conflict “transcends all local tribal and other differences and represents 
political discord between the people of Darfur and the central authority in Khartoum.” The 
“Arab” rebels “denounce the Janjawiid as a minority of mercenaries and hired individuals 
and pledge to fight the injustices of Khartoum and the terrorizing of civilians” (Flint 2007: 
167). In addition, a number of Darfur’s “Arab” tribes are increasingly fighting each other 
“over land, cows and other spoils of war. Disillusioned Janjaweed militiamen, abandoned by 
the government, have joined rebels and government soldiers in the business of looting, 
carjacking, and petty shakedowns” (Washington Post, 20 June 2008). Wolfe (2007) notes that 
even some of “the militias that formed the Janjaweed appear to be turning on each other.” 
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Sam Ibok, one of the leading African Union mediators working on the Darfur conflict, says 
that since the failed Libyan talks in October 2007, the Darfur peace process is “not going 
anywhere.” Ibok adds that all parties have “lost confidence in the process and remain unable 
to overcome their mutual distrust… The rebels have fractured into more than twenty groups 
and [the Sudanese government] has failed to formulate a clear Darfur strategy” (Los Angeles 
Times, 2 April 2008).  
 
General Martin Agwai, the commander of the UN/AU peacekeeping forces in Darfur, claims 
that the conflict in Darfur is “no longer simply ‘African against Arab’ but colored by 
infighting between Africans, Arabs, and rival signatories of past peace accords” (Independent 
Online, 15 October 2008). General Agwai urges the international community “to put as much 
pressure on the fragmented rebels in the war-torn Sudanese region as it does on the Khartoum 
government.” Agwai says that “while it is popular to ‘bash’ the Sudanese government, the 
reluctance of Darfur rebels to negotiate is often forgotten” (Mail and Guardian, 13 August 
2008). Jean-Marie Guehenno, the UN peacekeeping chief, argues that the conflict in Darfur 
has “grown infinitely more complex [over the years], and prospects for peace seem more 
remote.” Guehenno claims that none of the parties in the conflict is “demonstrating the 
political will to abandon the military option, engage in negotiations, or fully cooperate with 
the UN mission in Darfur and the humanitarian community” (Reuters, 15 May 2008). Alex de 
Waal (2008) writes that the “situation in Darfur is one of turbulence. It is constant movement 
and shifting of alliances, but at the end of the day very little in the way of actual forward 
motion or real strategic change.” 
 
In the beginning of May 2008, the JEM forces mounted an attack on the Sudanese capital, the 
first attack by a Darfur rebel group outside the province. The attack failed, but showed the 
JEM’s determination to change the Sudanese regime. After the Darfur Peace Agreement 
failed to bring peace and the government failed to deliver any of the provisions it pledged to 
implement, such as disarmament of the Janjaweed militias, protection of civilians, ceasefire, 
and deployment of UN/AU troops, the JEM’s main aim became regime change (Flint 29 May 
2008). Many analysts emphasize “the psychological importance of the JEM’s attack on the 
capital,” adding that this is the first time since independence that the fighting has reached the 
capital. Even though the JEM’s attack did not succeed, it has exposed the “vulnerability of 
the regime” (Mohammed 2008; Reuters, 11 May 2008). 
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In July 2008, after the UN Security Council requested from the International Criminal Court 
(ICC) to investigate the crimes committed in Darfur, the ICC prosecutor, Luis Moreno-
Ocampo, filed ten charges against Omar al Bashir, Sudan’s president - three counts of 
genocide, five of crimes against humanity, and two of murder. The ICC accuses Bashir of 
orchestrating a counter-insurgency campaign in Darfur since 2003 that has killed 35,000 
people, while at least 100,000 died through starvation and diseases and 2.5 million people 
were forced to flee their homes (Reuters, 17 July 2008). The ICC prosecutor also requested 
arrest warrants for three Darfur rebel commanders who are accused of war crimes and attacks 
on peacekeepers (Sudan Tribune, 21 November 2008).  
 
Many analysts and conflict management experts argue that the ICC’s case against president 
Bashir could be counter-productive in achieving peace in Darfur (Lanz 2008a: 3). Nick 
Grono (Boston Globe, 16 July 2008) from the International Crisis Group reminds that the 
goal of the ICC prosecutor regarding Darfur is not to “advance the interests of peace; his 
official role is to act in the interests of justice, to end impunity for those believed guilty of 
atrocity crimes.” This could backlash in Sudan and Darfur and “lead the regime to lash out, 
with the potential to increase the suffering of large numbers of people.” Sudan’s foreign 
ministry undersecretary, Mutrif Siddiq, said in an interview that an indictment of president 
Bashir would have “a very negative impact” on Darfur and Sudan. “The rebellion in Darfur 
will escalate. [The rebels] will feel jubilant ... They will say they are fighting a legitimate 
cause against a criminal government and a criminal president” (Mail and Guardian, 6 January 
2009). Alex de Waal (2007: 7) notes that, if Bashir “believes that the end result will be that 
he shares the same fate as Saddam Hussein, no amount of pressure will make him yield.”  
 
The Arab League finally showed interest in the Darfur conflict in August 2008 and vowed to 
organize new Darfur peace talks in Qatar. Some Darfur rebel groups dismissed the initiative, 
saying “the move [by the Arab world] came five years too late.” According to the Sudan 
Tribune (5 January 2009), “none of the rebel groups announced clearly its intention to take 
part in the [Qatar peace] talks.” The analysts and rebel leaders believe that the proposed Qatar 
peace process is just a “desperate attempt to save the Sudanese president from international 
justice,” happening around the same time as the move by the International Criminal Court to 
charge president Bashir for the crimes committed against civilians in Darfur (AFP, 11 
September 2008). Khalil Ibrahim, the leader of the JEM, says that “the Arab League is not 
eligible for mediation” due to its support of the Khartoum government and the lack of interest 
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in the Darfur conflict up to this point (Sudan Tribune, 20 December 2008). The Qatari 
diplomats are currently consulting with the parties in Darfur and Sudan and plan to organize 
peace talks in the beginning of 2009 (International Herald Tribune, 5 January 2009). 
 
In October 2008, the Sudanese president launched the “Darfur Peace Initiative” aimed at 
“reaching a peace deal to the five-year old conflict” in Darfur. While the initiative was 
attended by some Sudanese political parties and civic organizations, the Darfur rebel groups, 
“whose participation would appear to be a requirement for any effective settlement to the 
conflict,” refused to take part. The Justice and Equality Movement issued a statement 
claiming that this is only an attempt “by the ruling National Congress Party to avoid an arrest 
warrant for president Bashir at the International Criminal Court” (Voice of America, 17 
October 2008). 
 
The initiative made the following suggestions: immediate and unilateral ceasefire by the 
government; support for the UN/AU peacekeeping force in Darfur; creation of a 
compensation fund to help the return of refugees and displaced; creation of additional vice-
presidential position for a Darfur representative; and the reversal of the 1994 decision to 
divide Darfur into three states (Sudan Tribune, 11 November 2008). On 11 November 2008, 
president Bashir announced an unconditional ceasefire as recommended by the “Darfur Peace 
Initiative.” Bashir said his government “confirms the commitment of negotiations to reach 
peaceful solutions that guarantee the eradication of disputes” (Mail and Guardian, 12 
November 2008). In addition, president Bashir said the government of Sudan would “disarm 
various armed groups, in an apparent reference to Arab Janjaweed fighters which are alleged 
to have links to the government” (Al Jazeera, 13 November 2008). 
 
However, the Darfur rebel movements dismissed the ceasefire, saying that “president Bashir 
cannot be trusted” and that they would not accept the ceasefire “until pro-government militias 
are disarmed” (Voice of America, 12 November 2008). A few days after Bashir’s ceasefire 
announcement, the government forces clashed with the rebels in Darfur and many analysts 
saw this as a clear breach of the “unconditional ceasefire” by the government (Reuters, 17 
November 2008). Analysts remind that president Bashir “has announced several ceasefires 
during the nearly six-year Darfur conflict, all of which failed” (Voice of America, 12 
November 2008).  
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4.3. Conclusion 
 
This chapter has explored historical roots of conflicts in Sudan and Darfur. The first part of 
the chapter has focused on Sudan under the colonial rule and post-independence divisions 
and conflict between the south and north Sudan. The focus of the second part has been on the 
Darfur province and the roots of the current conflict and rebellion.  
 
The next chapter will present research findings collected through semi-structured interviews 
with the representatives of the Justice and Equality Movement and an extensive literature 
analysis. The chapter will be divided into twelve sections that deal with the issues regarding 
the Darfur conflict and the aims and perspectives of the JEM. 
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CHAPTER FIVE – RESEARCH FINDINGS 
 
 
5. Introduction 
 
This chapter will present research findings collected through semi-structured interviews and 
an extensive literature analysis. To gather first-hand data about the Justice and Equality 
Movement, the author has interviewed official representatives of the movement. In addition 
to the interviews, the author has conducted a literature analysis and consulted a wide range of 
sources (books, academic journals, news articles and interviews, NGO publications, and 
statements from the rebel movement) in order to get a better picture of the Darfur conflict and 
the aims and perspectives of the JEM. The material from the literature will be used to either 
confirm or contradict the data collected through the interviews or bring in new arguments and 
views. 
 
As the aim of this study is to examine the Darfur conflict and the future of the region from 
the perspective of the Justice and Equality Movement, the author will present below the 
responses of the rebel representatives in full. This chapter is divided into twelve sections and 
structured according to the twelve predetermined questions (presented in chapter three, 
section 3.6) asked during the interview process. Each question is a theme that deals with 
specific issues regarding the Darfur conflict and the rebels. Follow-up questions and the 
responses to these questions will be incorporated in some of the twelve sections. After 
presenting the responses of the JEM, whenever available and appropriate, the author will 
present the information collected through the literature analysis that deals with each question. 
 
In chapter six, the author will conduct an analysis of the data presented in this chapter using 
the grounded theory approach. When appropriate, he will also refer to chapters two and four 
– Literature Review and Historical Background respectively - during the data analysis 
process in order to either confirm or contradict the data collected in this study or bring in new 
arguments and views. Chapter six will present key findings that emerge from the data. 
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5.1. Can you explain why the fighting started in 2003? 
 
The representatives of the Justice and Equality Movement interviewed for this study argue 
that, 
 
Darfur’s dissatisfaction with the Centre began far earlier than 2003. If we limited that 
history to independent Sudan, the first manifestation of distress with the Centre was in 
the formation of Darfur Development Front (Jabhat Nahdhat Darfur) in 1964. The 
proclaimed objective of DDF was to work for the political and economic rights of the 
region albeit through peaceful means.  
 
The Darfur uprising of 1980 was an integral part of the refusal of the injustice done to 
the region by the Centre. The short-lived armed movement of Dawoud Bolad was 
another signboard on the road to what is coming next. Ecological factors that led to 
internal migration and relocation of enormous populations led to frictions to between 
the newcomers and old settlers. Unfortunately, the Centre has been blamed for taking 
sides instead of its natural role of a fair arbiter. Ethnic groups found no choice to 
forming their militias to defend themselves. These militias gradually got more 
politicized and turned their guns towards the Centre that has been accused of 
meddling in the intertribal relations in Darfur. The coup against the spiritual leader of 
the National Congress Party was interpreted by some as a move Darfur and west 
Sudan in general and that led to severance of relations with their old comrades from 
the Riverian north. The eruption of the armed conflict is a mixture and a culmination 
of all above.  
 
In addition, movement’s “Proposal for Change” (JEM 2008: 2) states that,  
 
Sudan has been controlled by elites of the Northern Region throughout its 
independent history; this control has remained the same irrespective of the nature of 
the government of the day. The hegemony of the Northern elites has prevailed 
through democratic, theocratic, socialist and military governments alike. The 
domination of the North that is reckoned to constitute only five percent of Sudan’s 
population is so pervasive and has been maintained at a huge cost to the nation. The 
result is obvious: wars, famines, disease and poverty. 
 
In May 2000, the Darfur Islamists who are believed to be the same people who later founded 
the JEM, published The Black Book in which they explained the economic marginalization of 
Darfur and the “region’s systematic under-representation in national governments” of post-
independence Sudan. This book created the ground for the rebellion against the central 
government (de Waal 2004). In order to test the arguments expressed in The Black Book 
about the economic and political marginalization of Darfur and other peripheries by the 
ruling northern Sudanese elites, Alex Cobham (2005: 9-10) examined the economic and 
developmental data, revenue and expenditure patterns, and regional human development 
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outcomes from the government of Sudan, World Bank, International Monetary Fond, and 
United Nations. He came to a conclusion that “the claims made in The Black Book that Sudan 
has been governed since independence to benefit the northern region disproportionately at the 
expense of all other” Sudanese regions are correct. Cobham gives examples of economic and 
social marginalization of Darfur:  
 
The northern states enjoyed a subsidy more than twice that offered to the West 
[Darfur region]. Per capita development expenditure in the West has run at less than a 
fifth of that of the North. Education outcomes exhibited similar patterns, with literacy 
and enrolment rates notably higher in the North and Khartoum than elsewhere, indeed 
towards twice the levels in the West. 
 
The International Commission of Inquiry on Darfur (2005: 23) explains why the Darfur 
rebels began the armed rebellion in 2003: 
 
While only loosely connected, the two rebel groups [the JEM and Sudan Liberation 
Movement] cited similar reasons for the rebellion, including socio-economic and 
political marginalization of Darfur and its people. In addition, the members of the 
rebel movements were mainly drawn from local village defence groups from 
particular [African] tribes, which had been formed as a response to increases in 
attacks by other [Arab] tribes.  
 
Both rebel groups had a clearly stated political agenda involving the entirety of the 
Sudan, demanding more equal participation in government by all groups and regions 
of the Sudan. Initially the SLM, at that stage named the Darfur Liberation Front, came 
into existence with an agenda focused on the situation of the people of Darfur, and 
only later expanded its agenda to cover all of Sudan. The Justice and Equality 
Movement based its agenda on a type of manifesto – The Black Book, published in 
2000 – which essentially seeks to prove the disparities in the distribution of power and 
wealth, by noting that Darfur and its populations, as well as some populations of other 
regions, have been consistently marginalized and not included in influential positions 
in the central government in Khartoum. 
 
 
5.2. Was there a link between the Comprehensive Peace Agreement negotiated at the 
time between the government of Sudan and southern Sudan and the escalation of 
conflict and violence in Darfur? 
 
The representatives of the Justice and Equality Movement think that the negotiations which 
led to the Comprehensive Peace Agreement did in some way influence the escalation of 
conflict in Darfur in 2003: 
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It is hard to exclude completely the effect of the CPA negotiations and the escalation 
of the conflict in Darfur. First, the causes of the conflicts in all the marginalized parts 
of the Sudan are in principle the same: Political, economic and social injustice and 
marginalization. Second, what was going on at the negotiating table between SPLM 
and GoS [Government of Sudan] was a paramount proof that the Centre will not pay 
the dues of others unless they resort to arms. Actually the president of the country 
once declared that he reached power by force and whoever wants it should use the 
same. He was also quoted saying “we negotiate only with those who carry arms”. 
Third, there is strong evidence that the SPLA/M supplied arms and military support to 
Sudan Liberation Army/Movement (SLA/M) while it was negotiating with the GoS. 
SPLA/M was trying to put maximum pressure on GoS to get the maximum from the 
negotiations. The three combined made their impact on the ground in Darfur.  
 
As noted in chapter four, many analysts and Sudan experts believe that the Darfur rebellion 
was indirectly provoked by the negotiations between the government and southern Sudan 
(Prunier 2005: 163; Tar 2006: 408). The International Commission of Inquiry on Darfur 
(2005: 23) established that the peace negotiations between the government and south “did in 
some way represent an example to be followed by other groups, since an armed struggle 
would apparently lead to fruitful negotiations with the government.” 
 
 
5.3. What is the political program of your movement? 
 
According to the JEM representatives,  
 
JEM believes that Sudan has been ruled through a wrong equation since its 
independence in 1956. That equation led to the political and economic 
marginalization of the majority of population in the regions at the expense of the 
Centre. The result is armed conflicts in the South, in Blue Nile, in the Nuba 
Mountains, in the East, in Darfur and currently in the North. That being said, JEM 
demands a new social contract between the Sudanese peoples and regions where by 
all citizens have political and economic rights, have proportionate representation at 
the Centre coupled with a real federal system with true devolution of power and 
resource.  
 
In addition, the JEM “Proposal for Change” (JEM 2008: 2-4) explains in detail the political 
program of the movement: 
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General objectives of the Justice and Equality Movement: 
 
• Eradication of economic, cultural and political marginalization of the majority of 
Sudanese, which has been a feature of Sudan’s politics since its Independence in 
1956; 
 
• Establishment of a just system based on democratic principles, rule of law, respect of 
human rights and accommodation of diversity of all Sudanese people; 
 
• Institution of constitutional reform that enables all regions of Sudan to rule 
themselves within a federal system under a united Sudan; 
 
• Improvement of standards of living for all people in the country and with equitable 
access to public services; 
 
• Initiation of sustainable socio-economic development that will span the whole nation; 
 
• Realization of the supremacy of the law and separation of powers in the country; 
 
• Establishment of a federal and democratic government of national unity; 
 
• Liberation of Sudanese citizens from poverty, disease, illiteracy, hunger and restoring 
their dignity and confidence; 
 
• Enabling all Sudanese citizens to participate effectively in the process of production, 
creativity and peaceful co-existence; 
 
• Empowerment and support of women, youth and other marginalized sectors in the 
community to assume their full role in building a prosperous society; 
 
• Provision of care for the weakest members of the society including children, orphans, 
widowed, elderly, displaced and the disabled; 
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• Institution of congenial and friendly relations with the outside world guided by 
principles of mutual respect and promotion of common interests;  
 
General principles of the JEM: 
 
• Sudan shall remain a sovereign and united country; 
 
• Sudan shall become a federation of Six Regions: the Central Region, the Southern 
Region, the Northern Region, the Eastern Region, Kordofan Region, Darfur Region; 
 
• Khartoum shall maintain a special status as a National Capital Zone during the interim 
period; 
 
• Country shall be ruled according to a new Federal and Democratic System; 
 
• Arabic and English shall become the official languages of the country while genuine. 
Indigenous languages will be promoted and officially recognized; 
 
• The country shall be obligated to protect human rights of all citizens; 
 
• The country shall have four levels of governance: Federal, Regional, State and Local. 
 
The Justice and Equality Movement’s “Proposal for Change” (JEM 2008: 5) states that the 
movement is committed to separation of religion and state, removal of “religion from 
Sudanese politics,” and would like to see Sudan as “a non-theocratic federal republican 
state.” 
 
 
5.3.1. Is JEM an Islamist movement? 
 
There is a lot of talk in the Western media about the Justice and Equality Movement being an 
“Islamist” movement and having strong links with Hassan al Turabi, the man who had been 
the main ideologue of the ruling National Islamic Front in the 1990s. Alex de Waal (2007b: 
14) argues that the  links between the JEM and to Turabi, who is “the greatest fear” of the 
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ruling regime, “account for the ferocity of the offensives in Darfur following the formation of 
the JEM.” The JEM’s representatives offer their official perspective on these labels and 
claims: 
  
The current Islamophobia in the West makes it extremely difficult to see facts as they 
are. JEM never talked about any religious agenda and its written or spoken literature 
speak about a civic democratic governance for a country that does not differentiate 
between its citizens in rights or duties on the basis of creed, colour, race, or regional 
affiliation. The mere fact that the chairperson of JEM or a few of its leaders used to 
belong to the National Islamic Front does not mean that it is an Islamic organization 
or has links to Dr. Hassan Turabi. We wish if those who claim so produce any 
supportive evidence whatsoever to prove their claim. 
 
JEM is an independent movement that talks to all the Sudanese political parties and 
civil society organizations, but has no affiliation with any of them. JEM believes that 
the Centre that includes Turabi has marginalized the rest of the country and left it in 
deprivation and despair. Contrary to the common allegations of the West, The Black 
Book which was produced by JEM before resorting to armed struggle condemns the 
regime led by Turabi more than any other political era for its injustices. JEM is an 
open organization that accepts all those who believe in its objective and are willing to 
work for their realization. The membership as well as the leadership of JEM reflects 
the diversity of the Sudanese society politically and socially and does not discriminate 
against any part of our nation. JEM is out to fight for the rights of the marginalized 
people of the Sudan regardless of their creeds or political affiliations. JEM believes 
that only the people of the Sudan have the right to decide through a fair transparent 
and democratic process how they shall be ruled. No one has the right to impose upon 
them his own vision of life or way of living. 
 
Hassan al Turabi himself has publicly said that the Justice and Equality Movement “has no 
relation with the Popular Congress Party [Turabi’s party]. It is true that many of JEM 
members used to be part of us back in the days, but they broke with us to create their own 
party” (Sudan Tribune, 13 May 2008). Julie Flint (29 May 2008), a journalist and the author 
of a number of books about Sudan and Darfur, believes that the JEM and its leader, Khalil 
Ibrahim, are not in any significant way involved with Turabi today. The next sub-section will 
present more information about Khalil Ibrahim, the leader of the JEM. 
 
 
5.3.2. The leader of the Justice and Equality Movement, Khalil Ibrahim 
 
Khalil Ibrahim, the leader of the Justice and Equality Movement, is a member of the Kobe 
tribe, a subgroup of the Zaghawa. In the 1990s, he was a member of the ruling Sudanese 
party, the National Islamic Front, and a minister of education, health, and social affairs for 
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the Darfur province (Prunier 2005: 93; Flint 2008: 151). Ibrahim was a long-time follower of 
Hassan al Turabi, the man who used to be the main Islamic ideologue of the ruling regime in 
the 1990s (Tanner and Tubiana 2007: 31).  
 
After a conflict between the president of Sudan Omar al Bashir and Turabi over “ideology, 
foreign policy, the constitution, and ultimately power itself,” Bashir’s faction prevailed and 
dismissed Turabi from the post of the speaker of the National Assembly. Many Darfurians 
who were brought into the Islamist movement by Turabi decided to leave their government 
posts (de Waal 2004b). One of them was Khalil Ibrahim, who later formed the Justice and 
Equality Movement and began the Darfur rebellion in 2003. Since the rebellion broke out, 
Ibrahim has many times publicly distanced himself and the JEM from Turabi. 
 
Analysts say that Khalil Ibrahim and his movement possess growing military strength and 
grand ambitions for regime change in Sudan. Sharing the same ethnic background as the 
leadership of neighbouring Chad, Ibrahim and the JEM have been the main beneficiaries of 
the Chadian military, financial, and other support for the Darfur rebels. This support has been 
the main reason the JEM “has become, militarily, the most powerful faction on the ground in 
Darfur” (Voice of America, 15 May 2008). 
 
 
5.4. How do your goals differ from those of some of your main rivals in Darfur? 
 
According to the representatives of the Justice and Equality Movement, 
 
The basic difference between JEM and SLM is the scope of change they aspire to 
achieve. JEM believes that the ills of Sudan rest with the Centre and its faulty 
structure while SLM is more interested in regional demands. JEM is famed to be more 
articulated, has a clear vision, well organized and privileged with a highly educated 
leadership. JEM did preach its views and publish its literature long ahead of taking 
arms while others came to light only through their military activities.4 
                                                
4
 The Sudan Liberation Movement, another Darfur rebel movement that began the 2003 rebellion with the 
Justice and Equality Movement, was initially called the Darfur Liberation Front (DLF), and had “a secessionist 
agenda for Darfur.” In 2003, the DLF was renamed the Sudan Liberation Movement and its secessionist agenda 
was replaced with a national strategy and a goal of a “united democratic Sudan and separation of State and 
religion” (International Commission of Inquiry on Darfur 2005: 37). In 2003, the SLM manifesto declared that 
the movement’s goals were the end of economic and political marginalization of Darfur, a united Sudan, and a 
secular government (Flint and de Waal 2008: 91). Julie Flint (2007: 160) writes that the SLM’s political 
manifesto was written with the help from the members of the southern Sudan People’s Liberation Movement 
(SPLM). That is why the SLM’s political declaration was a “clear echo of Garang’s [the late leader of the 
SPLM] vision of a ‘New Sudan.’” The “New Sudan” vision aims to establish a country that would “belong 
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5.5. How would you characterize the current conflict in Darfur – as a rebellion, 
revolution, uprising, civil war, or some other characterization? 
 
The representatives of the Justice and Equality Movement argue that their movement is 
fighting a revolutionary warfare for the “grand structural change” in Sudan: 
 
Most of the characterizations mentioned above embody more than an element from 
the others. However, we do believe that what is going on in several parts of the 
country amounts to a revolution that may eventually lead to a structural change in the 
way our country has been ruled and our resources managed. This does not necessarily 
mean that all movements have the same view or concept. Some are opting for very 
local and limited demands and have nothing to do with the grand structural change.  
 
A rebellion is an armed struggle against an oppressive regime. Revolutionary movements aim 
to overthrow ruling regimes, take power, and fundamentally change the system (Weede and 
Muller 1998: 49; Katz 2001: 5). After the Darfur Peace Agreement failed to bring peace and 
the government failed to deliver any of the provisions it pledged to implement, such as 
disarmament of the Janjaweed militias, protection of civilians, ceasefire, and deployment of 
UN/AU troops to Darfur, the main aim of the Justice and Equality Movement became regime 
change (Flint, 29 May 2008). In late 2006, the JEM leader, Khalil Ibrahim, said “we cannot 
bring peace in Darfur unless we change this government” (Flint and de Waal 2008: 244). The 
JEM leadership believes that the current Sudanese regime is “the main obstacle to finding 
peace to the whole Sudan problem, not only Darfur” (Voice of America, 15 May 2008). The 
JEM “Proposal for Change” states that the movement plans to achieve its objectives through 
a “war against the government in Khartoum with the aim of liberating the entire Sudan and in 
conjunction with other movements that share common objectives” (JEM 2008: 3).  
 
According to a JEM commander, his movement’s goal is to “make dramatic changes in 
Sudan. Power and wealth must be shared equally in all the marginalized areas” (Voice of 
America, 7 July 2008). Tanner and Tubiana (2007: 31) note that the Justice and Equality 
Movement “lays claim to an agenda of radical reform for all Sudan,” which essentially means 
regime change. Gerard Prunier (2005: 122), an African scholar, agrees that changing the 
central government is perhaps the only way to solve the Darfur conflict and decades of 
marginalization of Sudan’s peripheries.  
                                                                                                                                                    
equally to all its citizens” (Flint and de Waal 2008: 91) and “bring real political and economic equality for the 
marginalized provinces” (de Waal 2007b: 37).  
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In the beginning of May 2008, the JEM forces mounted an attack on the Sudanese capital, the 
first attack by a Darfur rebel group outside Darfur. The attack failed, but showed the 
movement’s determination to change the current Sudanese regime. Many analysts emphasize 
“the psychological importance of the attack,” adding that this is the first time since 
independence that the fighting has reached the capital. Even though the attack by the JEM did 
not succeed, it has exposed the “weakness of security in Khartoum and the vulnerability of 
the regime” (Mohammed 2008; Reuters, 11 May 2008). 
 
Alex de Waal, the leading international expert on Sudan, describes the JEM’s attack on the 
capital as a “bid for power.” He believes that other rebel movements in Darfur “don’t share 
that ambition ... they want peace for their places rather than wanting power in Khartoum 
for themselves” (International Herald Tribune, 12 May 2008). In the aftermath of the attack, 
the JEM leader, Khalil Ibrahim, said that this was “just a rehearsal for the attacks to come, 
and we will continue to attack till we change this regime” (Sudan Tribune, 17 May 2008). de 
Waal (2008) thinks that the aim of the attack “was nothing less than taking power” and adds 
that Khalil Ibrahim “seems truly to believe that he can instigate a popular uprising of Sudan’s 
black majority” against the ruling elite in Khartoum. In December 2008, Ibrahim repeated 
that the Justice and Equality Movement’s ultimate and “strategic goal is to topple the 
government and govern ourselves” (Sudan Tribune, 20 December 2008). 
 
 
5.6. What is your movement fighting for – access to government, restructuring of the 
state, breaking away, or replacing the government? 
 
The JEM representatives say that their movement is fighting for both the access to 
government and restructuring of the state: 
 
JEM is fighting for the unity of Sudan which the current regime is seriously 
endangering. We are for the restructuring of the state which the current regime is 
blocking and we do not see how a true restructuring can occur while the architects are 
excluded. I.e. we should have access to government with others.  
 
In addition, the JEM “Proposal for Change” (JEM 2008: 4) states that “Sudan shall remain a 
sovereign and united country” and a “federation of six regions: the Central Region, the 
Southern Region, the Northern Region, the Eastern Region, Kordofan Region, and the Darfur 
Region.” According to the International Commission of Inquiry on Darfur (2005: 39), the 
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Justice and Equality Movement “is not only fighting against the marginalization, but also for 
political change in the country, and has a national agenda directed against the present 
government of the Sudan.”  
 
 
5.7. How do you see Darfur in the future – politically, socially, and economically? 
 
The JEM representatives believe that the future of Darfur is hopeful and that the region 
would prosper in a peaceful environment:  
 
Darfur has had a long registered history of statehood and peaceful co-existence and 
played instrumental role in formation of contemporary Sudan. Hopefully, it will 
remain a federal region enjoying wide powers in governing itself, but within a united 
Sudan. Its damaged social fabric will be restored rapidly with peace. It is beyond 
doubt that the economic potentials of Darfur are immense. Before the discovery of oil 
in Sudan, the contribution of the agricultural sector of Darfur in Sudan’s GDP was 
substantial. Its mineral riches said to be tantalizing. With peace and good governance, 
Darfur which is sitting on the largest sweet water depot in the world, will be a dream 
land.  
 
 
5.8. How would you improve the lives of ordinary people in Darfur? 
 
The JEM representatives explain how their movement plans to improve the lives of ordinary 
people in Darfur: 
 
Darfur has been deprived of public services and basic infrastructure. With universal 
free pre-university education and appropriate primary healthcare coupled with 
electricity and potable water, life will change qualitatively in Darfur. Our agricultural 
sector needs a little bit of capital and modern technology to produce magical results.  
 
The JEM “Proposal for Change” (JEM 2008: 7-8) outlines a plan to “share the wealth of the 
nation” equally among all people in Sudan and improve the lives of the marginalized: 
 
• Allocation of National Budgets to different Regions in accordance with their 
population weight; 
 
• All key positions in the public sector shall be divided among different Regions on the 
bases of population weight; 
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• Uniformity of delivery of public services (health, education, security) shall be adopted 
throughout the country; 
 
• Provision of free education for all citizens up to the college level with the Primary 
education to be made compulsory for all citizens; 
 
• Primary Health Care shall be offered free for all citizens in addition to free health 
coverage for the poorest of the nation; 
 
• Fair distribution of developmental schemes among all Regions; 
 
• Equal provision of investment opportunities for all Regions of the country. Annual 
development and investment loans must be allocated to members of all Regions on 
equal bases with clear mechanisms for prevention of favouritism, nepotism and 
monopolization by certain circles; 
 
• Fair allocation of all developmental schemes in the country to reflect Regional 
distribution of population and to prevent concentration of these schemes in Khartoum 
and other favoured Regions. 
 
 
5.9. How broad is the support for your movement among the people in Darfur? 
 
The representatives of the Justice and Equality Movement state that their movement is not 
solely a Darfur movement, but a national movement with supporters in many parts of the 
country: 
 
Justice and Equality Movement is not a regional movement. It is a nation-wide 
movement that has bases in Eastern Sudan, Kordufan and Darfur. It is equally well 
established in the centre to the extent that it was accused of two coup attempts in Sept 
2003 and April 2004. All political parties claim popular support, however, there is no 
contestation to the fact that JEM is by far the strongest movement politically and 
militarily. The Chairman of JEM is the elected leader of the Union of the 
Marginalized People of the Sudan.  
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Wadlow (2006: 87-88) argues that the Justice and Equality Movement draws its support from 
various tribal and ethnic groups in Darfur: 
 
[The JEM] is more multi-tribal [than other rebel groups], drawing its strength from 
people who were first in favour the Islamic policy of the central Sudanese 
government. When they saw that the Islamic central government was going to take no 
development measures for Darfur, they turned against the government. 
 
Tanner and Tubiana (2007: 34-35) believe that, even though the leadership of the JEM is 
largely made up of the members of the Kobe tribe (a subgroup of Zaghawa), the Justice and 
Equality Movement promotes itself as a national movement and has been reaching out to 
other tribes and ethnic groups in Darfur. Julie Flint (2007: 142) writes that the leaders of the 
JEM “took the gamble of escalating the war” in the aftermath of the Darfur Peace Agreement 
and a number of military victories have given the JEM a high profile in the international 
media and the movement has attracted support in Darfur from both the civilians and members 
of other rebel groups unhappy with their leadership. Thus, the JEM was able to add to its 
ranks many members of the Zaghawa, Bideyat, Masalit, Fur, Meidob, Berti, Erenga, and 
Missiriya Jebel ethnic and tribal groups (Tanner and Tubiana 2007: 53). 
 
 
5.9.1. Military capabilities of the JEM 
 
By the end of 2003, it was estimated that the Sudan Liberation Movement had about 6,000-
7,000 soldiers and the Justice and Equality Movement about 1,000 (Flint 2007: 152). Before 
the negotiations of the Darfur Peace Agreement, the JEM’s military capabilities were 
believed to be minimal. A faction of the Sudan Liberation Movement led by Abdel Wahid al 
Nur was assumed to have defensive capabilities, while the SLM faction led by Minni Minawi 
was seen as the only rebel group with an offensive capability (Joomla 2006: 7). Seth Appiah-
Mensah (2005), a military advisor to the African Union Chairman and the head of the AU 
mission in Sudan in 2005, argues that prior to the DPA, the JEM was seen as a movement 
with a “well-organized political structure” but the weakest rebel group in Darfur in “terms of 
military capacity.” As Tanner and Tubiana (2007: 51) note, “the JEM was one-tenth the size 
of the SLM” in 2005. A report by the International Crisis Group (2005: 1) called the JEM a 
“less important militarily” rebel group in Darfur.  
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However, in the aftermath of the DPA, the JEM’s “strength grew rapidly, based on the ample 
financial and military resources at its disposal – partly from Chad” (Economist, 20 September 
2007). Sharing the same ethnic background as the leadership of neighbouring Chad, the JEM 
has been the main beneficiary of the Chadian support for the Darfur rebels (International 
Crisis Group 2007: 11). The support from Chad has been the main reason the JEM “has 
become, militarily, the most powerful [rebel] faction on the ground in Darfur” (Voice of 
America, 15 May 2008). In return, when the Chadian rebels attacked the capital and 
attempted to overthrow the government of Chad in 2006, the JEM forces fought alongside the 
Chadian regular army against the rebels (de Waal 2007c: 373).  
 
As mentioned above, a number of military victories in 2007 and 2008 have helped the JEM to 
attract many members of other rebel movements and factions. For example, the Justice and 
Equality Movement announced in December 2008 that more than 400 commanders and 
soldiers who belonged to Minni Minawi’s faction of the Sudan Liberation Movement have 
defected and joined their ranks (Sudan Tribune, 17 December 2008). 
 
 
5.10. Why do you think there are currently so many movements opposing the 
government in Darfur? 
 
The JEM representatives argue that,  
 
Human society is innately diverse and complex. We have tens of political parties with 
negligible differences in programmes in the Centre. Persons with opposing political 
backgrounds are very likely to stay apart even if they formed new organizations. 
Ethnicity in underdeveloped societies tends to constitute competing poles of gravity. 
On the other hand, the number of rebel groups in Darfur has always been overly 
exaggerated. The real forces on the ground are less than the fingers of one hand. 
Many of the claimed movements are existent only in the internet. The government 
resorts to the exaggeration of the figure to use it as an excuse not to negotiate. The 
splintering of the movements is also a scapegoat for the joint mediation to cover up its 
failures. The most relevant issue is not the number of the movements but their 
demands and political agenda. There is no doubt that they have typical demands at 
least for Darfur.  
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5.10.1. Fragmentation of the Darfur rebel movements 
 
In protracted internal conflicts, rebel movements typically fragment over time. Alex de Waal 
(2007: 3) argues that some rebels “are bought off and join the government. Some fight each 
other. Some become pawns of neighbouring countries. They can be at times just as abusive as 
the pro-government militias.” It is estimated that currently there are over twenty rebel 
factions in Darfur (BBC, 10 May 2008). Hanson (2007) notes that the political stance of 
many new factions formed in the aftermath of the DPA is unclear. Nathan (2007) writes that 
many new factions “claim to represent the same constituencies and only a few of them have 
proven support in Darfur.” Clea Kahn (2008: 23) believes that the fragmentation of the 
Darfur rebels “is now so pronounced that it is difficult for the international community even 
to identify interlocutors for talks.” 
 
Jalloh and Tekeu (2007) believe that new rebel factions “feel that by taking up arms they can 
gain a seat at the table” during the future peace talks. Observers say that some of the new 
rebel groups are not more than “warring gangs, compounding the violence and insecurity for 
civilians, peacekeepers and aid workers” in Darfur (iAfrica News, 17 March 2008). Many 
analysts think that divisions among the rebels are the “result of clashing egos within the 
movements” (Washington Post, 1 April 2007). 
 
The fragmentation and fighting among the rebels has intensified after the DPA, “spurred by 
ethnic tensions and what appears to be a relentless grab for more territory” (International 
Herald Tribune, 31 May 2006). As the rebels movements are increasingly dividing along 
tribal and ethnic lines, “their messages are becoming more fragmented and less representative 
of constituencies they claim to speak for” (International Crisis Group 2007). The Washington 
Post (1 April 2007) argues that “there is a growing sense that the biggest obstacles to peace in 
Darfur are not only the Sudanese government and its militias, but the Darfur rebels 
themselves.”  
 
Ever since the Darfur rebellion broke out in 2003, “one point of consistency has endured: the 
military effectiveness [of the rebels] stands in stark contrast to the weakness of their political 
structures” (Tanner and Tubiana 2007: 65). Buchanan-Smith and Jaspars (2007: 559) add that 
the Darfur conflict is described by many analysts as a “political crisis that has become 
increasingly tribal at the local level.” Wadlow (2006: 87) believes that the tribal and ethnic 
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divisions among the rebels reflect the “complexity of the ethnic, social, and economic 
tensions of the area.” Kajee (2006) paints a grim picture of Darfur and the fighting among the 
rebels:  
 
The fragmented rebel groups are now pitted against each other in a deadly race to gain 
ground before any new peace talks, and each one is targeting communities perceived 
to be sympathetic to rival groups. The chaos has led to no-go zones which 
humanitarian agencies cannot penetrate and a growing incidence of disease and 
starvation.  
 
Many analysts blame the Sudanese government and its divide-and-rule tactics in Darfur for 
some of the rebel fragmentation. The International Crisis Group (2007) notes that the “divide-
and-rule tactics complicate efforts to achieve long-term stability in Darfur, deliberately increase 
the conflict’s tribalization, and contribute directly to the general chaos and lawlessness.” 
According to the Washington Post (1 April 2007), Abdel Wahid al Nur, the leader of one 
faction of the rebel Sudan Liberation Movement, also believes that the fragmentation of the 
Darfur rebels is largely the “product of a clever divide-and-conquer strategy by the 
government.” Hanson (2007) writes that since 2005, the government of Sudan has signed 
“bilateral deals with lower-level commanders of rebel factions, thus complicating the political 
process and sowing divisions within rebel groups.”  
 
The leaders of the Justice and Equality Movement and the faction of the Sudan Liberation 
Movement led by Abdel Wahid also accuse the United Nations and African Union mediators 
“for encouraging the fragmentation of the rebels.” They blame the mediators for “pushing 
smaller rebel groups to join Abuja deal and to invite them to participate in the second 
mediation to weaken the two non signatory movements” (Sudan Tribune, 5 May 2008). 
 
 
5.10.2. Fragmentation of the Justice and Equality Movement 
 
As Flint and de Waal (2008: 111) write, since its formation, the key posts in the Justice and 
Equality Movement have been controlled by the Kobe tribe, a “subgroup of the Zaghawa.” 
Khalil Ibrahim and his “Kobe inner circle” held all power in the JEM, which frustrated the 
members of other tribes and led to fragmentation of the movement. The JEM experienced 
first fragmentation in 2004, when a number of members led by JEM’s Chief of Staff, Jibril 
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Abdel Karim Bari, broke away and formed the National Movement for Reform and 
Development (BBC, 10 May 2008).  
 
In May 2006, a group of JEM members accused Khalil Ibrahim of leading the movement in a 
“tribalist, undemocratic, and corrupt” way. Led by Bahar Idriss Abu Garda, the group formed 
a new movement called JEM Collective Leadership. The press statement issued by the new 
faction said that Ibrahim “has become a threat for the unity of the movement and has 
monopolized the leadership of the group with his two brothers” (Sudan Tribune, 8 October 
2007). Other groups that split from the JEM and formed their own movements are the JEM 
Peace Wing, Field Revolutionary Command, and Popular Forces Troops. According to the 
BBC (10 May 2008), “very little, other than the names, is known about the composition, 
leadership, and numbers of the breakaway groups.”5 
 
 
5.11. Do you think cooperation among the Darfur rebel movements is possible? If yes, 
how do you think this could be achieved? If not, how do you think future negotiations to 
end the conflict should be approached? 
 
The representatives of the Justice and Equality Movement think that the cooperation among 
the Darfur rebel movements is not impossible:  
 
Cooperation among the Darfur groups is not easy but it is not impossible. We intend 
to resume our efforts to unify the movements if not in one organization to have a 
common negotiating position and a single negotiating team. This can be achieved 
                                                
5
 The Sudan Liberation Movement, another Darfur rebel movement that began the 2003 rebellion with the 
Justice and Equality Movement, has experienced more fragmentation than the JEM. Ethnic and tribal 
differences, “issues of personality, lack of leadership skills, and the rapid growth of the movement” led to 
fragmentation of the Sudan Liberation Movement a year after the Darfur rebellion broke out (Flint and de Waal 
2008: 94). Control over the top leadership positions between Abdel Wahid al Nur and Minni Minawi was one of 
the main reasons for the split in the SLM into two factions. The two men have competed for power “both on the 
ground in Darfur among the fighters and communities and in the external arena among the Darfurian Diaspora 
and the international community” (Tanner and Tubiana 2007: 27).  
 
During the negotiation process that led to the Darfur Peace Agreement and in the aftermath of the DPA, the two 
SLM factions fought against each other in Darfur over territory. Both factions “were responsible for incidents of 
killings, torture, and rape of civilians perceived to be supporters of the other faction, and several thousand 
civilians were displaced by the clashes” (Human Rights Watch 2007). After the DPA was signed in 2006, the 
SLM experienced further fragmentation. Currently, the original Sudan Liberation Movement is divided into the 
SLM/Minni Minawi, SLM/Abdel Wahid, SLM-Unity, Free Will, SLM-Classic, Greater Sudan Liberation 
Movement/Army, and National Movement for the Elimination of Marginalization (BBC, 10 May 2008). Very 
little is known about the structures, aims, and goals of the splinter groups (Tanner and Tubiana 2007: 49). 
Furthermore, Joomla (2006: 10) argues that Minni Minawi’s faction of the SLM is “now divided into two wings, 
one engaged in Khartoum with the Sudanese government to implement the Darfur Peace Agreement, and the 
other calling for the suspension of the DPA.” 
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with ease if the international community refrained from recognizing and patronizing 
whoever claims to be a movement without any criteria or scrutiny. It also helps if the 
government realizes that the splintering of the movements through its dirty finances 
and games will not make peace much closer and that ultimately it is going to pay the 
price direly. However, if such noble efforts fail, JEM will be left only with a single 
choice: to walk the road to peace alone and others are free to negotiate with the 
government on parallel lines. 
 
Mahmoud Suleiman (Sudan Tribune, 10 September 2008), the Deputy Chairman of the 
Justice and Equality Movement’s General Congress, argues that, even though the 
fragmentation of the rebel movements in Darfur is complicating the efforts to negotiate the 
end of the conflict, the rebels should not be pressured to unify or cooperate if they do not 
want: 
It is true that multiplicity of factions at the negotiating table would confuse talks, 
dilute the peace process and lead to more suffering of the people of Sudan in Darfur. 
Nevertheless, one has to acknowledge the fact that individuals in Darfur, like the 
other Sudanese people, have the democratic rights to make their own political bodies 
or join a political party of their choice and they should not be compelled to join forces 
they do not want. 
 
In June 2006, the Justice and Equality Movement and the Sudan Liberation Movement-Unity 
(SLM-Unity, a breakaway faction of the original Sudan Liberation Movement, also known as 
the G-19) formed an umbrella group called the National Redemption Front (NRF). The NRF 
coordinated joint military actions against the government forces and their militias. In late 
2006, the NRF won a number of military victories against the government forces in Darfur. 
However, disagreements between the JEM and SLM-Unity have ended the coalition after a 
few months (Tanner and Tubiana 2007: 53-56; Economist, 20 September 2007). The SLM-
Unity commanders were angered when the JEM claimed the credit for a number of military 
victories in which the majority of fighters came from the SLM-Unity ranks (Flint 2007: 169). 
 
In October 2008, the Justice and Equality Movement and southern Sudan People’s Liberation 
Movement issued a statement in which they “agreed to strengthen their political relations.” 
The two movements pledged to work closely on ending the conflict in Darfur and planning “a 
joint vision” for the “New Sudan” (Sudan Tribune, 30 October 2008). This is the first public 
statement about a possible cooperation between the JEM and SPLM. Their cooperation in the 
upcoming national and presidential elections could significantly change the balance of power 
in Sudan. According to the Economist (20 November 2008), the elections are “the best 
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chance of ending” the rule of the current government which “came to power by overthrowing 
Sudan’s last democratic government in a coup in 1989.” Alex de Waal (2007b: 21-22) points 
out that, even though Darfur and other Sudanese provinces are poor and underdeveloped, 
they still “command the largest electorate and whenever there is an election, their votes are 
needed to deliver a ruling majority.”  
 
On 2 January 2009, the Sudan Tribune reported that the Justice and Equality Movement and 
the Kordofan Association Movement, a movement which claims to represent the people of 
Kordofan who are marginalized by Sudan’s central government, agreed to join military and 
political forces and “put together their efforts to topple the Sudanese government.” Kordofan 
is a province bordering Darfur, south Sudan, and the capital Khartoum. According to the 
International Herald Tribune (5 January 2009), the government has already “sent forces into 
the South Kordofan province, claiming that Darfur rebels are operating there.” 
 
 
5.11.1. Negotiations 
 
Asked if the Justice and Equality Movement is ready to negotiate with the government to end 
the Darfur conflict and if the movement has any preconditions, the JEM representatives say 
that, 
 
JEM adamantly believes that since ultimately the conflicting parties are to sit around 
the negotiating table to talk peace, the sooner that takes places the better. Though, 
JEM never dropped the idea of militarily conquering this regime if it deems 
necessary. For political problems political solutions are the best solutions. We do not 
have preconditions to start talking to the regime, but grounds should be prepared and 
a conducive environment be created for peace talks to succeed. We will not negotiate 
with a regime that continues to raid the IDP camps and indiscriminately kill women, 
children and unarmed men. We will not talk peace while thousands of Darfurians are 
undergoing all sorts of physical and psychological torture in ghost houses meanwhile 
scores of them are sentenced to death through extra judiciary special courts. 
 
JEM has to be consulted in advance on the issues of agenda, venue, parties to the 
negotiations, the role of the host country or the sponsor, the roles of neighbouring 
countries and international partners as well as the negotiating format. JEM is very 
keen to talk peace but not eyes folded. 
 
In March 2008, the Justice and Equality Movement “demanded one-on-one peace talks with 
the Sudanese government, saying it was the only viable insurgent force left in the war-torn 
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region.” The JEM leader, Khalil Ibrahim, said in an interview that “the main players in 
Darfur are JEM. There are really no other groups in Darfur apart from JEM. Other factions 
are just a media phenomenon with no real support on the ground” (Reuters, 17 March 2008). 
More recently, Suleiman Sandal, a senior JEM commander, said in an interview with the 
Reuters (8 November 2008) that the “JEM refuses to share a negotiating table with any of 
Darfur’s other armed groups… We should negotiate alone ... Man to man, just the two 
parties. We want bilateral negotiations between JEM and the Sudanese government, nobody 
else.” However, the Sudanese government turned down the JEM’s call for one-on-one talks. 
A senior government official, Qutbi Mahdi, rejected the offer made by the JEM, saying that 
the government prefers a “comprehensive peace agreement because separate talks have 
proven they are not fruitful.” Mahdi was referring to the 2006 Darfur Peace Agreement, 
which was signed only by one rebel group and the government but did not bring peace to 
Darfur (Sudan Tribune, 10 November 2008). 
 
 
5.12. What do you think about the international community’s response to the Darfur 
conflict? 
 
According to the representatives of the Justice and Equality Movement, 
 
JEM is really grateful for the international community for the relief effort that has 
been extended and continues to flow to its people. Without that help the death toll 
would have been beyond imagination and the struggle would have taken a much 
bloodier course. We are also grateful for the international media that arose the human 
conscience and helped mitigate the genocide. We are equally thankful for the efforts 
rendered by the international community in arranging for peace talks in different 
venues. However, China and the Arab world played negative roles and encouraged the 
regime in Khartoum to stay its bloody course. For the international community to play 
a more effective role in bringing about peace in Sudan and else where, it needs to 
speak the same language cohesively and to show more resolve in the search for peace. 
The international community’s job is equally instrumental in the post-conflict peace 
building phase.  
 
As mentioned in chapter two, the Darfur rebels have used “the Western public’s revulsion at 
the atrocities in Darfur to portray the conflict as genocide,” thus hoping to delegitimize the 
government in the eyes of the international community and foster regime change (Flint and 
de Waal 2008: 101). The rebels have largely succeeded in labelling the Darfur conflict as 
genocide in the eyes of the Western world. Since September 2004, many politicians, 
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humanitarians, activists, journalists, and celebrities in the West have used the term 
“genocide” to describe the conflict in Darfur. 
 
However, apart from the humanitarian assistance to the refugees and displaced people and 
readiness “to condemn human rights violations in very strong terms,” the international 
community is not willing to do anything significant in Darfur (Flint and de Waal 2008: 182). 
Heinze (2007: 383) argues that the “emotive and condemnatory” statements about Darfur 
from the Western governments were meant to be “a substitute for more decisive action.” 
 
Nigerian general Martin Agwai, the commander of the UN/AU peacekeeping forces in 
Darfur, blames the international community for prolonging the Darfur conflict. Agwai says 
that if the international community had “approached [the conflict] from day one with 
constructive engagement, maybe we would have got beyond where we are today. Now we are 
taking time to correct the mistakes” (Independent Online, 15 October 2008). 
 
The Justice and Equality Movement and other rebel groups have numerous times accused the 
UN and AU mediators “for encouraging the fragmentation of the rebels.” They blame the 
international mediators for inviting the splinter rebel groups to the consultations and talks and 
that this has significantly weakened their movements (Sudan Tribune, 5 May 2008). 
 
In September 2008, the Arab League announced its plans to organize new Darfur peace talks 
in Qatar. The JEM and SLM dismissed the initiative, saying “the move [by the Arab world] 
came five years too late.” The analysts and the rebel leaders believe this is just a “desperate 
attempt to save the Sudanese president from international justice,” happening around the 
same time as the move by the International Criminal Court to charge Sudan’s president, 
Omar al Bashir, for the crimes committed against civilians in Darfur (AFP, 11 September 
2008). 
 
 
5.13. Conclusion 
 
This chapter has presented the findings collected through semi-structured interviews with the 
representatives of the Justice and Equality Movement and an analysis of the literature. The 
chapter has been divided into twelve sections that deal with the issues regarding the Darfur 
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conflict and the aims and perspectives of the JEM. To gather the first-hand data about the 
rebels, the author has interviewed the official representatives of the JEM. In addition to the 
interviews, the author has conducted a literature analysis and consulted a wide range of 
sources (books, academic journals, news articles and interviews, NGO publications, and 
statements from the rebel movement) in order to get a better picture of the Darfur conflict and 
the aims and perspectives of the rebels. The material from the literature was presented 
whenever available and appropriate and was used to either confirm or contradict the data 
collected through the interviews or bring in new arguments and views. 
 
In the next chapter, the author will analyze of the data presented in this chapter using the 
grounded theory approach. When appropriate, he will also refer to chapters two and four – 
Literature Review and Historical Background respectively – in order to either confirm or 
contradict the data collected through the interviews or bring in new arguments and views. 
The next chapter will present the key findings derived from the data. 
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CHAPTER SIX – DATA ANALYSIS 
 
 
6. Introduction 
 
In this chapter, the author will analyze the data presented in chapter five using the grounded 
theory approach. When appropriate, he will also refer to chapters two and four – Literature 
Review and Historical Background respectively – in order to either confirm or contradict the 
data collected through the interviews or bring in new arguments and views. 
 
Even though the grounded theory approach is mainly used to generate theories about studied 
topics, the author’s goal in this study is not to develop a grounded theory that explains the 
perspectives of the Justice and Equality Movement or the conflict in Darfur. Instead, he will 
present key findings that emerge from the data. The author believes that more research is 
needed and other rebel groups and other parties in Darfur and Sudan need to be included in 
the sample in order to come up with a grounded theory. Strauss and Corbin (1998: 155) note 
that the grounded theory approach can be used even if the “ultimate research goal is to arrive 
at a set of findings rather than theory development.” In this case, researchers present their 
findings without the final integration of concepts and categories and development of a 
grounded theory. 
 
 
6.1. Data analysis process 
 
After the data was collected, the author started an in-depth data analysis process with open 
coding. Open coding leads to discovery of words and phrases that are used by participants or 
found in the data that highlight the issues of importance or interest to the study (Allan 2003: 
1). As suggested by Strauss and Corbin (1998: 109), the “comparative analysis” method was 
used to compare and contrast the data collected in the interviews, literature analysis, chapter 
two, and chapter four. The author has carefully read and analyzed the data and has written 
down words, phrases, and arguments that seemed important. 
 
After the initial coding, the author looked for conceptual patterns. A concept is “an abstract 
representation of an event, object, or action/interaction that a researcher identifies as being 
significant in the data” (Strauss and Corbin 1998: 103). This step has led to axial coding, 
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where the codes and concepts were grouped and linked according to their relationships in 
order to identify key components and central categories (Sarantakos 2005: 350).  
 
For example, using the open coding process, the author found concepts such as 
“environmental degradation,” “ecological collapse,” “migrations of nomads,” “resource 
competition,” and “conflict over land and water” in the interview responses and additional 
data. Using the axial coding process, the author linked these labels to come up with a 
category titled “Environmental degradation was an important cause of conflict in Darfur.” 
 
Using this data analysis process, the author was able to identify seventeen central categories 
(key findings) that have emerged from the data. The majority of the findings presented below 
represent the aims and perspectives of the Justice and Equality Movement. Some findings are 
based on the additional data gathered through the literature analysis. Each key finding will be 
followed by the most important concepts and arguments from the interviews and additional 
data that have led the author to that specific finding. According to Neuman (2006: 160), the 
findings that emerge from the data after using the grounded theory approach are fully 
“faithful to the evidence.” Denscombe (2007: 104) argues that grounded theories and findings 
are developed after “constant reference to the empirical data and this means that, unlike with 
speculative, abstract theories, they are built on a sound foundation of evidence.” 
 
 
6.2. Category 1: Economic, political, and social marginalization and neglect of the 
Darfur province were major causes of conflict and rebellion 
 
The following emerged from the interviews and additional data that led to this category: 
 
• The Darfur province has been marginalized politically, socially, and economically 
ever since Darfur became a part of Sudan in 1917; 
• The rebellion is a result of the accumulated injustices done to Darfur by the 
British colonial administration and Sudan’s northern elites after independence; 
• Since independence, Darfur was under-represented in national governments; 
• Since independence, the Darfur province received less development assistance and 
fewer government posts than any other region in Sudan; 
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• Post-independence Sudan has been governed to benefit the northern region 
disproportionately at the expense of all other parts of the country. 
 
 
6.3. Category 2: Manipulation of ethnic and tribal identities was an important cause of 
conflict in Darfur 
 
The following emerged from the interviews and additional data that led to this category: 
 
• In the 1980s and 1990s, Darfur’s ethnic and tribal groups have been politicized 
and manipulated during the second north-south conflict; 
• The central government supported the “Arabs” while excluding “Africans” in 
Darfur; 
• Since the 1980s, the central governments have ignored the attacks by the “Arab” 
militias on “African” tribal and ethnic groups in Darfur; 
• In 1994, the government decided to split the Darfur province into three states, thus 
dividing the Fur, the largest ethnic group and the largest “African” tribe in Darfur, 
and making them a minority in each state. This was intended to help the “Arab” 
tribes take control of the province. 
 
 
6.4. Category 3: Environmental degradation was an important cause of conflict in 
Darfur 
 
The following emerged from the interviews and additional data that led to this category: 
 
• Environmental degradation in Darfur has led to migrations of people and conflict 
between different tribal and ethnic groups; 
• Desertification and severe droughts in the 1980s forced the “Arab” groups to 
compete with “Africans” over scarce land and water. Coupled with the arrival of 
modern weapons, this has led to the conflict between different groups and 
communities. 
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6.5. Category 4: The Darfur rebellion was triggered by the negotiations between the 
government of Sudan and southern Sudan 
 
The following emerged from the interviews and additional data that led to this category: 
 
• The negotiations between the government and southern Sudan to end the two-
decades-long civil war have led many Darfurians to believe that they would not 
end the marginalization of their province without resorting to an armed rebellion; 
• The leader of the southern Sudanese rebel group has encouraged the Darfur 
rebellion in order to put additional pressure on the central government during the 
north-south peace talks. 
 
 
6.6. Category 5: The Justice and Equality Movement (JEM) aims to fundamentally 
transform Sudan 
 
The following emerged from the interviews and additional data that led to this category: 
 
• The JEM aims to fundamentally restructure the social, political, and economic 
system in Sudan; 
• The main goal of the JEM is to transform Sudan into a country where the entire 
population has “political and economic rights and proportionate representation, 
coupled with a real federal system with true devolution of power and resources”; 
• The JEM aims to establish a democracy, rule of law, and respect for human rights 
in Sudan; 
• The Justice and Equality Movement wants to remove religion from Sudanese 
politics and separate religion and state. 
 
 
6.7. Category 6: The JEM is not linked to Hassan al Turabi 
 
The following emerged from the interviews and additional data that led to this category: 
 
• The Western media and analysts claim that the JEM is linked to Hassan al Turabi, 
the man who had been the main Islamic ideologue of the ruling National Islamic 
Front in the 1990s; 
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• The JEM strongly denies the links, claiming that the central government of Sudan, 
including Turabi, has “marginalized the rest of the country and left it in 
deprivation and despair”; 
• Hassan al Turabi claims that he has no links to the JEM; 
• Some Western analysts claim that the Justice and Equality Movement and Turabi 
have no links today; 
• There is no evidence that the JEM is linked to Turabi and his party. 
 
 
6.8. Category 7: The Justice and Equality Movement is not an Islamist movement 
 
The following emerged from the interviews and additional data that led to this category: 
 
• Many Western analysts see the JEM as an Islamist movement due to the past links 
between the JEM leadership and Sudan’s Islamist movement; 
• The JEM denies that they are an Islamist movement; while some leaders and 
members of the JEM have belonged to Sudan’s Islamist movement in the past, 
they broke away from it and formed their own organization; 
• The JEM claims it is fighting for the marginalized people in Darfur and Sudan 
without regard to race, religion, or political affiliation; 
• The membership of the JEM is diverse and not only limited to those who were the 
members of the Islamist movement; 
• The aim of the Justice and Equality Movement is not an Islamic Sudan; the 
movement wants to separate religion and politics in the country. 
 
 
6.9. Category 8: Darfur needs to remain a part of Sudan 
 
The following emerged from the interviews and additional data that led to this category: 
 
• The Justice and Equality Movement categorically rejects any talks about breaking 
away and forming an independent Darfur state. The JEM wants Darfur to remain a 
part of a unified and decentralized Sudan. 
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6.10. Category 9: The Justice and Equality Movement is a revolutionary movement 
 
The following emerged from the interviews and additional data that led to this category: 
 
• The majority of the Darfur opposition movements are fighting a rebellion, aiming 
to end the marginalization of Darfur; 
• The JEM has evolved into a revolutionary movement and aims to overthrow the 
current government of Sudan and fundamentally restructure the social, political, 
and economic system of the country. 
 
 
6.11. Category 10: Living conditions in Darfur can be improved through good 
governance, job creation, aid, and investments 
 
The following emerged from the interviews and additional data that led to this category: 
 
• Good governance is the key for improving the living conditions in Darfur; 
• All Sudanese provinces need to receive financial aid from the central government, 
not only the northern part of the country; 
• The financial aid and government jobs should be awarded to the provinces 
reflecting the size of the population in each province; 
• The JEM claims it will insist that the post-conflict government provides universal 
and free pre-university education, primary healthcare, and access to electricity and 
water in Darfur; 
• Domestic and international investments can improve living conditions in post-
conflict Darfur. 
 
 
6.12. Category 11: The popular support for the JEM in Darfur is increasing 
 
The following emerged from the interviews and additional data that led to this category: 
 
• The JEM draws its support from various tribal and ethnic groups in Darfur; 
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• In the aftermath of the Darfur Peace Agreement (DPA) and a number of military 
victories against the government forces, the JEM has attracted support from both 
the civilians and members of other rebel movements and factions in Darfur; 
 
 
6.13. Category 12: The JEM is militarily the most powerful movement in Darfur 
 
The following emerged from the interviews and additional data that led to this category: 
 
• Before the Darfur Peace Agreement, the Justice and Equality Movement’s 
military capabilities were minimal; 
• In the aftermath of the DPA, the JEM’s strength grew rapidly, mainly due to the 
military and financial support from Chad; 
• Currently, the JEM is militarily the most powerful rebel force in Darfur. 
 
 
6.14. Category 13: The JEM is very likely to try defeating the government of Sudan 
militarily 
 
The following emerged from the interviews and additional data that led to this category: 
 
• The Justice and Equality Movement attacked the capital of Sudan, Khartoum, in 
May 2008; 
• The JEM is forming alliances with other groups in Sudan that oppose the central 
government; 
• The leadership of the JEM claims that they are preparing for new attacks aimed at 
defeating the current regime; 
• The JEM is currently the most powerful Darfur rebel movement; 
• If the next peace talks fail, the JEM is very likely to try defeating the regime 
militarily. 
 
 
6.15. Category 14: Fighting over power, control, and leadership are the primary causes 
of the rebel fragmentation 
 
The following emerged from the interviews and additional data that led to this category: 
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• Fighting over power, control, and leadership are the primary causes of the rebel 
fragmentation in Darfur.  
• Many analysts think that the divisions among the rebels are the “result of clashing 
egos within the movements”; 
• Some commanders form new groups in order to “gain a seat at the table” during 
the future peace talks; 
• The rebels are increasingly dividing along tribal and ethnic lines; 
• The divide-and-rule tactics by the government of Sudan have led to some of the rebel 
fragmentation; 
• The rebels blame the United Nations and African Union mediators for 
encouraging the rebel fragmentation by inviting breakaway factions to 
consultations and peace talks. 
 
 
6.16. Category 15: Cooperation among the Darfur rebels is hardly achievable 
 
The following emerged from the interviews and additional data that led to this category: 
 
• The Justice and Equality Movement’s position is that the rebels should not be 
pressured to unify or cooperate if they do not want; 
• The JEM has formed a coalition with some rebel groups in the aftermath of the 
2006 Darfur Peace Agreement. The coalition has failed after a few months due to 
disagreements; 
• A common position and a single negotiating team among the Darfur rebel 
movements are hardly achievable due to the large number of rebel factions and 
disagreements over leadership roles and control. 
 
 
6.17. Category 16: The Darfur conflict urgently needs a negotiated political solution 
 
The following emerged from the interviews and additional data that led to this category: 
 
• No party is powerful enough to end the conflict militarily; 
• The Darfur conflict needs a political solution through negotiations; 
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• The most powerful rebel movements claim they will not attend new peace talks 
unless the conflict is suspended and safety, security, and ceasefire in Darfur are 
installed and respected; 
• The government of Sudan needs to finally start respecting the ceasefire promises; 
• The rebels want to play a role in deciding the agenda of the future talks, host 
countries and venues, parties, and the format of the negotiation process; 
• The future peace process needs to solve the root causes of the Darfur conflict and 
end the marginalization of the province; 
• The participants in the future peace talks need to be chosen according to their 
strength on the ground and the popular support among the people in Darfur; 
• The mediators need to include the Darfur civil society in the talks; 
• The mediators needs to properly plan and organize the future peace talks;  
• The international community cannot expect to come up with a quick solution to 
the conflict; 
• The mediators need to design a negotiation process that can accommodate many 
parties as cooperation among the Darfur rebels is hardly achievable. 
 
 
6.18. Category 17: The calls by the Justice and Equality Movement for one-on-one talks 
with the government are unrealistic and can only hurt the Darfur peace process 
 
The following emerged from the interviews and additional data that led to this category: 
 
• Even though the JEM is currently the most powerful rebel force in Darfur, the 
movement is not the only representative of the people in Darfur; 
• For a long-lasting peace, all parties must be involved in the peace talks. 
 
 
6.19. Conclusion 
 
In this chapter, the author has conducted an analysis of the data presented in chapter five 
using the grounded theory approach. When appropriate, he has also referred to chapters two 
and four – Literature Review and Historical Background respectively – in order to either 
confirm or contradict the data collected through the interviews or bring in new arguments and 
views. Even though the grounded theory approach is mainly used to generate theories about 
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studied topics, the author’s goal in this study has not been to develop a grounded theory that 
explains the perspectives of the Justice and Equality Movement or the conflict in Darfur. 
Instead, he has presented seventeen key findings about the conflict that have emerged from 
the data. The author believes that more research is needed and other rebel groups and other 
parties in Darfur and Sudan need to be included in the sample in order to come up with a 
grounded theory.  
 
The next chapter will reflect on the study and the process of data collection and analysis, 
present the summary of the research findings, and discuss the limitations and significance of 
the study. The author will give recommendations for further research and the Darfur peace 
process. 
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CHAPTER SEVEN – CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
 
 
7. Introduction 
 
Chapter one has served as a general introduction to the study. Chapter two has reviewed the 
literature consulted during the research process and focused of the concepts important for this 
study. The author has also reviewed some of the most important books, academic journals, 
and analyses that focus on the history of Sudan and Darfur and the current conflict in Darfur. 
Chapter three has discussed research design and methodology, sample, data collection and 
analysis, validity and reliability, ethical considerations, and limitations of the study. In 
chapter four, the author has explored historical roots of conflicts in Sudan and Darfur. 
Chapter five has presented the research findings collected through semi-structured interviews 
with the rebel Justice and Equality Movement and a literature analysis. Chapter six has 
provided an analysis of the data using the grounded theory approach and the author has 
presented the key findings that have emerged from the data.  
 
This chapter will reflect on the study and the process of data collection and analysis, present 
the summary of the research findings, and discuss limitations and significance of the study. 
The author will give recommendations for further research and the Darfur peace process. 
 
In 2003, a conflict broke out in Sudan’s western province of Darfur between the mainly 
“African” rebels and the government forces and their proxy “Arab” militias. It is estimated 
that about 200,000 people have so far died in the conflict from fighting, diseases, and 
starvation. The World Health Organization estimates that about 20% people died from 
fighting and violence, while 80% died from starvation and diseases. The UN and aid agencies 
estimate that over two million Darfurians, out of the population of about six million, are 
living in refugee camps (BBC Online, 6 September 2007; Heleta, 29 May 2008). Even 
though the majority of all deaths in Darfur have occurred in 2003 and 2004 (Natsios 2008), 
the conflict is nowhere near the end. 
 
Two loosely connected rebel movements, the Sudan Liberation Movement (SLM) and the 
Justice and Equality Movement (JEM), began attacking the government forces in Darfur in 
April 2003. Both groups listed the political, economic, and social marginalization of the 
region as the main causes of the rebellion (Baldo 2006). The majority of the rebels came from 
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Darfur’s “African” sedentary ethnic and tribal groups Fur, Zaghawa, and Massaleit 
(International Crisis Group 2006). In response to the rebellion, the Sudanese government 
mobilized and armed local militias from Darfur’s “Arab” groups, particularly those without 
traditional land rights, to fight against the rebels. The Sudanese army supplied the militias 
with weapons and equipment and supported their attacks on the rebels and civilians with 
military intelligence and air bombings (Prunier 2005: 98).  
 
In May 2006, the government and one faction of the Sudan Liberation Movement signed the 
Darfur Peace Agreement (DPA), while another SLM faction and the Justice and Equality 
Movement refused to sign it. Signing of the DPA, instead of bringing peace, only intensified 
fighting and deteriorated the humanitarian situation in Darfur (International Crisis Group 
2007a). The agreement damaged relationships among the rebel groups and led to leadership 
struggles and fragmentation along ethnic and tribal lines. It is estimated that currently there 
are over twenty rebel movements and factions in Darfur. According to the BBC (10 May 
2008), “very little, other than the names, is known about the composition, leadership, and 
numbers of the breakaway groups.” 
 
The aim of this qualitative study was to critically explore the Darfur conflict and the future of 
the region from the perspective of the Justice and Equality Movement. The author decided to 
work on this study after realizing that almost six years since the Darfur conflict began, there 
is hardly any comprehensive information about the rebels’ aims, objectives, and plans for the 
future. It is hard to fully understand the conflict in Darfur and plan peace negotiations 
between the warring parties if we do not know enough about the rebels. The author has 
decided to focus on the Justice and Equality Movement as this is currently the most powerful 
rebel movement in Darfur. The aims and objectives of the study were as follows: 
 
Aims 
 
• Explore why the Justice and Equality Movement began the rebellion;  
• Explore what the JEM wants to achieve; 
• Contribute to a better understanding of the Darfur conflict. 
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Objectives 
 
• Present the Justice and Equality Movement’s perspectives about the causes of the 
conflict; 
• Present the JEM’s perspectives about the possible solutions to the conflict and the 
future of the region. 
 
This study has critically explored the perspectives of the Justice and Equality Movement 
about the conflict in Darfur. The author has used the first-hand information gathered through 
interviews with the JEM representatives and additional data about the conflict and the rebels 
collected through an analysis of the literature. Using a variety of data collection methods has 
ensured the credibility and authenticity of the study and findings. The study was planned and 
conducted in an accurate, ethical, and professional manner to ensure its validity, reliability, 
credibility, and trustworthiness. The author believes that the findings that have emerged from 
this study will contribute to a better understanding of the aims and perspectives of the Justice 
and Equality Movement and the Darfur conflict in general. 
 
 
7.1. Data collection and analysis 
 
The methodology used in this exploratory qualitative study was the interpretive research 
methodology. The aim of the interpretive social science is to learn about individuals and their 
views, perspectives, interpretations, and experiences (Neuman 2006: 88). The author believes 
that this research methodology was the most appropriate for exploring the aims and 
perspectives of the Justice and Equality Movement.  
 
To gather the first-hand data about the movement, the author has used semi-structured 
interviews. Extensive semi-structured interviews are believed to be one of the best methods 
for a study of this type (Neuman 2006: 92-93). Due to the safety concerns and the lack of 
funds, the author was not able to travel to Darfur and conduct face-to-face interviews with the 
rebel officials. Instead, the interview questions have been emailed to the JEM representatives, 
which they answered and returned to the author. The author was able to probe the participants 
with additional questions during the data analysis process. 
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In addition to the interviews, the author has conducted an extensive literature analysis and 
consulted a wide range of sources (books, academic journals, news articles and interviews, 
NGO publications, and statements from the rebel movement) in order to get a better picture 
of the Darfur conflict and the JEM’s aims and perspectives. The literature analysis has been 
used to either confirm or contradict the data collected through the interviews or bring in new 
arguments and views. 
 
To analyze the data collected in this study, the author has used the grounded theory approach. 
Denscombe (2007: 92) argues that the grounded theory approach is particularly useful when 
social researchers want to “investigate the participants’ points of view.” Being derived from 
data, the grounded theories and findings closely and accurately explain human actions and 
behaviour (Sarantakos 2005: 118). Even though this approach is mainly used to generate 
theories, the outcome of this study was not a theory that explains the conflict in Darfur. 
Instead, the author has presented the key findings about the conflict from the perspective of 
the Justice and Equality Movement. The grounded theory approach can be used even if the 
“ultimate research goal is to arrive at a set of findings rather than theory development.” In 
this case, researchers present their findings without the final integration of concepts and 
categories and development of a theory (Strauss and Corbin 1998: 155). 
 
 
7.2. Summary of the research findings 
 
Using the grounded theory approach as the data analysis method, the author was able to 
identify seventeen key findings that have emerged from the data. According to Neuman 
(2006: 160), the findings that emerge from the data after using the grounded theory approach 
are fully “faithful to the evidence.” Denscombe (2007: 104) reminds that grounded theories 
and findings are developed after “constant reference to the empirical data and this means that, 
unlike with speculative, abstract theories, they are built on a sound foundation of evidence.” 
Listed below are the key findings presented in chapter six: 
 
1. Economic, political, and social marginalization and neglect of the Darfur province 
were major causes of conflict and rebellion; 
2. Manipulation of ethnic and tribal identities was an important cause of conflict in 
Darfur; 
 140
3. Environmental degradation was an important cause of conflict in Darfur; 
4. The Darfur rebellion was triggered by the negotiations between the government of 
Sudan and southern Sudan; 
5. The Justice and Equality Movement aims to fundamentally transform Sudan; 
6. The JEM is not linked to Hassan al Turabi; 
7. The Justice and Equality Movement is not an Islamist movement; 
8. Darfur needs to remain a part of Sudan; 
9. The Justice and Equality Movement is a revolutionary movement; 
10. Living conditions in Darfur can be improved through good governance, job creation, 
aid, and investments; 
11. The popular support for the JEM in Darfur is increasing; 
12. The JEM is militarily the most powerful movement in Darfur; 
13. The JEM is very likely to try defeating the government of Sudan militarily; 
14. Fighting over power, control, and leadership are the primary causes of the rebel 
fragmentation; 
15. Cooperation among the Darfur rebels is hardly achievable; 
16. The Darfur conflict urgently needs a negotiated political solution; 
17. The calls by the Justice and Equality Movement for one-on-one talks with the 
government are unrealistic and can only hurt the Darfur peace process. 
 
The views and perspectives of the Justice and Equality Movement regarding the causes of the 
Darfur conflict and current rebellion do not differ significantly from the majority of historians 
and Sudan and Darfur experts. Decades-long economic, political, and social neglect and 
marginalization of Darfur by the successive central governments of Sudan are seen as the 
main causes of the Darfur conflict and rebellion. However, the JEM representatives argue 
that the current Sudanese regime which came to power in 1989 has marginalized Darfur more 
than any other colonial and post-independence regime in the country. At the same time, the 
manipulation of ethnic and tribal identities and the environmental degradation in Darfur are 
seen as important causes of the conflict.  
 
As it was shown in this study, during the course of the conflict, the JEM has evolved from a 
rebel to a revolutionary movement. The movement’s primary aim is to topple the current 
Sudanese regime and fundamentally change the country. Only time will tell if the Justice and 
Equality Movement will be able to defeat the regime and bring about revolutionary change in 
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Sudan. This will depend on many factors, such as the ability to attract support in other parts 
of the country, cooperation with other rebel movements, finance, military power, 
international support, and, in the event of their victory, the implementation of substantial 
political and/or socio-economic changes in the country. 
 
As this study has found, the JEM is not an Islamist movement, as it is often argued by the 
Western media and analysts, but a movement of the marginalized people who want to change 
the government of Sudan and end decades of neglect and marginalization. Even though the 
support for the JEM and the movement’s military capabilities were minimal before May 
2006, the movement has grown into currently the most powerful Darfur rebel/revolutionary 
movement. 
 
The fragmentation of the Darfur rebels is seen as one of the major obstacles to an effective 
peace process. The main causes of the rebel fragmentation are fighting over power, control, 
and leadership, as well as the divide-and-rule tactics by the government of Sudan. 
Cooperation among the rebels is hardly achievable due to divisions and years of fighting 
between the groups. 
 
After almost six years of fighting and destruction that took over 200,000 lives and forced 
more than two million people from their homes, Darfur and its people urgently need a 
negotiated political solution to the conflict that will satisfy all the parties. As Alex de Waal 
(2006c) points out, “the crisis in Darfur is political. It’s a civil war, and like all wars it needs 
a political settlement.” The goal of the mediators who work on a new Darfur peace process 
must be solving the root causes of the conflict and ending the marginalization of the province. 
A peace agreement will last only if it accommodates and is signed by all parties. Everything 
else will be a short-term solution and a further protraction of conflict and violence. 
 
 
7.3. Limitations of the study 
 
One of the main limitations of this study was the focus on only the aims and perspectives of 
the Justice and Equality Movement. This had to be done due to the time constraints and the 
author’s inability to reach other rebel groups at this point. However, the author plans to 
expand this study in the future and explore the aims and perspectives of other rebel groups in 
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Darfur. The author also plans to interview Sudanese government officials (from both south 
and north Sudan) and the representatives of the Darfur “Arabs” in order to give a balanced 
picture of the conflict. 
 
The main limitation of the grounded theory approach is a possibility of researchers being too 
subjective and having “high level of arbitrary decisions” in their studies (Sarantakos 2005: 
350). To limit subjectivity and arbitrary decisions, the author has kept an open mind 
throughout the research process and has based the findings solely on the data collected in the 
study.  
 
One of the limitations of the study was relying on the media for a large portion of the data. 
This was necessary as the conflict in Darfur is ongoing and many events explored in this 
study are too recent to be discussed in books or academic journals. In order to present up-to-
date picture of the conflict, in many cases the author had to use news articles as the primary 
sources of data. Throughout the data collection process, the author has made sure that only 
credible and reliable news sources were included in the study (Denscombe 2007: 228). 
 
Another limitation was using the internet to interview the participants instead of conducting 
face-to-face interviews. When researchers conduct interviews this way, they lose the 
opportunity to observe “visual clues” and “non-verbal behaviour” of the participants 
(Sarantakos 2005: 285; Denscombe 2007: 187). However, using the internet to interview the 
rebel representatives was the only method the author could use at this point. 
 
 
7.4. Significance of the study 
 
This study has critically explored the Darfur conflict and the future of the region from the 
perspective of the rebel Justice and Equality Movement. To be able to fully understand the 
conflict and plan negotiations between the warring parties in Darfur, it is very important to 
explore why the rebels decided to start the rebellion and what they are trying to achieve. We 
need to know if their fight is political, economic, and/or existential and what the various rebel 
groups would like Darfur to become in the future - a more developed part of Sudan, an 
independent country, or something else. It is “vitally important to have access to [credible 
and up to date] information about the conflict” and the parties before any new peace talks, 
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since one of the major “frustrations disputants regularly experience is the feeling that no one 
really understands” them and their problems (Bradshaw 2007: 89). 
 
The timing of this study was right because Darfur is currently one of the main conflict 
hotspots and humanitarian disasters in the world. The author hopes to contribute with this 
study to a better understanding of the aims and perspectives of the Justice and Equality 
Movement, currently the most powerful Darfur rebel movement, and inspire more research 
about this and other rebel movements and factions ad the Darfur conflict in general. He hopes 
that his findings will be of value to organizations and institutions which decide to organize 
future peace talks to end the Darfur conflict. 
 
 
7.5. Recommendations 
 
As mentioned above, almost six years after the Darfur conflict broke out there is hardly any 
comprehensive information about the rebels’ aims, perspectives, and plans for the future. It is 
difficult to fully understand the conflict in Darfur and plan peace negotiations between the 
warring parties if we do not know enough about the rebels. As this study has focused only on 
the Justice and Equality Movement, the author believes that more research is needed about 
other rebel movements and factions. 
 
It is very important to explore what other rebel groups are trying to achieve. An extensive 
research project about the aims and perspectives of all Darfur rebel groups could lead to a 
conclusion that the rebels have similar aims and objectives and this could help resolve 
divisions and bring cooperation among them. On the other hand, identifying divisions that 
cannot be reconciled could lead to a new approach in negotiating the end of the conflict that 
will have to accommodate many different parties. 
 
The author will present below recommendations regarding the future of the Darfur peace 
process that are based on the data presented in this study: 
 
 
7.5.1. Need for a completely new agreement 
 
As the 2006 Darfur Peace Agreement has failed to attract support of the parties and the 
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people in Darfur and end the conflict, the agreement should be dismissed and the parties, with 
the help of the international community, should work on a new agreement. The largest Darfur 
rebel movements also demand to negotiate a completely new agreement, while the 
government of Sudan still insists on using the DPA as the basis of any new talks (International 
Crisis Group 2007a). 
 
 
7.5.2. Security and ceasefire before peace talks 
 
Many rebel groups which boycotted the talks in Libya in October 2007 have listed the lack of 
security in Darfur as one of the main reasons for their absence. It will be of outmost 
importance to have an effective ceasefire agreement respected by all parties before new peace 
talks take place. As Brickhill (2007: 4) argues, “security arrangements are fundamental to the 
prospects of peace processes.” The international community must put pressure on the 
government of Sudan to respect ceasefire promises. As noted in chapter four, the government 
has “announced several ceasefires during the nearly six-year Darfur conflict, all of which 
failed” (Voice of America, 12 November 2008). 
 
 
7.5.3. Peace before justice in Darfur 
 
While justice is very important, the aim of the international community should be to first end 
the conflict in Darfur and then punish the perpetrators of war crimes and crimes against 
humanity. To that end, the International Criminal Court’s case against Sudan’s president, 
Omar al Bashir, should be postponed and the focus should be on ending the conflict and 
bringing peace to Darfur.  
 
 
7.5.4. Neutral venue for peace talks 
 
It will be very important to choose a neutral venue for the future talks and not make the same 
mistake made in 2007 by the United Nations and African Union when Libya was chosen to 
host the Darfur peace talks even though that country has been involved in training and arming 
of the radical “Arab” militias that have been involved in the worst atrocities in Darfur since 
the conflict broke out in 2003. 
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7.5.5. Choosing participants for the future peace talks 
 
There is no consensus among the parties involved in the Darfur conflict about who should 
participate in the future peace talks (Nathan 2007). One of the reasons the Libyan talks have 
failed was the refusal by the largest rebel movements to attend peace talks together with the 
smaller rebel factions that formed in the aftermath of the DPA. Campbell (2008) thinks that 
the refusal by the “more established rebel leaders” to negotiate if smaller and splinter factions 
are also invited to the peace talks is one of the “biggest obstacles” to ending the Darfur 
conflict. 
 
Anstey (2006: 138) stresses the importance of parties having clear mandates from their 
consistencies in order to achieve a long-term solution to the conflict. Hanson (2007) notes 
that “no effort has been made to make a real assessment of how effective the rebel groups in 
Darfur are or what kind of acceptance they have from their own population.” To be able to 
plan future talks between the warring parties in Darfur, it is very important to explore who 
the rebels are, what are they trying to achieve, and how large is their following. This could 
help in selection of the participants for the future peace talks. 
 
 
7.5.6. Rebel cooperation 
 
The United Nations and African Union envoys emphasize that the rebel fragmentation 
“remains the principle obstacle to hold peace talks with the government” (Sudan Tribune, 19 
March 2008). As Kahn (2008: 23) points out, the rebel fragmentation “is now so pronounced 
that it is difficult for the international community even to identify interlocutors for talks.” The 
Sudanese government uses this fragmentation, often instigating rebel groups to fight each 
other. Many analysts argue that before any new talks, the Darfur rebels need to agree on a 
“joint set of grievances and a common negotiating position” (Mail and Guardian, 15 October 
2007).  
 
The mediators need to try to reach a common negotiating position among the rebels through 
pre-negotiation talks and workshops. “If the [rebel] movements cannot unify, they need at least 
to consolidate into several recognizable blocs, with coherent leadership and political positions” 
(International Crisis Group 2007a: 22). Failure by the rebels to cooperate and attend 
negotiations is “playing into the hands of the Sudanese government which is happy for the 
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talks to fail as long as it escapes the blame of the international community” (Economist, 20 
September 2007). 
 
 
7.5.7. Opening the peace process to the Darfur society 
 
Fadul and Tanner (2007: 313) write that the majority of Darfurians who are not “affiliated 
with the government or rebels have little or no voice.” The International Crisis Group (2007a: 
25) emphasizes the need to broaden participation in future peace talks and involve the civil 
society, IDP communities, women, and “Arab” tribes. According to the estimates, “women 
and children are more than 80% of the population in the camps; women have a tremendous 
stake in reconciling and reconstructing Darfur and would bring distinct perspectives to 
negotiations.”  
 
The next negotiation process needs to be transparent and open to the Darfur society in order 
to be accepted and implemented on the ground. The United Nations and African Union 
special envoys for Darfur believe that future peace talks “need to be as inclusive as possible 
to ensure that any agreement secures maximum ownership from those directly affected by it, 
and not just those who have taken up arms” (International Herald Tribune, 25 October 2007). 
This would “improve buy-in and facilitate the implementation of an agreement” (International 
Crisis Group 2007a: 25).  
 
 
7.5.8. Including the “Arab” militias in the peace talks 
 
As some of the key players in the conflict and potential “spoilers” of a peace agreement, the 
leaders of the “Arab” militias, the Janjaweed, need to be involved in negotiations since their 
cooperation and disarmament are crucial for lasting peace and security in Darfur. It cannot be 
expected that the Janjaweed militias are represented by the government of Sudan at the future 
talks. Even though the Janjaweed are armed, funded, and supported by the government, many 
Janjaweed leaders distrust the Sudanese government and the government does not have full 
control over them (de Waal 2006b). 
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7.5.9. Wealth-sharing as an incentive 
 
Wadlow (2006: 87) writes that oil was one of the main incentives that helped bring peace 
between the north and south Sudan. She adds that “there is no similar economic incentive to 
reach an agreement in Darfur.” Nathan (2006a) believes that the government of Sudan, as by 
far the strongest party in the conflict, needs to make concessions and offer financial 
provisions that would help economic development of the Darfur province. As the main trade 
partner and importer of Sudan’s oil, China could play a major role in influencing the 
government of Sudan to stop pursuing a military solution in Darfur and offer substantial 
wealth-sharing provisions to the province (Cohen 2007: 3). 
 
 
7.5.10. Using a problem-solving approach in negotiations 
 
Burton (quoted in Anstey 2006: 17) argues that deep-rooted conflicts are “founded in 
fundamental human needs for security, identity, recognition, and development. They cannot 
be compromised, but require accommodation through problem-solving rather than power-
driven bargaining.” The Darfur conflict is a typical example of a deep-rooted conflict where 
the rebels began fighting over the issues of poor economic conditions, lack of development 
and security, and political and social exclusion of their province. Pruit and Kim (2004: 190) 
maintain that using problem-solving to negotiate the end of a deep-rooted conflict calls for a 
“joint effort to find mutually acceptable solutions” for all parties. The author believes that 
using a problem-solving approach in the next peace talks would be the best way to end the 
Darfur conflict and bring lasting peace. 
 
 
7.5.11. The parties need to “own” the agreement 
 
As noted in chapter four, the problem with the Darfur Peace Agreement was not that it asked 
the parties to compromise. The main problem was that “the compromises were crafted by the 
mediators and were not a product of agreements negotiated by the parties” (Nathan 2006a). 
Brickhill (2007: 10) believes that the mediators should not “negotiate on behalf of the parties, 
but rather facilitate negotiations between the parties themselves.” Mediators who work on the 
next Darfur peace talks need to let the parties negotiate a settlement and not allow the 
international community to impose an agreement in order to come up with a quick fix for the 
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Darfur conflict. 
 
 
7.5.12. No quick-fix for the Darfur conflict 
 
One of the major failures of the Darfur Peace Agreement was the attempt by the African 
Union mediators and the international community to get a peace agreement through the 
“deadline diplomacy.” According to David Mozersky (2007) from the International Crisis 
Group, “too much haste to do a deal was a key reason the Darfur Peace Agreement failed to 
deliver.” As Nathan (2007) writes, it is impossible to bring about a quick fix to a civil war or 
a protracted conflict since, 
 
These conflicts have multiple, complex, and intractable causes and the difficulty of 
resolution is heightened immeasurably by the protagonists’ mutual hatred and 
suspicion. There is no point in rushing negotiations and forcing the parties to sign an 
agreement to which they are not committed. As happened in Abuja, they will simply 
leave the signing ceremony and continue fighting. 
 
The next peace talks to end the conflict and human suffering in Darfur should be planned and 
carried out by proven experts from the conflict management field who are not obsessed with 
quick fix solutions. Their goal must be an agreement that is accepted by all parties and can be 
implemented on the ground without angering any of the sides. 
 
 
7.6. Conclusion 
 
This qualitative study has critically explored the Darfur conflict and the future of the region 
from the perspective of the Justice and Equality Movement, currently the most powerful 
Darfur rebel force. The author has used the first-hand information gathered through 
interviews with the representatives of the movement and additional data about the conflict 
and the rebels collected through an extensive literature analysis to portray the movement and 
its aims, perspectives, and plans for the future. Using the grounded theory approach as the 
data analysis tool, the author has presented key findings about the conflict from the 
perspective of the Justice and Equality Movement that have emerged from the data collected 
in this study. 
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This last chapter has reflected on the study and the process of data collection and analysis, 
presented the summary of the research findings, and discussed limitations and significance of 
the study. The author has given recommendations for further research and the Darfur peace 
process. 
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Appendix II – Map of refugee and IDP camps in Darfur and eastern Chad 
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Appendix III - Informed consent form 
  
 
I (participant’s name, position, contact details) was invited to participate in the below-
mentioned research project that is being undertaken by Savo Heleta, a Masters student in 
Conflict Transformation and Management at the Nelson Mandela Metropolitan University in 
Port Elizabeth, South Africa. 
 
I confirm that I have read and understood this informed consent form and that I voluntarily 
consent to participate in this research project. 
 
Title of the research project:  
 
“The Darfur Conflict from the Perspective of the Rebel Justice and Equality 
Movement” 
 
Principal investigator: Savo Heleta 
Address:  
Contact telephone number: 
 
 
The following aspects of the study have been explained to me, the participant: 
 
The information will be used for: Treatise research for a Masters Degree.  
 
Aim of the research project:  
 
- Explore why the rebels started the Darfur rebellion and what they want to achieve; 
- Compare and contrast the rebels’ aims, goals, objectives, and aspirations;  
- Explore the causes of the fragmentation among the rebels; 
- Contribute to a better understanding of the Darfur conflict. 
 
Procedures:   
 
- I understand that the investigator will use semi-structured interviews and literary analysis to 
gather information about the rebel groups in Darfur. 
 
Risks: 
 
- Participants revealing information that may harm them 
- The researcher has advised me not to reveal any politically sensitive information that may 
jeopardize my group after the research is made public.  
 
Possible benefits:   
 
- Better understaning of the Darfur conflict among the people and institutions that work in the 
conflict management field.  
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Confidentiality:   
 
My identity will not be revealed in any discussion, description or scientific publications by 
the investigators. 
 
Access to findings:   
 
The participants will receive the final research report in a written form after the entire project 
is completed.  
 
My participation is voluntary and my decision whether or not to participate will in no 
way affect my present or future career/employment/lifestyle.  
 
The information above was explained to me/the participant by Savo Heleta in English 
language and I am in command of this language. I was given the opportunity to ask questions 
and all these questions were answered satisfactorily. 
 
No pressure was exerted on me to consent to participation and I understand that I may 
withdraw at any stage without penalization. Participation in this study will not result in any 
additional cost to myself. 
 
I HEREBY VOLUNTARILY CONSENT TO PARTICIPATE IN THE ABOVE-
MENTIONED PROJECT. 
 
 
